Yes, it is illegal. The Constitution guarantees 'equal protection,' which means the government can't treat people unfairly based on certain characteristics. The Court had already banned striking jurors based on race, and it said the same logic applies to gender. Relying on old-fashioned stereotypes like 'men will favor the man' or 'women will favor the woman' is exactly the kind of prejudice the law forbids. This kind of discrimination is unfair to the person on trial, the jurors who get kicked off, and the public.

Yes, it's illegal, but I'm worried about the consequences. This decision makes jury selection more complicated and less based on a lawyer's gut feelings. Sometimes, a person's gender really does affect their life experience and how they might see a case. I also think this rule should only stop the government from doing this, not regular people in lawsuits or those accused of a crime.

Yes, it's illegal because the Constitution protects each person as an individual. Kicking someone off a jury because of their gender is an insult to them personally. Jurors are not supposed to be team representatives for their gender; they are supposed to be impartial citizens.

No, this goes too far. The Court's rules for race are stricter than its rules for gender for good reason. Real differences exist between men and women, and it's not an insult to think those differences might affect their views. Allowing lawyers to consider gender helps them pick a fair jury and is not as harmful as racial discrimination.

No, this is wrong. The Court is just being politically correct. In this very case, both sides were striking jurors of the opposite sex. The system balanced itself out. The whole point of a peremptory strike is that you don't have to give a reason. This decision ruins a very old and important part of our justice system.

Yes, it's against the rules. The government can't remove jurors just for being men or women because it's not fair and supports wrong ideas about men and women. This rule also applies to race. Removing jurors based on gender hurts everyone involved - the people in the case, the community, and the removed jurors. It's wrong to assume a juror will be biased just because they are a man or a woman.

Agrees with the main decision but is worried about how this will make picking juries more complicated and might mess with the way lawyers can challenge jurors without giving a reason. O'Connor thinks gender might sometimes matter in how a juror sees a case, but agrees the government didn't prove that gender alone can predict a juror's views. She wants the rule to only stop the government from removing jurors based on gender.

Agrees with the result and says it's important because the Constitution protects each juror's right to a fair jury selection process. A juror's gender, like their race, can't be used to guess if they will be biased. Kennedy says a juror is an individual, not just part of a gender or racial group.

Disagrees, saying gender discrimination is different from racial discrimination, so the rule from the Batson case about race shouldn't be used for gender. Rehnquist says the government has an interest in removing jurors based on sex to make sure the jury is fair.

Disagrees and thinks the majority's reasons are wrong to extend the Batson rule to gender. Scalia says focusing on single challenges ignores the big picture that lets both sides remove jurors they think won't like their case. He argues there's no unfairness if both sides can remove jurors based on gender. Scalia is worried about how this will affect the whole jury system.

The Equal Protection Clause prohibits the use of peremptory challenges based solely on race or gender.

The Equal Protection Clause prohibits the prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges to exclude jurors on the basis of race or gender.

"[P] otential jurors, as well as litigants, have an equal protection right to jury selection procedures that are free from state-sponsored group stereotypes rooted in, and reflective of, historical prejudice."

—the United States Supreme Court extended Batson to prohibit discrimination in jury selection based on gender.

—ex rel. TB, stating "discrimination in jury selection on the basis of gender violates the Equal Protection Clause."

—declaring that peremptory challenges based on "gender, like race, is an unconstitutional proxy for juror competence and impartiality

—reversing a judgment in a state paternity case, in which the exercise of peremptory challenges had eliminated all the men in the jury pool, Justice Harry Blackmun, writing for the court, quoted: "Restricting jury service to only special groups or excluding identifiable segments playing majority roles in the community cannot be squared with the constitutional concept of jury …

Yet litigants can assert potential jurors' rights against race or sex discrimination in jury selection even when the litigants have never met potential jurors and do not share their race or sex.

That " `long and unfortunate history'"had provided the contextual underpinning for the heightened scrutiny applied to gender-based classifications.

Even when the Supreme Court has extended Batson, it has done so only when the classification at issue had already been subjected to heightened scrutiny.

Yes. Intentional discrimination on the basis of gender by state actors violates the Equal Protection Clause. The Court extended the reasoning of Batson v. Kentucky, which prohibits race-based peremptory challenges, to challenges based on gender. The Court reasoned that gender-based classifications are subject to heightened scrutiny and require an 'exceedingly persuasive justification,' which the state failed to provide. The state's proffered reason—that men might be more sympathetic to the male defendant in a paternity case—relies on the very type of archaic and overbroad stereotypes the Equal Protection Clause is meant to condemn. Such discrimination harms the litigants, the excluded jurors, and the community's confidence in the judicial system.

