Irvine v. California
98 L. Ed. 2d 561, 1954 U.S. LEXIS 2750, 347 U.S. 128 (1954)
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Rule of Law:
The Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause does not forbid the admission of evidence obtained by an unreasonable and shocking search and seizure in a state prosecution, so long as the police conduct does not involve coercion, violence, or brutality to the person.
Facts:
- Police in California strongly suspected Patrick Irvine of illegal bookmaking but lacked direct proof.
- While Irvine and his wife were away from their home, a police officer had a locksmith make a key to their front door.
- On three separate occasions without a warrant, police used the key to surreptitiously enter Irvine's home.
- During these entries, police installed a concealed microphone, first in the hall, then moved it to the bedroom, and finally to a bedroom closet.
- For over a month, officers used the microphone to listen to and record incriminating conversations inside Irvine's home from a nearby garage.
- Irvine had also purchased a federal wagering tax stamp, as required by federal law, which identified him as being involved in gambling.
Procedural Posture:
- Patrick Irvine was prosecuted for illegal gambling by the State of California in a state trial court.
- At trial, illegally obtained recordings of his conversations were admitted into evidence over his objection.
- Irvine was convicted of the charges.
- Irvine appealed his conviction through the California state court system, exhausting all available state remedies.
- The United States Supreme Court granted Irvine's petition for a writ of certiorari.
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Issue:
Does the admission of evidence obtained by state officers through repeated illegal entries into a suspect's home to install a secret microphone violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Jackson
No. The admission of evidence obtained through repeated illegal entries to install a secret microphone does not violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. While the police conduct was a flagrant violation of the Fourth Amendment's principles, the Court adheres to its decision in Wolf v. Colorado, which held that the exclusionary rule is not binding on the states. The conduct here, though a trespass to property and an invasion of privacy, is distinguishable from Rochin v. California because it did not involve the coercion, violence, or brutality to the person that 'shocks the conscience.' Creating a subjective standard based on the degree of shock would leave state courts with an indefinite rule, so the Wolf doctrine controls, leaving states to decide their own evidentiary rules.
Concurrence - Justice Clark
No. While the police activity was 'incredible' and he would have applied the exclusionary rule to the states if he had been on the court for Wolf v. Colorado, precedent requires adherence to Wolf. An ad hoc, case-by-case approach where the Court reverses convictions based on whether five Justices are 'sufficiently revolted' is unpredictable and does not effectively shape police conduct. Therefore, with great reluctance, he concurs in the judgment of affirmance, hoping that strict adherence to Wolf might lead to its eventual extinction.
Dissenting - Justice Black
Yes. The conviction should be reversed because it was based on evidence extorted from the petitioner in violation of the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination. The federal law requiring Irvine to purchase a wagering tax stamp compelled him to be a witness against himself. Using this federally-coerced confession in a state court violates the Fifth Amendment, which should prevent the use of such evidence in any court, state or federal. The Fourteenth Amendment should also be interpreted to make the Fifth Amendment applicable to the states.
Dissenting - Justice Frankfurter
Yes. The conviction violates due process because the police conduct offends the 'canons of decency and fairness' established in Rochin v. California. This case should not be governed by the simple search-and-seizure rule of Wolf, but by the Rochin principle that states cannot use methods that offend civilized standards. The police's month-long, surreptitious electronic surveillance of the Irvine's entire household, including their bedroom, is a more powerful and offensive invasion of privacy than the single physical trespass in Rochin. Due process is not limited to physical violence but protects against any methods that offend 'a sense of justice.'
Dissenting - Justice Douglas
Yes. The police conduct smacks of a police state, and the conviction based on this unconstitutional evidence should be reversed. The Court should overturn Wolf v. Colorado, which has allowed civil liberties to deteriorate. The only effective sanction to deter lawless police searches is the exclusion of illegally obtained evidence. Relying on federal prosecution of state officers under civil rights laws is an inadequate remedy and relegates fundamental constitutional rights to a 'lowly status.' The Court should apply the exclusionary rule to the states to ensure the Fourth Amendment's protections are meaningful.
Analysis:
This case demonstrates the Court's firm, albeit temporary, refusal to impose the Fourth Amendment's exclusionary rule on the states, even when faced with police conduct it described as 'almost incredible.' By narrowly interpreting the 'shocks the conscience' standard from Rochin to apply only to physical brutality, the Court created a significant gap in constitutional protection, allowing egregious electronic surveillance. This decision highlighted the instability of the Wolf doctrine and the growing tension over states' rights in criminal procedure, ultimately paving the way for Mapp v. Ohio (1961), which overruled Wolf and applied the exclusionary rule to the states.
