Jacobs v. State
2010 Fla. App. LEXIS 11408, 2010 WL 3034890, 41 So. 3d 1004 (2010)
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Rule of Law:
A vacant house, even one damaged by fire and unoccupied for years, remains a 'dwelling' for the purposes of a burglary conviction as long as its character has not been so substantially changed that it is unsuitable for human lodging. A partially fenced yard with an opening for a driveway can constitute the 'curtilage' of such a dwelling.
Facts:
- A house built in 1912 was used as a family home until it was damaged by a fire in 1996.
- The house has been unoccupied since the 1996 fire.
- The owner has been slowly renovating the house in the years following the fire.
- The property's backyard was bounded by fences on three sides, with an open gap for a driveway.
- The house had a roof, floors, walls, and was equipped with plumbing and electrical utilities, although they were not turned on.
- On July 23, 2008, James Jacobs and another man were removing aluminum siding from the exterior walls of the vacant house.
- A neighbor testified to seeing one of the men 'inside the fences' on the property.
Procedural Posture:
- The State charged James Jacobs with burglary of a dwelling in a Florida trial court.
- During the trial, Jacobs' counsel made motions for a judgment of acquittal, arguing the state failed to prove the structure was a 'dwelling'.
- The trial court denied the motions for judgment of acquittal.
- A jury convicted James Jacobs as charged.
- Jacobs (Appellant) appealed his conviction to the Florida First District Court of Appeal, challenging the trial court's denial of his motions.
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Issue:
Does a vacant, fire-damaged house under slow renovation, located on a partially fenced lot, qualify as a 'dwelling' under the Florida burglary statute, thereby making the removal of siding from its exterior legally sufficient to support a conviction for burglary of a dwelling?
Opinions:
Majority - Clark, J.
Yes, a vacant, fire-damaged house under these circumstances qualifies as a 'dwelling' under the statute. The evidence was legally sufficient to support the conviction. First, the court found there was sufficient evidence to establish the 'curtilage' of the dwelling. Citing precedent, the court reasoned that 'some form of an enclosure' is all that is required, and a continuous fence or a gate is not necessary; the fences on three sides were adequate. Second, the court determined the house retained its status as a 'dwelling.' Relying on Perkins v. State, the court noted that mere vacancy does not change a house's status. The critical question is whether the structure's character has been so 'substantially changed or modified to the extent that it becomes unsuitable for lodging.' Unlike the 'construction site' in Munoz v. State, there was no evidence here that the house was in a state of ruin. Because it retained its roof, walls, and floors, the question of its suitability for lodging was a proper one for the jury to decide.
Analysis:
This decision reinforces the broad legal protection afforded to residential structures under burglary statutes, even when they are unoccupied or in a state of disrepair. The court clarifies the high threshold required to strip a house of its 'dwelling' status, distinguishing between mere vacancy or damage and a substantial transformation into something akin to a construction site. This precedent makes it more difficult for defendants to challenge burglary charges based on the condition of an unoccupied building, emphasizing the structure's design and original purpose over its current state of occupancy or habitability. The ruling provides a clear signal that the law prioritizes the protection of homes, occupied or not.
