Yes. A kid's age definitely matters. It's just common sense that kids feel more pressure from police and are more likely to feel scared and trapped than adults. A 13-year-old pulled out of class into a room with four authority figures isn't going to feel like they can just get up and leave. The rule for deciding if someone is 'in custody' has to be realistic. Ignoring that J.D.B. was a kid would be unfair and doesn't make sense. As long as the police knew or could clearly see he was a kid, his age should be part of the decision.

No. Age shouldn't be part of the test. The whole point of the Miranda rule is to have a simple, clear, one-size-fits-all rule for police to follow easily. If we start making exceptions for age, what's next? Do police have to guess how smart someone is, or if they're shy? This makes things messy and confusing for police who need to make quick decisions. The old, simpler rule was better because everyone knew where the line was.

Yes, a child's age matters in deciding if they're "in custody" when questioned by police, as long as the police knew or should have known the child's age. This is because a reasonable child might feel pressured to stay and answer questions when a reasonable adult would feel free to leave. The law has always recognized children aren't adults, and police can't ignore that obvious fact. The Court said a child's age is more than just a number - it can change how a reasonable person sees their freedom to walk away. But age won't always be the deciding factor. Courts have to look at all the circumstances to determine if a reasonable person in the child's situation would have felt free to stop the questioning and leave. This isn't about the actual child's maturity or the police officer's private thoughts.

The Court's ruling makes it less clear and harder to apply the rules about when police have to read suspects their rights. Many kids questioned by police are almost adults, so considering their age won't matter much. For younger kids, the fact that questioning happens at school can already be considered under the current rules. For very young children, courts can consider age without messing up the clear rules. The Court's decision goes against the main reason for having a simple rule - so police know what to do. Now they'll have to waste time and energy trying to figure out if they should have known a suspect's age. The Court didn't need to change the rule to protect kids' rights during police questioning.

Yes, a child's age matters in deciding if they're "in custody" when questioned by police, as long as the police knew or should have known the child's age. This is because a reasonable child might feel pressured to stay and answer questions when a reasonable adult would feel free to leave. The law has always recognized children aren't adults, and police can't ignore that obvious fact. We say a child's age is more than just a number - it can change how a reasonable person sees their freedom to walk away. But age won't always be the deciding factor. Courts have to look at all the circumstances to determine if a reasonable person in the child's situation would have felt free to stop the questioning and leave. This isn't about the actual child's maturity or the police officer's private thoughts.

No, a child's age should not be a separate factor in deciding if they feel free to leave. The Court's ruling makes it less clear and harder to apply the rules about when police have to read suspects their rights. Many kids questioned by police are almost adults, so considering their age won't matter much. For younger kids, the fact that questioning happens at school can already be considered under the current rules. For very young children, courts can consider age without messing up the clear rules. The Court's decision goes against the main reason for having a simple rule - so police know what to do. Now they'll have to waste time and energy trying to figure out if they should have known a suspect's age. The Court didn't need to change the rule to protect kids' rights during police questioning.

Courts typically conduct this analysis in two steps, addressing (1) whether the questioning constituted an interrogation, and (2) whether the suspect was in custody for Miranda purposes.

Jensen also asserts that his status as a juvenile should be factored into the custody analysis, noting the United States Supreme Court has held that "a child's age is far `more than a chronological fact.'"

Id.[7] Whether a suspect is in custody is an objective determination based on "the circumstances surrounding the interrogation" and whether "a reasonable person [would] have felt he or she was at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave."

In JDB, the Supreme Court held that the age of a child subjected to police questioning is relevant to the custody analysis of Miranda.

The Court held that, "so long as the child's age was known to the officer at the time of police questioning, or would have been objectively apparent to a reasonable officer, its inclusion in the custody analysis is consistent with the objective nature of that test."

"The law has historically reflected... that children characteristically lack the capacity to exercise mature judgment and possess only an incomplete ability to understand the world around them."

