J.J. v. M.F.
2014 WL 470061, 167 Cal. Rptr. 3d 670, 223 Cal.App.4th 968 (2014)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
Under the Domestic Violence Prevention Act (DVPA), a mutual restraining order cannot be issued unless the court makes detailed findings of fact indicating that both parties acted primarily as aggressors and that neither party acted primarily in self-defense, supported by substantial evidence.
Facts:
- J.J. and M.F. began dating in December 2007 and cohabiting in April 2009, eventually having a son together.
- During their relationship, M.F. physically abused J.J. multiple times, including pushing her while she was seven months pregnant, pushing her out of a car, repeatedly choking her, and in June 2010, slapping and kicking her and throwing her against a glass door, causing injury.
- Around September 2011, M.F. repeatedly came to J.J.'s apartment demanding their son and sent her numerous threatening text messages, including threats of physical harm and taking their son to avoid child support.
- In October 2012, after a dispute over their son's warm jacket, M.F. approached J.J. at her grandparents' house, blocked her car, yelled at her, tried to take their son from her arms, grabbed her by the neck, and choked her, while M.F.'s wife simultaneously punched J.J. in the face and hit her with a shoe.
- During the October 2012 incident, J.J. pushed M.F. away from her and their son.
- J.J. had made several phone calls to M.F. and his mother about returning their sick son's only warm jacket, as the weather was cold.
Procedural Posture:
- In September 2011, J.J. applied for a domestic violence restraining order against M.F. in the trial court (court of first instance).
- The trial court entered a temporary restraining order and, after a hearing, issued a three-year restraining order against M.F. on September 28, 2011.
- In January 2012, M.F. filed a motion to set aside the restraining order, claiming lack of notice.
- J.J. did not appear at the hearing, and the trial court granted M.F.'s motion to set aside the restraining order.
- In September 2012, J.J. applied ex parte to vacate the order setting aside the restraining order, claiming she never received notice of M.F.'s motion. The trial court did not grant ex parte relief but set the matter for a hearing in October 2012.
- J.J. then filed a second ex parte application for a restraining order against M.F. due to a recent incident.
- On November 6, 2012, M.F. filed a response to J.J.'s second application, but did not request a restraining order against J.J.
- The trial court heard testimony from J.J., M.F., and J.J.'s grandmother over two mornings.
- The trial court issued a three-year mutual restraining order against both J.J. and M.F., finding that both parties acted with aggression.
- J.J. filed a timely notice of appeal to the California Court of Appeal, challenging the portion of the order against her.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Did the trial court abuse its discretion by issuing a mutual restraining order against J.J. when there was not substantial evidence to support a finding that she acted primarily as an aggressor and not primarily in self-defense, as required by Family Code section 6305?
Opinions:
Majority - Flier, J.
Yes, the trial court erred in issuing a mutual restraining order against J.J. because substantial evidence did not support a finding that she acted primarily as an aggressor and not primarily in self-defense. The court emphasized that California Family Code section 6305 sets strict requirements for mutual restraining orders, mandating detailed findings that both parties acted primarily as aggressors and neither acted primarily in self-defense. The trial court's findings that J.J. was primarily an aggressor based on pushing M.F. and making 'harassing' phone calls were not supported by substantial evidence. J.J.'s single act of pushing M.F. away during the October 2012 incident was deemed consistent with acting primarily in self-defense, particularly given M.F.'s documented history of abuse against her (including pushing her while pregnant, pushing her through a glass door, and choking her) and his aggressive behavior at the time. The court noted that Civil Code section 50 permits necessary force to protect oneself or a child. Furthermore, J.J.'s phone calls regarding her sick son's only warm jacket were made in good faith due to a legitimate parental concern for her child's health, and therefore did not constitute the type of harassment enjoinable under the DVPA as defined by Penal Code section 653m. The court also observed that M.F. never claimed to be threatened by J.J. or requested a restraining order against her. Consequently, the statutory requisites for a mutual restraining order against J.J. were not met.
Analysis:
This case significantly clarifies the stringent requirements for issuing mutual domestic violence restraining orders under the DVPA, particularly Family Code § 6305. It establishes that a court must find, with substantial evidence, that both parties were primarily aggressors and not primarily acting in self-defense. The ruling reinforces that a victim's single act of physical defense, especially in the context of a prior abusive relationship, does not automatically qualify them as a 'primary aggressor.' Moreover, it delineates that good-faith communications regarding a child's welfare are not 'harassment' under the DVPA, preventing the weaponization of such orders against victims. This decision protects victims from being unfairly branded as abusers and ensures that the DVPA is applied to genuinely prevent domestic violence, rather than neutralizing legitimate claims.
