Earl Lloyd Jackson v. Jill Brown
513 F.3d 1057 (2008)
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Rule of Law:
The prosecution's due process obligation to disclose favorable impeachment evidence (Brady) and to correct perjured testimony (Napue) extends to promises of assistance made to witnesses by police investigators, even if the prosecutor is not personally aware of them.
Facts:
- In 1977, elderly neighbors Vernita Curtis and Gladys Ott were beaten to death during burglaries of their apartments in Long Beach, California.
- Earl Jackson's fingerprints were found in Ott's apartment, and upon turning himself in, he confessed to participating in the burglaries with accomplices but minimized his role in the murders.
- At trial, two of Jackson's fellow inmates, Ronald McFarland and Mark Mikles, testified that Jackson had confessed to them in detail about personally and brutally beating and sexually assaulting Ott.
- McFarland testified that prosecutor Paul Marin had not promised him anything for his testimony.
- Mikles testified that no one in law enforcement had promised him anything for his testimony besides 'protection.'
- In reality, Marin had promised to write a letter to help McFarland serve his sentence in Arizona.
- Additionally, police officers had promised Mikles they would use their 'best efforts' to help him get his current and pending sentences reduced or eliminated in exchange for his cooperation.
Procedural Posture:
- Earl Jackson was convicted in a California state trial court of two counts of first-degree murder and burglary.
- The jury found two special circumstances rendering him death-eligible and returned a verdict of death.
- On direct appeal, the California Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and sentence.
- Jackson filed a second state habeas petition alleging prosecutorial misconduct regarding the jailhouse informants.
- The California Supreme Court appointed a referee who found that the prosecution had failed to disclose inducements and correct false testimony.
- The California Supreme Court adopted the referee's findings of error but concluded they were not prejudicial and denied the petition.
- Jackson filed a federal habeas petition in the U.S. District Court.
- The District Court denied relief as to the underlying convictions but granted conditional relief as to the special circumstances findings and the death sentence.
- The State (Warden Brown) appealed the district court's grant of relief regarding the special circumstances findings to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, and Jackson cross-appealed the denial of relief on his convictions.
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Issue:
Does the prosecution violate a defendant's due process rights by failing to disclose promises of assistance made to jailhouse informants by police and by failing to correct the informants' false testimony denying such promises, when this testimony is material to a jury's special circumstances finding?
Opinions:
Majority - Wardlaw, Circuit Judge
Yes. The prosecution violates a defendant's due process rights by failing to disclose material impeachment evidence and failing to correct known false testimony, and this duty extends to information possessed by the entire prosecution team, including police. The court found that the prosecution committed four distinct constitutional errors under Brady v. Maryland and Napue v. Illinois: (1) failing to disclose the promise made to McFarland; (2) failing to correct McFarland's perjured testimony denying any promises; (3) failing to disclose promises made to Mikles by police; and (4) failing to correct Mikles's perjured testimony about those promises. The court rejected the State's argument that holding the prosecutor responsible for police promises was a 'new rule' barred by Teague v. Lane, finding that precedent like Giglio v. United States (1972) had already established that the prosecutor's office is a single entity responsible for all information held by the government's agents. These errors were material to the jury's special circumstances findings, which required a finding of 'intent to cause death,' because the informants' testimony was the only evidence that Jackson admitted to personally committing the acts causing death. The false testimony bolstered their credibility, and the undisclosed truth would have destroyed it, thereby undermining confidence in the verdict on the special circumstances.
Analysis:
This decision reaffirms the broad scope of the prosecution's disclosure duties under Brady and Napue, solidifying that the 'prosecution team' includes police investigators. It establishes that a prosecutor cannot claim ignorance of deals made by police to secure witness testimony; the duty is proactive. This precedent significantly impacts cases relying on jailhouse informants by compelling full disclosure of any benefits offered, thereby giving the defense powerful impeachment material. The ruling also illustrates how constitutional errors can be immaterial to a general conviction but material to specific sentencing findings, like the 'intent' required for a death sentence.
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