"It is beyond dispute that children will often feel bound to submit to police questioning when an adult in the same circumstances would feel free to leave

Recognizing that the inherently coercive nature of custodial interrogation blurs the line between voluntary and involuntary statements, this Court in Miranda adopted a set of prophylactic measures designed to safeguard the constitutional guarantee against self-incrimination

In JDB, the United States Supreme Court "observed that children `generally are less mature and responsible than adults,'[citation]; that they `often lack the experience, perspective, and judgment to recognize and avoid choices that could be detrimental to them,'[citation]; that they `are more vulnerable or susceptible to... outside pressures' than adults [citation]; and so on

T] he `subjective views harbored by either the interrogating officers or the person being questioned'are irrelevant. The test, in other words, involves no consideration of the `actual mindset'of the particular suspect subjected to police questioning

Yes. A child's age properly informs the Miranda custody analysis. The objective 'reasonable person' test for custody must account for a child's age if it was known or objectively apparent to the officer. The Court's reasoning is that children are fundamentally different from adults; they are less mature, more vulnerable to outside pressure, and generally feel less free to challenge authority figures like police officers. This is a commonsense reality that the law has recognized in other contexts, such as tort and contract law. To ignore a juvenile's age in the custody analysis would be to force an absurd inquiry, evaluating circumstances specific to a child through the eyes of an adult. Including age as a factor does not make the test subjective, because age itself is an objective fact, and its effects on a child's perceptions are widely understood, unlike idiosyncratic personal traits.

No. A child's age should be excluded from the Miranda custody analysis. The primary virtue of the Miranda custody test is its clarity and ease of application, which stems from a one-size-fits-all objective standard. Introducing age compromises this clarity and starts a slide down a slippery slope toward a fully subjective test, where other characteristics like intelligence, education, or background would also have to be considered. This would transform the simple prophylactic rule into the same complex, fact-intensive voluntariness analysis that Miranda was intended to supplement. Police officers would be burdened with making difficult psychological assessments on the spot. The dissent argues that the existing due process voluntariness test, which does consider age, is sufficient to protect the rights of especially vulnerable young suspects without undermining Miranda's clarity.

Yes. A child's age is relevant to the Miranda custody analysis as long as it was known to the officer at the time of questioning or would have been objectively apparent to a reasonable officer. This is because a reasonable child subjected to police questioning will sometimes feel pressured to submit when a reasonable adult would feel free to go. The law has historically reflected the reality that children are not adults, and the custody analysis should not blind itself to that commonsense reality. The Court emphasized that a child's age is more than a chronological fact, and it is a factor that may affect how a reasonable person would perceive their freedom to leave. However, a child's age will not be a determinative factor in every case. Courts must examine all the circumstances surrounding the interrogation to determine whether a reasonable person in the suspect's position would have felt at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave. This is an objective test that does not consider the subjective views of the suspect or the interrogating officers.

The Court's decision greatly diminishes the clarity and administrability of the Miranda custody inquiry. Many minors questioned by police are near the age of majority, and accounting for their age in the custody analysis will not make a significant difference. For younger minors, the circumstances of being questioned at school can be adequately considered under the existing Miranda framework. In cases involving very young children, the voluntariness due process test can account for age without undermining the clarity of Miranda. The Court's decision runs counter to the main justification for the Miranda rule - the perceived need for a clear, easily applied prophylactic rule. Consideration of age will often require time-consuming and disruptive factual inquiries into whether a reasonable officer would know the suspect's age. The Court's new rule is unnecessary to protect the constitutional rights of minors subjected to custodial interrogation.

Yes. A child's age is relevant to the Miranda custody analysis as long as it was known to the officer at the time of questioning or would have been objectively apparent to a reasonable officer. This is because a reasonable child subjected to police questioning will sometimes feel pressured to submit when a reasonable adult would feel free to go. The law has historically reflected the reality that children are not adults, and we should not blind ourselves to that commonsense reality. We emphasize that a child's age is more than a chronological fact, and it is a factor that may affect how a reasonable person would perceive their freedom to leave. However, a child's age will not be a determinative factor in every case. Courts must examine all the circumstances surrounding the interrogation to determine whether a reasonable person in the suspect's position would have felt at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave. This is an objective test that does not consider the subjective views of the suspect or the interrogating officers.

No. I respectfully dissent. The Court's decision greatly diminishes the clarity and administrability of the Miranda custody inquiry. Many minors questioned by police are near the age of majority, and accounting for their age in the custody analysis will not make a significant difference. For younger minors, the circumstances of being questioned at school can be adequately considered under the existing Miranda framework. In cases involving very young children, the voluntariness due process test can account for age without undermining the clarity of Miranda. The Court's decision runs counter to the main justification for the Miranda rule – the perceived need for a clear, easily applied prophylactic rule. Consideration of age will often require time-consuming and disruptive factual inquiries into whether a reasonable officer would know the suspect's age. The Court's new rule is unnecessary to protect the constitutional rights of minors subjected to custodial interrogation.

J.D.B. v. North Carolina

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