Irvin v. Dowd
366 U.S. 717 (1961)
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Rule of Law:
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is violated when a criminal defendant is tried by a jury in a community where pervasive and inflammatory pretrial publicity has created a presumption of prejudice, regardless of jurors' assurances of impartiality during voir dire.
Facts:
- Six murders were committed in the vicinity of Evansville, Indiana, between December 1954 and March 1955, arousing great public excitement and indignation.
- Leslie Irvin was arrested on April 8, 1955.
- Following his arrest, law enforcement officials issued widely publicized press releases stating that Irvin had confessed to all six murders.
- In the six to seven months preceding the trial, local news media unleashed a barrage of stories about Irvin, which were delivered to approximately 95% of the homes in Gibson County, the venue for the trial.
- This media coverage repeatedly described Irvin as the 'confessed slayer of six' and detailed his prior criminal record, including juvenile offenses, arson, and burglary.
- The news also reported on public opinion, quoting residents who believed Irvin was guilty and 'should be hanged,' and relayed a sheriff's promise to personally ensure Irvin's execution.
Procedural Posture:
- Leslie Irvin was indicted for murder in Vanderburgh County, Indiana.
- The state trial court granted Irvin's motion for a change of venue to the adjoining Gibson County.
- The trial court denied Irvin's subsequent motions for another change of venue from Gibson County, citing a state statute that permitted only one such change.
- Following a trial in the Circuit Court of Gibson County, Irvin was convicted of murder and sentenced to death.
- The Indiana Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and sentence.
- Irvin filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Indiana, claiming his trial was unfair.
- The District Court dismissed the petition, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal.
- The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari, remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for a decision on the merits.
- The Court of Appeals then ruled against Irvin on the merits of his claim.
- The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the Court of Appeals' decision.
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Issue:
Does a criminal defendant's conviction violate the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause when pretrial publicity is so pervasive and prejudicial that a 'pattern of deep and bitter prejudice' exists in the community, even if the selected jurors claim they can be impartial?
Opinions:
Majority - Mr. Justice Clark
Yes. A criminal defendant's conviction violates the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause when a 'pattern of deep and bitter prejudice' resulting from pretrial publicity permeates the community, making a fair trial by an impartial jury impossible. The right to a jury trial guarantees an accused a fair trial by a panel of impartial, 'indifferent' jurors. While jurors are not required to be totally ignorant of the facts, their verdict must be based on evidence presented at trial. Here, the record revealed a 'barrage' of inflammatory news coverage that created a climate of deep-seated prejudice in the community. This was confirmed during voir dire, where nearly 90% of prospective jurors entertained an opinion as to Irvin's guilt, and eight of the twelve jurors ultimately selected admitted they believed he was guilty before the trial began. In light of such pervasive bias, the jurors' proclaimed ability to be impartial could be given 'little weight,' as the 'psychological impact' of such an environment undermines the constitutional standard of a fair trial.
Concurring - Mr. Justice Frankfurter
Yes. The conviction represents a 'miscarriage of justice due to anticipatory trial by newspapers instead of trial in court.' A bedrock principle of Western civilization is that the state must prove guilt based solely on evidence produced in court under fair procedures. This is impossible when jurors come to their task with their minds 'ineradicably poisoned' by months of media coverage designed to establish the accused's guilt. This case highlights a widespread problem where inflammatory media coverage distorts justice, and the freedom of the press cannot be interpreted to mean that 'the poisoner is constitutionally protected in plying his trade.'
Analysis:
This decision established that extreme pretrial publicity can create a presumption of prejudice so strong that it violates a defendant's due process right to a fair trial. It empowered federal courts to conduct an independent review of the totality of the circumstances, including the voir dire record, rather than deferring to a trial court's finding of juror impartiality. The Court clarified that a juror's simple assertion of fairness is insufficient to overcome overwhelming evidence of pervasive community hostility. This precedent became a cornerstone for subsequent litigation involving change of venue motions and media influence on criminal trials.