Yes. Justice O'Connor agreed that the Equal Protection Clause prohibits the government's use of gender-based peremptory challenges, as the state's justifications were not exceedingly persuasive. However, she wrote separately to express concern over the costs of this decision, arguing that it further erodes the traditional, intuitive nature of the peremptory challenge and will increase the complexity of jury selection. She argued that the holding should be limited to government actors and not be extended to criminal defendants or private civil litigants, cautioning against ignoring the factual reality that gender can sometimes be relevant to a juror's perspective.

Yes. The Equal Protection Clause protects the rights of individuals, not groups, and guarantees that the government must treat citizens as individuals. Denying a person jury service because of their sex is an injury to that individual's personal dignity and right to participate in the political process. Justice Kennedy emphasized that jurors sit as individual citizens, not as representatives of a gender or racial group, and must decide cases based on the law and facts, not personal bias.

No. The principle of Batson should not be extended to gender because there are sufficient differences between race and gender discrimination. Under equal protection jurisprudence, race receives strict scrutiny while gender receives a less-searching intermediate scrutiny. He argued that the biological and experiential differences between men and women may produce different outlooks, making gender a valid consideration for a peremptory challenge in the pursuit of an impartial jury. Therefore, the state has a legitimate interest that is substantially furthered by allowing gender-based strikes.

No. The majority opinion is an irrelevant display of political correctness that ignores the reality of the case, which involved strikes against men. He argued that the peremptory challenge system, when viewed as a whole, is evenhanded because both sides can strike any group. Focusing on individual strikes is unrealistic and destroys the 'arbitrary and capricious' nature of the peremptory challenge, which is its essential feature. This decision, he contended, invalidates a centuries-old tradition, will burden the justice system with extensive litigation, and is not required by the Constitution.

Yes. The Equal Protection Clause prohibits the use of peremptory challenges to exclude jurors on the basis of gender because it serves to ratify and perpetuate invidious, archaic, and overbroad stereotypes about the relative abilities of men and women. This prohibition extends to both race and gender discrimination in jury selection. Gender, like race, is an unconstitutional proxy for juror competence and impartiality. Respondent's rationale for gender-based strikes echoes the same stereotypes that justified the wholesale exclusion of women from juries and the ballot box for most of our country's history. Discrimination in jury selection, whether based on race or gender, causes harm to the litigants, the community, and the individual jurors who are wrongfully excluded from participation in the judicial process. The Equal Protection Clause forbids intentional discrimination on the basis of gender, just as it prohibits discrimination on the basis of race.

Concurs with the majority that the Equal Protection Clause prohibits the government from excluding a person from jury service on account of gender, but expresses concern about the impact of the decision on the jury selection process and the peremptory challenge system. O'Connor notes that gender-based challenges may sometimes be rational, as gender may be relevant to a juror's view of a case, but agrees that the State has not shown that gender alone is an accurate predictor of jurors' attitudes. She would limit the Court's holding to prohibit only the government's use of gender-based peremptory challenges.

Concurs in the judgment, agreeing that the Equal Protection Clause prohibits gender discrimination in the exercise of peremptory challenges. Kennedy emphasizes that individual jurors have a right to nondiscriminatory jury selection procedures, and that a juror's sex, like race, cannot be used as a proxy for bias. He stresses that a juror sits as an individual citizen, not as a representative of a racial or sexual group.

Dissents, arguing that there are sufficient differences between race and gender discrimination such that the principle of Batson should not be extended to peremptory challenges based on sex. Rehnquist notes that racial groups are subject to strict scrutiny, while gender-based classifications receive a lower level of scrutiny. He contends that the State has an interest in using peremptory strikes based on sex to secure a fair and impartial jury.

Dissents, criticizing the majority's reasoning and the extension of Batson to gender. Scalia argues that the Court's focus on individual exercises of the peremptory challenge ignores the totality of the practice, which allows both sides to strike jurors they believe would be less sympathetic to their case. He contends that as long as both sides can strike jurors based on gender, there is no equal protection violation. Scalia expresses concern for the implications of the decision on the peremptory challenge system and the justice system as a whole.

J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B.

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