Jacqueline Lewis v. City of Union City, Georgia
918 F. 3d 1213 (2019)
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Rule of Law:
To establish a prima facie case of intentional discrimination using comparator evidence under the McDonnell Douglas framework, a plaintiff must show that she and her comparators were 'similarly situated in all material respects.' This meaningful comparator analysis must be conducted at the prima facie stage of the litigation.
Facts:
- Jacqueline Lewis, an African-American woman, worked as a detective for the Union City Police Department.
- In 2009, Lewis suffered a heart attack but was subsequently cleared to return to work without any restrictions.
- In 2010, the Police Chief instituted a new policy requiring all officers to carry Tasers, which included a mandatory five-second Taser shock for training.
- Citing her heart condition, Lewis's doctor submitted a note recommending that neither a Taser nor pepper spray be used 'on or near' her.
- The Chief concluded Lewis could not perform her essential duties and placed her on unpaid administrative leave, instructing her to complete FMLA paperwork.
- After Lewis exhausted her accrued paid leave but had not yet completed the FMLA forms, the City terminated her employment for taking an 'unapproved leave of absence.'
- Years later, two white male officers, Sergeant Cliff McClure and Officer Walker Heard, were also deemed unfit for duty after failing physical fitness tests.
- McClure was given 90 days of leave to remedy his issue and successfully returned to work, while Heard was terminated after 449 days on leave.
Procedural Posture:
- Jacqueline Lewis sued Union City and Police Chief Charles Odom in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia, alleging race and gender discrimination.
- The defendants moved for summary judgment.
- The district court (trial court) granted summary judgment in favor of the City, holding that Lewis's proffered comparators were not sufficiently similar.
- Lewis, as appellant, appealed the summary judgment order to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.
- A three-judge panel of the Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court's decision.
- The Eleventh Circuit then granted a petition for rehearing en banc, vacating the panel's opinion to clarify the circuit's standard for comparator evidence.
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Issue:
For the purpose of establishing a prima facie case of intentional discrimination, must a plaintiff show that her proffered comparators are 'similarly situated in all material respects'?
Opinions:
Majority - Newsom, J.
Yes, a plaintiff must demonstrate that she and her proffered comparators were 'similarly situated in all material respects.' The court holds that a meaningful comparator analysis must be conducted at the prima facie stage to create an inference of discrimination. This new standard rejects both the overly strict 'nearly identical' standard and the overly lenient 'same or similar' and 'not useless' standards. The 'similarly situated in all material respects' standard requires a case-by-case analysis of substantive likenesses, considering factors such as whether the individuals engaged in the same basic conduct, were subject to the same policies, had the same supervisor, and shared similar work histories. Applying this standard, Lewis did not meet her burden. Her comparators, McClure and Heard, were not similarly situated because they were placed on leave years after Lewis, under a different physical fitness policy that did not exist at the time of her termination, and for different, potentially remediable conditions (failed fitness tests) rather than a chronic medical condition preventing mandatory training.
Dissenting - Rosenbaum, J.
No, while 'similarly situated in all material respects' is the correct standard, the majority applies it too rigorously at the prima facie stage, effectively collapsing the McDonnell Douglas framework and improperly considering the employer's defenses. The Supreme Court intended the prima facie burden to be minimal and generalized, with a more particularized inquiry reserved for the pretext stage. The majority's approach prevents plaintiffs from challenging an employer's proffered reasons for differential treatment. Here, Lewis, McClure, and Heard were materially similar because all were deemed physically unfit for duty and placed on involuntary leave. The differences cited by the majority are the employer's nondiscriminatory reasons, which Lewis should have the opportunity to prove are pretextual, especially given the stark difference in the length of leave granted (21 days for Lewis versus 90 and 449 for her white male counterparts).
Analysis:
This en banc decision resolves a long-standing conflict within the Eleventh Circuit by establishing 'similarly situated in all material respects' as the definitive standard for comparator evidence. It strikes a middle ground between previously used, inconsistent standards. By requiring a 'meaningful' and substantive comparison at the prima facie stage, the ruling solidifies this initial step as a significant hurdle for plaintiffs. This may make it more challenging for discrimination claims to survive summary judgment, as plaintiffs now bear a heavier burden to produce detailed evidence of similarity early in the litigation process.
