J. W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States
276 U.S. 394, 1928 U.S. LEXIS 284, 48 S. Ct. 348 (1928)
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Rule of Law:
Congress may delegate authority to an executive agency or official as long as it provides an 'intelligible principle' to guide the delegee in exercising that authority. Such a delegation is not a forbidden transfer of legislative power but rather a permissible grant of authority to execute the law.
Facts:
- J. W. Hampton, Jr., & Company imported a shipment of barium dioxide into New York.
- The Tariff Act of 1922 set a statutory duty of four cents per pound on barium dioxide.
- Section 315 of the Act, known as the 'flexible tariff provision,' authorized the President to increase or decrease duties by up to 50% to equalize the costs of production between the U.S. and the principal competing foreign country.
- Following an investigation by the United States Tariff Commission, President Calvin Coolidge found that the production costs for barium dioxide were higher in the U.S. than in Germany.
- President Coolidge issued a proclamation increasing the duty on barium dioxide from four cents to six cents per pound.
- A customs collector assessed J. W. Hampton, Jr., & Company's importation at the new, higher rate of six cents per pound.
Procedural Posture:
- J. W. Hampton, Jr., & Company protested the customs assessment and appealed to the United States Customs Court (a trial-level court).
- A majority of the United States Customs Court held that the Tariff Act was constitutional.
- Hampton, the appellant, then appealed the decision to the United States Court of Customs Appeals (an intermediate appellate court).
- The Court of Customs Appeals affirmed the judgment of the Customs Court.
- The Supreme Court granted Hampton's petition for a writ of certiorari to review the case.
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Issue:
Does Section 315 of the Tariff Act of 1922, which grants the President the authority to modify customs duties based on the difference in production costs between the United States and competing nations, represent an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power from Congress to the executive branch?
Opinions:
Majority - Chief Justice Taft
No. Section 315 of the Tariff Act of 1922 is not an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power. The Court reasoned that Congress did not give away its legislative power but merely authorized the President to execute its will under a defined standard. The key is that Congress laid down an 'intelligible principle'—equalizing the difference in production costs—to which the President was directed to conform. The President's role was not to make the law, but to act as an agent of Congress, finding the facts (the cost differences) that would trigger the application of the law's expressed will. The Court analogized this to its approval of Congress delegating rate-setting authority to the Interstate Commerce Commission, stating the same principle applies to fixing customs duties. The Court also dismissed the argument that tariffs can only be for revenue, pointing to the long historical practice of using tariffs for the 'encouragement and protection of manufactures' since the nation's first revenue act in 1789.
Analysis:
This landmark case established the 'intelligible principle' test, which remains the primary standard for evaluating the constitutionality of congressional delegations of authority. By setting a low bar for what constitutes a sufficient guiding principle, the decision validated the growing power of the modern administrative state. It grants Congress significant leeway to delegate complex and technical rulemaking functions to executive agencies, as long as the enabling statute provides some discernible standard to guide the agency's discretion. Consequently, this ruling has been foundational in upholding the vast regulatory authority exercised by federal agencies today.
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