Island City Flying Serv. v. General Elec. Credit Corp.
6 I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 1313, 585 So.2d 274, 16 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 584 (1991)
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Rule of Law:
An employer is not liable for negligent hiring or retention where an employee's intentional tort was not a foreseeable consequence of the employee's known past misconduct or unfitness. In a direct negligence action against an employer, the employer is entitled to raise the defense of comparative negligence, even if the employee's underlying act was an intentional tort.
Facts:
- General Electric Credit Corporation (GECC) owned a twin-engine aircraft and leased it to Southern Express Airways.
- Island City Flying Service hired Steve Diezel to work in its maintenance shop.
- Island City was aware that Diezel had a prior bad conduct discharge from the military for a drug offense.
- During his employment, Diezel had a history of work infractions, including tardiness, taking unauthorized leave, and failing to follow safety procedures, for which he was fired and quickly rehired twice.
- On the night of January 16, 1985, after his shift had ended and after consuming alcohol at a nearby bar, Diezel returned to the airport.
- Diezel entered the airfield through an unlocked gate, located the Southern Express aircraft, which was unlocked and did not require a key to start, and stole it.
- Diezel, who was not a licensed pilot and had minimal training in a different type of plane, crashed the aircraft into the ocean shortly after takeoff, destroying it.
- Diezel survived the crash and later pleaded guilty to the charge of stealing the airplane.
Procedural Posture:
- General Electric Credit Corporation sued Island City Flying Service in a Florida circuit court (trial court) for negligent hiring and retention.
- A jury found Island City negligent but also found GECC to be 75% comparatively negligent because its lessee had left the aircraft unlocked.
- The trial court entered a final judgment in favor of GECC, but reduced the damage award by 75% for comparative negligence.
- On appeal, the Third District Court of Appeal affirmed the finding of negligent hiring but reversed the reduction for comparative negligence, holding that the defense was inapplicable to a case involving an underlying intentional tort.
- Island City Flying Service, as petitioner, then sought review from the Supreme Court of Florida.
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Issue:
Does an employer's knowledge of an employee's prior military drug offense and various minor work infractions make the employee's subsequent theft and destruction of a commercial airplane a foreseeable act sufficient to establish liability for negligent hiring?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Overton
No. An employer's knowledge of an employee's past misconduct does not establish liability for negligent hiring unless the employee's subsequent intentional tort was a foreseeable consequence of that specific misconduct. Here, Island City could not have foreseen that Diezel would steal a commercial airplane based on his known history. Diezel's prior military drug offense and his minor work rule violations, such as tardiness, had no connection to the act of stealing an aircraft. To impose liability would create a standard that discourages the rehabilitation of individuals with criminal records by making employers de facto insurers for any future torts, regardless of foreseeability. The court also held that had a negligent hiring claim been viable, the defense of comparative negligence would have been proper. The action against Island City is for its own negligence in hiring, a separate tort from the employee's intentional act, and thus negligence-based defenses apply. GECC, as the owner of a dangerous instrumentality, is vicariously responsible for its lessee's negligence in leaving the aircraft unlocked.
Analysis:
This decision significantly clarifies the foreseeability requirement in negligent hiring cases, demanding a direct nexus between the specific unfitness known to the employer and the particular harm caused by the employee. It prevents the doctrine from expanding into a form of strict liability for employers who hire individuals with unrelated criminal backgrounds, thereby balancing employer responsibility with the public policy of rehabilitating ex-offenders. The opinion also reinforces the critical distinction between direct liability for negligent hiring, where standard negligence defenses like comparative fault apply, and vicarious liability under respondeat superior, where an employer may be barred from such defenses because it 'stands in the shoes' of the intentional tortfeasor.
