J. Michael Teets, Comm. v. Wendy J. Miller
2016 W. Va. LEXIS 435, 788 S.E.2d 1, 237 W. Va. 473 (2016)
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Rule of Law:
When a county commission's actions are undertaken in connection with the provision of emergency ambulance service under the Emergency Ambulance Service Act of 1975 (EASA), those actions are exempt from the general notice and open meeting requirements of the Open Governmental Proceedings Act and W. Va. Code § 7-1-2 due to EASA being a more specific statute that expressly supersedes other procedural requirements.
Facts:
- In the fall of 2011, Mathias-Baker Rescue Squad, one of three main emergency ambulance service providers in Hardy County, began experiencing financial difficulties and received $300,000 in funding from the Hardy County Commission to remain solvent.
- In October 2012, Mathias-Baker Rescue Squad suddenly closed, and while volunteers initially provided emergency ambulance services, these services ceased in May 2013.
- On November 20, 2012, the Hardy County Commission voted to hire a county medic and create the Hardy County Emergency Ambulance Authority to address the lack of ambulance service.
- Between March and August 2013, the Commission discussed and voted on imposing a Special Emergency Ambulance Service Fee and purchasing the Baker building, which was formerly owned by the defunct Mathias-Baker Rescue Squad and foreclosed by Capon Valley Bank.
- Throughout this period, the Commission's 'Standard Agenda' and 'Appointments Sheet' did not consistently provide advance public notice that the Ambulance Fee or the Baker building purchase would be discussed or voted upon, and the 'Appointments Sheet' was subject to additions up to the time of meetings.
- On July 16, 2013, the Commission initially rejected both the imposition of the Ambulance Fee and the purchase of the Baker building after public hearings received opposition.
- On August 2, 2013, Commissioners Teets and Keplinger voted to approve the Ambulance Fee and purchase the Baker building, with Commissioner Wade voting against, and the purchase transaction closed on August 6, 2013.
- The Baker building was specifically designed to house an ambulance service, including space for vehicles, sleeping quarters, and climate control for medications, and was centrally located for emergency responses.
Procedural Posture:
- On November 4, 2013, the Hardy County Citizens filed a two-part petition in the Circuit Court of Hardy County against Commissioners Teets and Keplinger and the Hardy County Commission.
- The petition sought the removal of Commissioners Teets and Keplinger and, in a separate part, sought to invalidate the Ambulance Fee ordinance and the purchase of the Baker building.
- The circuit court bifurcated the case, and a three-judge panel heard the removal action, ultimately finding no misconduct warranting removal of the Commissioners.
- The Circuit Court of Hardy County then heard the portion of the case seeking nullification of the Ambulance Fee and the purchase of the Baker building.
- By Final Order entered August 8, 2014, the circuit court ruled that the Commission's actions implementing the Ambulance Fee and purchasing the Baker building were void and ordered a refund of collected fees.
- By subsequent order entered August 29, 2014, the circuit court temporarily enjoined the Commission from taking any votes or considering the Ambulance Fee ordinance or Baker building purchase, pending a hearing on the Hardy County Citizens’ motion to enforce the final order and for injunctive relief.
- By Final Order entered October 10, 2014, the circuit court granted the Hardy County Citizens’ motion for attorney’s fees, awarding $112,000.00 plus interest; denied the Commissioners’ motion to join the sellers of the Baker building as indispensable parties; granted the Hardy County Citizens’ motion for injunctive relief, prohibiting the Ambulance Fee unless service was not otherwise available; and entered joint and several judgment against Commissioners Teets and Keplinger for $1,130,000.00.
- A notice of appeal was filed by Steptoe & Johnson, LLC, on behalf of the Commission and Commissioners Teets and Keplinger.
- The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia then remanded the case to the circuit court to resolve a conflict of interest issue regarding Steptoe & Johnson's representation.
- By order entered February 19, 2015, the circuit court found a conflict of interest, disqualified Steptoe & Johnson, and ordered the firm to refund $26,528.80 in attorney’s fees.
