Irving Trust Co. v. Day
1942 U.S. LEXIS 1010, 62 S. Ct. 398, 314 U.S. 556 (1942)
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Rule of Law:
A state legislature does not violate the Contracts Clause or Due Process Clause by enacting a law that grants a surviving spouse a right of election against a will, even if it invalidates a prior contractual waiver, when the testator voluntarily brings their estate under the new law by executing a codicil after the law's effective date.
Facts:
- On February 2, 1922, two days before her marriage to John J. McGlone in London, Helena Day Snyder signed a document renouncing all rights to his estate upon his death.
- At the time of the signing, New York law largely permitted a husband to disinherit his wife.
- In 1929, New York enacted § 18 of the Decedent Estate Law, effective September 1, 1930, which granted a surviving spouse a right to elect against a will.
- The new law stipulated that any waiver of this spousal right of election must be formally subscribed and acknowledged; Snyder's 1922 document was not acknowledged.
- On August 21, 1930, before the new law's effective date, McGlone executed a will leaving Snyder a small bequest of $2,000.
- On July 6, 1934, after the new law was in effect, McGlone executed a codicil to his will.
- Under New York law, the execution of the codicil had the legal effect of republishing the entire will as of that date, thereby subjecting it to the provisions of the new Decedent Estate Law.
- After McGlone's death, Helena Day Snyder sought to exercise her right of election under the 1930 law to take a larger share of his estate.
Procedural Posture:
- Helena Day Snyder initiated proceedings in the New York Surrogate's Court to exercise her statutory right of election.
- John J. McGlone's estate (appellants) asserted Snyder's 1922 waiver as a defense.
- The Surrogate held the waiver was not a binding contract and permitted the election.
- The appellants appealed to the Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court, which reversed, holding the waiver was a valid contract.
- Snyder's estate (appellee) appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, the state's highest court.
- The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division, holding that even if the waiver was a valid contract, § 18 of the Decedent Estate Law was a constitutional exercise of state power that granted Snyder the right of election.
- McGlone's estate appealed the decision of the New York Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court of the United States.
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Issue:
Does § 18 of the New York Decedent Estate Law, which grants a surviving spouse a right of election against the will and requires waivers of that right to be formally acknowledged, unconstitutionally impair the obligation of a contract or deprive individuals of property without due process when applied to an unacknowledged prenuptial waiver executed before the statute's enactment, particularly after the testator executed a codicil which brought the will under the new law?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Jackson
No, the New York law does not violate the Constitution. Rights of succession to property are created by state statute, not by the Constitution, and states have broad authority to limit, condition, or even abolish the power of testamentary disposition. The testator, John J. McGlone, was not forced to comply with the new law; he had the choice to let his pre-1930 will stand, in which case the new law would not have applied. By voluntarily executing a codicil in 1934, McGlone chose to bring his will under the purview of the new legal regime, including its requirement that any spousal waiver be formally acknowledged. Therefore, any impairment to the 1922 waiver agreement resulted not from the state's action alone, but from McGlone's own voluntary act of availing himself of the state's testamentary privileges under the new conditions.
Analysis:
This decision solidifies the principle of state plenary power over succession and testamentary disposition. It clarifies that the Contracts Clause is not a significant barrier to state legislation that alters inheritance rights, especially when such laws apply to wills executed or republished after the law's enactment. The ruling establishes that parties cannot contractually bind themselves in a way that prevents the state from later changing the public policy governing inheritance. By focusing on the testator's voluntary act of executing a codicil, the Court demonstrated that an individual's choice to engage with the legal system under new rules constitutes acceptance of those rules, negating a claim of unconstitutional impairment.
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