Jackson v. City of Chicago
552 F.3d 619, 105 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 257, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 411 (2009)
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Rule of Law:
An employee cannot use the present-day adverse effects of past, time-barred discriminatory acts to support a timely discrimination claim for a subsequent, discrete adverse employment action. Each discrete discriminatory act, such as a failure to provide training, starts a new clock for filing charges, and claims not filed within the statutory period are not actionable.
Facts:
- George Jackson, an African-American man, began working for the City of Chicago in 1987 as a carpenter and became a foreman of carpenters in 2003.
- In 2004, Jackson applied for two promotions to 'general foreman of general trades'.
- For the first position, another applicant, Michael Blake, had experience estimating materials, which Jackson acknowledged he lacked, and Blake scored 4.75 on a written test while Jackson scored 2.25; Blake was promoted.
- For the second position, candidates were required to complete a written work sample as part of the selection process.
- The City asserts that all candidates except Jackson completed the sample, while Jackson denies being asked to complete one.
- Another candidate, Kevin O’Gorman, received the highest combined score on the work sample and interview and was promoted to the second position.
- Jackson contended he was less qualified than Blake and O'Gorman because he had previously been denied 'acting up' opportunities, which are temporary assignments to higher positions for training and experience.
- The alleged denials of these 'acting up' opportunities occurred outside the 300-day statutory period for filing an EEOC discrimination charge.
Procedural Posture:
- George Jackson filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court against the City of Chicago, alleging race discrimination under Title VII in relation to two promotion denials.
- The City of Chicago filed a motion for summary judgment.
- The district court (the trial court) granted summary judgment in favor of the City of Chicago.
- Jackson (as appellant) appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, with the City of Chicago as the appellee.
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Issue:
Does a Title VII failure-to-promote claim fail when the employee's argument that he was qualified for the position relies on proving that prior, time-barred discriminatory acts (denial of training opportunities) were the cause of his inferior qualifications?
Opinions:
Majority - Evans, Circuit Judge
Yes. A failure-to-promote claim fails when it relies on proving past, time-barred discriminatory acts. Following Supreme Court precedent in cases like Ledbetter and Morgan, the court held that each discriminatory action is a 'discrete act' that must be challenged within the statutory limitations period, which is 300 days in this case. The City's decisions to deny Jackson 'acting up' opportunities were discrete acts that occurred outside this period and were therefore time-barred. The subsequent, timely failure-to-promote decisions were evaluated based on the candidates' qualifications at that time, and Blake and O'Gorman were demonstrably more qualified based on objective criteria like test scores and work samples. A present, nondiscriminatory act does not become a new violation simply because it has adverse effects resulting from past, unchallenged discrimination.
Analysis:
This decision reinforces the strict application of Title VII's statute of limitations for discrete employment acts, as established by the Supreme Court in Ledbetter v. Goodyear. It solidifies the principle that employees cannot revive time-barred claims by connecting them to the consequences of a later, timely adverse employment action. This places a significant burden on employees to promptly identify and file charges for each discrete discriminatory act, such as the denial of training or a negative performance review, rather than waiting until those acts contribute to a more significant outcome like a failure to promote. The ruling limits the ability to use past acts as 'background evidence' where doing so would require a 'mini-trial' into the time-barred events.
