Jackson v. Denno, Warden
378 U.S. 368 (1964)
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Rule of Law:
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that a criminal defendant receive a separate, reliable hearing conducted by the trial judge outside the presence of the jury to determine the voluntariness of a confession before it can be submitted as evidence to the jury determining guilt or innocence.
Facts:
- On June 14, 1960, Nathan Jackson robbed a hotel clerk at gunpoint in Brooklyn.
- Shortly after leaving the hotel, Jackson got into a struggle with a police officer, during which the officer was fatally shot and Jackson was shot twice in the body.
- Jackson was taken to a hospital, where he had lost about 500 cc. of blood from wounds to his liver and lung.
- At approximately 2 a.m., Jackson made an initial confession to a detective.
- At 3:55 a.m., after being administered the drugs demerol and scopolamine, Jackson was interrogated again by an Assistant District Attorney and gave a more detailed confession.
- Jackson later testified that during the second interrogation, he was in severe pain, gasping for breath, was refused water, and was told he would not be left alone until he gave the answers the police wanted.
- State witnesses testified that Jackson was in 'strong' condition and was denied water only because of an impending operation, not as a form of coercion.
Procedural Posture:
- Nathan Jackson was tried for murder in a New York state trial court.
- Following the New York procedure, the trial judge submitted the question of the voluntariness of Jackson's confession to the same jury deciding his guilt or innocence.
- The jury returned a general verdict of guilty of murder in the first degree, and Jackson was sentenced to death.
- The New York Court of Appeals, the state's highest court, affirmed the conviction.
- The United States Supreme Court denied Jackson's petition for a writ of certiorari on direct appeal.
- Jackson then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, challenging the constitutionality of the New York procedure.
- The District Court denied the petition.
- The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the District Court's denial.
- The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the Court of Appeals' decision.
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Issue:
Does the New York procedure, which allows the same jury that determines a defendant's guilt or innocence to also decide the voluntariness of a confession with a general verdict, violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?
Opinions:
Majority - Mr. Justice White
Yes, the New York procedure violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because it does not afford a reliable determination of the voluntariness of a confession. A defendant has a constitutional right to have a fair hearing and a reliable determination on the issue of voluntariness, uninfluenced by the truth or falsity of the confession. The New York procedure is flawed for two primary reasons. First, there is a serious danger that the jury, when presented with evidence of the confession's truthfulness, will let that knowledge 'infect' its determination of voluntariness, leading it to find a 'true' confession voluntary to ensure a conviction. Second, if the jury finds the confession involuntary, it is unrealistic to expect it to be able to completely disregard the confession, which has already been 'solidly implanted in the jury's mind,' when deliberating on guilt or innocence. Because the jury returns only a general verdict, it is impossible for a reviewing court to know whether the jury found the confession voluntary or involuntary, making meaningful review impossible. Therefore, the issue of voluntariness must be resolved by the judge in a separate proceeding before the confession is ever submitted to the jury trying guilt or innocence.
Dissenting - Mr. Justice Harlan
No, the New York procedure does not violate the Due Process Clause. States should be free to allocate trial issues between judge and jury as they see fit. The majority's holding shows an unwarranted distrust of the jury's ability to follow instructions, a position contrary to the Court's own precedents like Leland v. Oregon, which trusted juries with far more complex instructions. The Court's approval of the 'Massachusetts rule'—where the judge makes a preliminary finding of voluntariness and then the jury considers it again—reveals the hollowness of the holding, as the practical difference between the two procedures is minimal. By invalidating a long-standing state practice explicitly approved just years earlier in Stein v. New York, the Court is unwisely federalizing state criminal procedure.
Dissenting - Mr. Justice Clark
No, the New York procedure should be upheld, and in any event, the constitutional issue was not properly raised at trial. Jackson's counsel challenged the 'weight' of the confession, not its 'admissibility,' so the procedure was never properly invoked. The trial judge's instructions were clear and properly distinguished between the truth of the confession and its voluntariness. The Court's decision unjustifiably 'downgrades trial by jury' and undermines a cornerstone of the American criminal justice system.
Concurring-in-part-and-dissenting-in-part - Mr. Justice Black
No, as to the procedure, but yes, as to the result. The New York procedure is constitutional, and Stein v. New York was correctly decided; trial by jury is a bedrock safeguard, and juries can be trusted to decide factual issues like voluntariness. However, based on the undisputed facts in the record—Jackson's serious injuries, blood loss, the administration of drugs, and denial of water—his confession was 'inherently coercive' and thus inadmissible as a matter of law under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Therefore, the conviction should be reversed, but Jackson is entitled to a complete new trial, not the 'piecemeal prosecution' remedy of a separate hearing on voluntariness that the majority orders.
Analysis:
This decision fundamentally changed American criminal procedure by establishing a defendant's constitutional right to an independent judicial determination of a confession's voluntariness before it is heard by the jury. By overruling Stein v. New York (1953), the Court invalidated the 'New York rule,' which was used in numerous states, and mandated either the 'orthodox' or 'Massachusetts' rule for handling challenged confessions. The ruling created a crucial procedural safeguard, ensuring that the issue of coercion is decided separately from the issue of the confession's truthfulness. This separation prevents the jury's verdict on guilt from being tainted by an involuntary confession that it cannot realistically be expected to disregard, thereby strengthening the protections of the Due Process Clause.
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