Iseberg v. Gross
879 N.E.2d 278 (2007)
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Rule of Law:
A private person has no legal duty to protect another from a criminal attack by a third party unless a "special relationship" exists between the parties, such as common carrier-passenger, innkeeper-guest, business invitor-invitee, or voluntary custodian-protectee.
Facts:
- Mitchell Iseberg, Sheldon Gross, Henry Frank, and Edward Slavin were involved in a series of business partnerships and corporations to develop a car wash.
- A business dispute resulted in a September 1997 settlement agreement that formally terminated Iseberg's involvement in the real estate venture.
- Following the settlement, Slavin invested his life savings into the project but was forced to surrender his interest in February 1999, resulting in a total financial loss.
- Slavin blamed Iseberg for his financial ruin and became mentally unstable.
- Between the fall of 1998 and early 1999, Slavin repeatedly told Gross of his plans to harm Iseberg, progressing from threats of physical assault to a detailed plan to murder Iseberg and then commit suicide.
- Slavin informed Gross that he had purchased a gun for the purpose of killing Iseberg.
- Gross communicated these threats to Frank, but neither Gross nor Frank warned Iseberg or contacted the police.
- On January 24, 2000, Slavin went to Iseberg's home, rang the doorbell, and shot him four times, resulting in Iseberg becoming a paraplegic.
Procedural Posture:
- Mitchell and Carol Iseberg filed a complaint against Sheldon Gross and Henry Frank in the circuit court of Cook County, Illinois (trial court).
- The Isebergs' third amended complaint asserted a negligence claim (count I), alleging a duty to warn.
- Gross and Frank filed a section 2-615 motion to dismiss count I for failure to state a cause of action, arguing they owed no legal duty.
- The trial court granted the motion and dismissed the negligence count with prejudice.
- The Isebergs, as appellants, appealed the dismissal to the Illinois Appellate Court.
- A divided appellate court affirmed the trial court's dismissal.
- The Isebergs, as appellants, were granted a petition for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Illinois.
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Issue:
Does a person have a legal duty to warn a former business associate of specific, credible death threats made against them by a mutual third-party associate when no recognized special relationship exists between the parties?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Burke
No. A person does not have a legal duty to warn a former business associate of third-party threats because no such duty exists at common law absent a recognized special relationship. The court reaffirmed the general rule that a private person has no affirmative duty to protect another from criminal acts by a third party. The court considered and rejected the plaintiff's argument that a principal-agent relationship created a duty to warn under the Restatement (Second) of Agency §471, finding that the risk of harm did not arise from the 'particular nature of the employment' as the attack was personal and occurred at Iseberg's home, unrelated to any work he was performing. The court also explicitly declined to abandon the 'special relationship' doctrine in favor of a general four-factor negligence analysis, distinguishing prior cases as involving the defendants' own affirmative conduct that created the risk (misfeasance), rather than a mere failure to act (nonfeasance). Citing the principle of stare decisis and the practical difficulties of defining a universal duty to rescue, the court held that the plaintiffs failed to provide compelling reasons to depart from the established no-duty rule.
Analysis:
This decision reinforces the strict application of the common law no-affirmative-duty rule in Illinois, solidifying the 'special relationship' doctrine as the primary and almost exclusive framework for imposing a duty to protect against third-party criminal acts. The court's refusal to apply a general foreseeability-based negligence analysis to a case of pure nonfeasance draws a sharp line between creating a risk through one's own actions and failing to mitigate a risk created by others. This precedent significantly limits the ability of plaintiffs to bring negligence claims based on a failure to warn, even when the defendant possessed specific knowledge of a credible, imminent threat, thereby underscoring the high threshold for imposing a legal duty to intervene.
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