Interstate Circuit v. Dallas
20 L. Ed. 2d 225, 88 S. Ct. 1298 (1968)
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Rule of Law:
Legislation regulating expression, even when aimed at protecting minors, must contain narrowly drawn, reasonable, and definite standards to guide both the officials enforcing the law and the individuals whose conduct is being regulated, or it is unconstitutionally void for vagueness.
Facts:
- The City of Dallas, Texas enacted an ordinance creating a Motion Picture Classification Board.
- The ordinance empowered the Board to classify films as either 'suitable for young persons' or 'not suitable for young persons,' with 'young persons' defined as children under the age of 16.
- The ordinance required exhibitors to obtain a special license to show 'not suitable' films and restricted admission for persons under 16.
- The distributor and an exhibitor of the motion picture 'Viva Maria' submitted the film to the Board.
- After viewing the film, the Board classified 'Viva Maria' as 'not suitable for young persons,' citing its portrayal of 'sexual promiscuity.'
Procedural Posture:
- The Motion Picture Classification Board of the City of Dallas classified the film 'Viva Maria' as 'not suitable for young persons.'
- The exhibitor and distributor (appellants) filed a notice of non-acceptance.
- The City of Dallas (appellee) filed a suit in a county court (trial court) seeking an injunction to enforce the classification.
- The county court upheld the Board's classification and issued an injunction against the appellants.
- The appellants appealed the injunction to the Texas Court of Civil Appeals, an intermediate appellate court.
- The Texas Court of Civil Appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment.
- The Texas Supreme Court, the state's highest court, denied discretionary review.
- The appellants then brought the case to the U.S. Supreme Court, which noted probable jurisdiction.
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Issue:
Does a city ordinance that authorizes an administrative board to classify films as 'not suitable for young persons' based on undefined standards like 'sexual promiscuity' and whether a film is 'likely to incite or encourage' delinquency by creating an 'impression' that certain conduct is 'acceptable' or 'desirable,' violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Marshall
Yes. A city ordinance that classifies motion pictures based on vague and indefinite standards violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Motion pictures are a constitutionally protected form of expression, and precision of regulation is therefore required. The standards in the Dallas ordinance, such as 'sexual promiscuity' and whether a film creates an 'impression' on young people that certain conduct is 'acceptable' or 'desirable,' are not defined and are inherently subjective. Such vague standards set the censor 'adrift upon a boundless sea,' leading to regulation based on the individual beliefs of board members rather than by ascertainable legal principles. This uncertainty chills protected speech, as filmmakers and exhibitors may self-censor to avoid the risk of a restrictive classification. The salutary purpose of protecting children does not excuse the constitutional defect of vagueness, as legislation aimed at minors must be as clearly drawn and reasonably precise as that aimed at adults. The availability of de novo judicial review cannot cure this defect, as the courts themselves are left without definite standards to apply.
Concurring - Justice Douglas
Yes. The Dallas ordinance is unconstitutional. However, this conclusion is reached for the reasons stated in his other opinions on the subject, which maintain that most forms of censorship, whether for children or adults, are impermissible under the First Amendment regardless of the clarity of the standards.
Dissenting - Justice Harlan
No. The Dallas ordinance is not unconstitutionally vague and should be upheld. The Court demands a level of linguistic precision that is neither sensible nor achievable in this area of law. The terms used in the ordinance, such as 'sexual promiscuity,' are not significantly more ambiguous than the Court's own standards for obscenity articulated in cases like Roth v. United States. States should be granted wider authority to regulate materials for juveniles, and the Court should not interfere with such state determinations unless they are the product of 'prudish overzealousness.' The ordinance provides adequate notice to filmmakers and sufficient guidance for administrators.
Analysis:
This decision solidifies the application of the void-for-vagueness doctrine to content-based regulations aimed at protecting minors. It establishes that the government's legitimate interest in children's welfare does not provide a license to use imprecise or subjective standards in laws that restrict First Amendment freedoms. By striking down the Dallas ordinance, the Court signaled to legislatures that any film classification or censorship scheme must be based on objective, clearly defined criteria to survive constitutional scrutiny. This holding pushed subsequent legislation in this area toward more specific definitions, such as those tying material 'harmful to minors' to established legal tests for obscenity.
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