James Barber v. James Ponte
772 F.2d 982 (1985)
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Rule of Law:
The systematic exclusion of a cognizable group from a jury venire violates a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a jury drawn from a fair cross-section of the community, and this violation is not cured by the chance composition of a representative petit jury.
Facts:
- James Barber was a prisoner at the Massachusetts Correctional Institution at Norfolk.
- In September 1980, Barber was charged with unlawful possession of a hypodermic syringe, needles, heroin, and marijuana.
- Norfolk County utilized a "keyman system" for jury selection, where a board of selectmen prepared jury lists based on their knowledge of inhabitants, personal appearances, or questionnaires.
- A report generated for a separate case indicated that for the 25-month period between October 1, 1978, and October 31, 1980, young adults aged 18-34 were underrepresented by 50% in the county's jury selection process.
Procedural Posture:
- James Barber was tried in a Massachusetts state court (Norfolk Superior Court).
- Prior to trial, Barber filed a motion to dismiss the jury venire, alleging systematic exclusion of young people, which the trial court denied.
- A jury convicted Barber on three counts and acquitted him on one count.
- Barber, as appellant, appealed his conviction to the Massachusetts Appeals Court, which affirmed the trial court's judgment.
- Barber sought further appellate review from the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, which was denied.
- Barber filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts.
- The District Court denied the habeas petition.
- Barber, as appellant, appealed the denial to the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit.
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Issue:
Does the systematic exclusion of young adults, defined as persons aged 18 to 34, from a jury venire violate a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury drawn from a fair cross-section of the community?
Opinions:
Majority - Bownes, Circuit Judge
Yes, the systematic exclusion of young adults from a jury venire violates a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a jury drawn from a fair cross-section of the community. To establish a prima facie case for such a violation, a petitioner must satisfy the three-prong test from Duren v. Missouri. First, the court holds that young adults (ages 18-34) are a 'cognizable' or 'distinctive' group, citing societal age-based distinctions and sociological data suggesting different attitudes and experiences. Second, the statistical evidence showing a 50% underrepresentation over a sustained period demonstrates that the group's presence in venires is not 'fair and reasonable' in relation to their numbers in the community. Third, the underrepresentation is due to 'systematic exclusion' because the discretionary 'keyman system' provides an inherent opportunity for non-random selection, which, combined with the large statistical disparity, is sufficient proof without showing intentional discrimination. The court also held that a flawed venire is not cured by a representative petit jury, because the constitutional injury is to the selection process itself, which affects the defendant's right to challenge jurors and undermines the integrity of the justice system. The case is remanded for the petitioner to show that his specific venire was also underrepresented.
Dissenting - Torruella, Circuit Judge
No, the exclusion of young adults does not violate the Sixth Amendment because they are not a 'distinctive' group. The dissent argues that the age range of 18 to 34 is arbitrary and lacks the cohesiveness or commonality of interest required to be considered a cognizable group for Sixth Amendment purposes. Unlike race or sex, there is no basic similarity in attitude, ideas, or experience that runs through such a broad and diverse age group. The dissent criticizes the majority for judicially noticing this group's distinctiveness based on social science literature not present in the record, rather than on factual evidence. It notes that the First Circuit's position on this issue is a 'judicial rarity' and inconsistent with the holdings of almost every other federal circuit court.
Dissenting - Bownes, Circuit Judge
Yes, the exclusion of young adults violates the Sixth Amendment. This dissent forcefully argues that young adults (18-35) constitute a substantial, identifiable group and that the statistical evidence—a discrepancy with a probability of occurring by chance of less than one in one hundred quadrillion—proves systematic exclusion. The dissent criticizes an unseen majority for wrongly requiring proof of active, intentional discrimination, contrary to the Supreme Court's holding in Duren v. Missouri, which allows systematic exclusion to be proven by a sustained, significant statistical disparity coupled with an opportunity to discriminate. It argues that conflating the Sixth Amendment's broad cross-section requirement with the narrower focus of the Equal Protection Clause improperly limits constitutional protections for jury selection.
Analysis:
This decision solidifies the First Circuit's minority position that young adults constitute a cognizable group for Sixth Amendment fair cross-section challenges. It strongly affirms the principle that the constitutional analysis focuses on the integrity of the jury pool (venire) selection process, not the composition of the final petit jury. By finding that a discretionary 'keyman system' combined with a large statistical disparity satisfies the 'systematic exclusion' prong of the Duren test without proof of intent, the case lowers the bar for defendants challenging such systems and places a greater burden on the state to justify the resulting demographic imbalances.
