Jackson v. Paramount Pictures Corp.
80 Cal. Rptr. 2d 1, 68 Cal. App. 4th 10, 98 Daily Journal DAR 12097 (1998)
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Rule of Law:
To defeat a summary judgment motion in a defamation action, a public figure plaintiff must present clear and convincing evidence that the defendant published the defamatory statement with actual malice, meaning the defendant either knew it was false or entertained serious doubts as to its truth.
Facts:
- In late 1994, journalist Diane Dimond was informed by another journalist, Victor Gutierrez, about the purported existence of an X-rated videotape showing entertainer Michael Jackson engaged in sexual conduct with a minor.
- Gutierrez, who had previously been a reliable source for Dimond on stories about Jackson, claimed to have personally seen the tape.
- In December 1994, both the Los Angeles and Santa Barbara County District Attorneys' Offices received information regarding the alleged videotape and assigned an investigator to look into the matter.
- Dimond contacted Santa Barbara District Attorney Thomas Sneddon, who stated that the investigation into Jackson was 'still open' but declined to comment further on the videotape reports.
- Dimond spoke with another reporter, Kevin Smith, who confirmed that he had been interviewed by a D.A.'s investigator concerning the tape.
- Dimond also learned of an article in the London Sun newspaper reporting that Los Angeles legal officials were in a 'frantic race' to obtain the alleged videotape.
- On January 9, 1995, Dimond appeared on a KABC-AM radio show and stated she was 'as sure as [she could] possibly be' that the tape existed based on her source and reported that the D.A.'s office was actively seeking it.
- Later that day, a segment featuring Dimond aired on the television program 'Hard Copy,' produced by Paramount Pictures, which reported that investigators were 'hot on the trail' of the alleged videotape.
Procedural Posture:
- Michael Jackson filed a lawsuit for slander in a state trial court against Paramount Pictures Corporation, Diane Dimond, and Stephen Doran, among others.
- The defendants (respondents) filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing the broadcast statements were substantially true and were not made with actual malice.
- The trial court granted the motion for summary judgment, finding that Jackson had failed to present clear and convincing evidence of actual malice.
- Judgment was entered in favor of the defendants.
- Michael Jackson (as appellant) appealed the trial court's judgment to the intermediate appellate court.
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Issue:
Does a public figure plaintiff raise a triable issue of fact as to actual malice by presenting evidence that a reporter expressed initial skepticism about a source's story, when the reporter subsequently obtained corroborating information and relied on the source's past reliability?
Opinions:
Majority - Curry, J.
No. A public figure plaintiff fails to establish a triable issue of fact as to actual malice sufficient to defeat summary judgment merely by presenting evidence of a reporter's initial doubts about a story, especially when that reporter subsequently sought and obtained corroborating evidence. To show actual malice under the New York Times v. Sullivan standard, the plaintiff must provide clear and convincing evidence that the defendant published a statement with knowledge of its falsity or with reckless disregard for the truth. Reckless disregard is a subjective standard, requiring proof that the defendant 'in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his publication.' In this case, Dimond’s alleged expression of skepticism to Lisa Marlowe indicated initial doubt, not a settled knowledge of falsity. A healthy skepticism is a normal part of journalism. Crucially, Dimond did not publish in the face of these doubts; instead, she sought corroboration through her conversations with District Attorney Sneddon and reporter Kevin Smith, and from a report in the London Sun. Her ultimate reliance on this corroborating evidence, coupled with her source's past reliability, precludes a finding that she acted with reckless disregard for the truth. Therefore, Jackson's evidence was insufficient to meet the high 'clear and convincing' burden required to survive summary judgment.
Analysis:
This case reinforces the formidable burden of proof public figures face in defamation actions and highlights the judiciary's role in protecting First Amendment freedoms through the procedural mechanism of summary judgment. The court's analysis emphasizes that the 'actual malice' standard is subjective, focusing on the defendant's actual state of mind rather than on an objective, 'reasonable person' standard of journalistic practice. The decision provides a significant shield for media defendants by clarifying that initial skepticism or a failure to conduct a perfect investigation does not constitute actual malice, especially when a reporter takes steps to corroborate information or relies on sources with a track record of reliability. This precedent makes it more difficult for public figure plaintiffs to get past summary judgment, thereby reducing the 'chilling effect' of protracted litigation on the press.