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Issue:
Does the Emergency Ambulance Service Act of 1975, which states that no procedures or notices are required unless prescribed by that Act, exempt a county commission from the general open meeting and notice requirements of the Open Governmental Proceedings Act and W. Va. Code § 7-1-2 when making decisions related to emergency ambulance services, such as imposing a service fee or purchasing a building?
Opinions:
Majority - Ketchum, Chief Justice
Yes, the Emergency Ambulance Service Act of 1975 (EASA) exempts the Hardy County Commission from the general notice and open meeting requirements when making decisions connected to providing emergency ambulance services. The Court found that W. Va. Code § 7-15-18 of EASA acts as 'full and complete authority' for providing emergency ambulance service and explicitly states that 'no procedure or proceedings, notices, consents or approvals shall be required in connection therewith except as may be prescribed by this article.' The imposition of the Ambulance Fee and the purchase of the Baker building bore a 'logical relationship' to the Commission’s duty to provide emergency ambulance service and were therefore 'in connection with' the Act. The Court applied the principle that a specific statute (EASA, which deals with ambulance services) takes precedence over a more general statute (Open Government Proceedings Act and W. Va. Code § 7-1-2, which deal with general governmental proceedings) when the two cannot be reconciled. Furthermore, the Open Government Proceedings Act itself allows for exceptions 'as expressly and specifically otherwise provided by law,' and EASA's explicit language creates such an exception. The Commission was exercising discretionary authority under W. Va. Code § 7-15-17 to impose a fee, not merely fulfilling a mandatory duty under W. Va. Code § 7-15-4.
Concurring-in-part-and-dissenting-in-part - Benjamin, Justice
No, the Open Government Proceedings Act's requirements for public notice should apply to the Commission's actions. Justice Benjamin concurred in part and dissented in part, arguing that the Legislature intended exceptions to the Open Government Proceedings Act to be 'few' and 'clear,' which the 'no notices' clause in EASA is not. He pointed to similar language in the Public Service District (PSD) statute (W. Va. Code § 16-13A-21), noting that despite this clause, the PSD statute still requires specific public notice for the creation of public service districts. Therefore, he reasoned, the 'no notices' clause in EASA was intended to remove external impediments to the execution of the statutory mission, not to obscure the governmental processes leading to its creation or funding. For decisions like creating or funding an ambulance service, the Open Government Proceedings Act should be considered the more specific and applicable statute, ensuring public transparency.
Concurring-in-part-and-dissenting-in-part - Loughry, Justice
No, the Commission's actions concerning the Baker building purchase and the ambulance fee are not exempt from the Open Government Proceedings Act. Justice Loughry concurred in part and dissented in part, stating that the Commission's actions 'reek of “back-door” politics' and offend the objectives of the Open Government Proceedings Act, which promotes transparency and public trust. He argued that EASA does not contain the 'expressly and specifically' required language to create an exemption from the Open Government Proceedings Act, especially since both acts were passed in the same legislative session. He suggested that the 'exemption' from notice was likely intended for ministerial, day-to-day functions of the emergency ambulance authority, not its creation or funding. Furthermore, he noted that the Commission's duty to provide ambulance services under EASA (W. Va. Code § 7-15-4) is conditioned on service not being 'otherwise available' and funds being budgeted, which were disputed facts, undermining the basis for EASA's authority in this instance. He agreed with the majority that the personal liability and disgorgement of attorney's fees should be reversed, but strongly disagreed with the finding of an exemption.
Analysis:
This case significantly clarifies the interaction between general open government laws and specific statutes granting authority to public bodies. The majority's interpretation of W. Va. Code § 7-15-18 as a specific override to general notice requirements provides a powerful exemption for county commissions operating under EASA, potentially allowing such bodies to make critical financial and operational decisions without the public transparency mandated by the Open Government Proceedings Act. Future cases will likely examine the precise scope of 'in connection with' and 'expressly and specifically otherwise provided by law' to determine if other specialized statutes can similarly circumvent open meeting laws. The dissenters' strong emphasis on legislative intent for transparency and narrow construction of exceptions highlights a persistent tension in statutory interpretation, especially concerning governmental accountability.
