International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee
120 L. Ed. 2d 541, 1992 U.S. LEXIS 4532, 505 U.S. 672 (1992)
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Rule of Law:
An airport terminal operated by a public authority is a nonpublic forum for First Amendment purposes. Consequently, a regulation prohibiting in-person solicitation of funds within the terminal is constitutionally permissible if it is reasonable and not an effort to suppress expression merely because of disagreement with the speaker's view.
Facts:
- International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. (ISKCON) is a non-profit religious corporation whose members perform a ritual called sankirtan, which involves disseminating religious literature and soliciting funds in public places.
- The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, a public entity, owns and operates three major airports in the New York City area: Kennedy, La Guardia, and Newark.
- The airport terminals are generally accessible to the public and contain numerous commercial establishments, such as restaurants, bars, and stores.
- The primary purpose of the terminals is to facilitate air travel, and nearly all visitors are present for travel-related reasons.
- The Port Authority adopted a regulation that forbids the repetitive solicitation of money and distribution of literature within the interior areas of the airport terminals.
- This regulation effectively prohibits ISKCON from performing sankirtan inside the terminals.
- The Port Authority permits solicitation and distribution activities on the public sidewalks outside the terminal buildings.
Procedural Posture:
- ISKCON brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Walter Lee, the Port Authority's police superintendent, in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York.
- ISKCON sought declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging the regulation violated the First Amendment.
- The District Court granted summary judgment for ISKCON, finding the terminals to be traditional public forums and the ban not narrowly tailored to a compelling state interest.
- Lee, representing the Port Authority, appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
- The Court of Appeals reversed in part, holding that the terminals were not public forums and that the ban on solicitation was a reasonable restriction, though it struck down a related ban on literature distribution.
- The U.S. Supreme Court granted ISKCON's petition for a writ of certiorari to review the decision upholding the solicitation ban.
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Issue:
Does a public airport authority's regulation banning in-person solicitation of money within its terminals violate the First Amendment's guarantee of free speech?
Opinions:
Majority - Chief Justice Rehnquist
No, the regulation does not violate the First Amendment. Airport terminals are not traditional public forums because they have not, by long tradition, been used for public assembly and debate. They are also not designated public forums, as the Port Authority has not intentionally opened them for expressive activity. As nonpublic forums, restrictions on speech need only be reasonable. The ban on solicitation is reasonable because face-to-face solicitation can be disruptive to the flow of travelers, who are often in a hurry, carrying luggage, and vulnerable to duress or fraud. The ban is a rational means of ensuring passenger safety and preventing congestion in the crowded terminal environment.
Concurring - Justice O'Connor
No, the regulation is constitutional. While agreeing that airports are nonpublic forums, the reasonableness inquiry should recognize that the Port Authority has created a multipurpose environment akin to a shopping mall, not merely a transportation hub. The ban on solicitation is reasonable because face-to-face solicitation is uniquely disruptive and intimidating in a way that other commercial and expressive activities are not. It impedes traffic flow and confronts travelers who are often under time pressure, making the ban a reasonable measure to maintain the airport's operational environment.
Concurring - Justice Kennedy
No, the regulation is constitutional, but for different reasons than the majority. The airport terminals are public forums because their objective physical characteristics and broad, open access to the public make them suitable for public discourse. As a public forum, the regulation must be analyzed as a time, place, and manner restriction. The ban on the 'solicitation and receipt of funds' is a narrowly tailored regulation targeting the conduct of immediate money exchange, which poses a unique risk of fraud and duress to travelers. Because it leaves open alternative channels for solicitation, such as distributing literature with preaddressed envelopes for donations, it is a valid time, place, and manner restriction.
Dissenting - Justice Souter
Yes, the regulation violates the First Amendment. I agree with Justice Kennedy that airport terminals are public forums. However, the total ban on solicitation fails the constitutional test for time, place, and manner restrictions. The government's asserted interests in preventing coercion and fraud are not supported by sufficient evidence and are too speculative to justify a 'broad prophylactic rule.' The ban is not narrowly tailored, as less restrictive measures could address these concerns, and it fails to leave open ample alternative channels of communication for organizations that rely on immediate solicitation to fund their expressive activities.
Analysis:
This decision significantly narrowed the scope of the traditional public forum doctrine, limiting its application primarily to spaces historically dedicated to public expression like streets and parks. By classifying a modern, bustling public space like an airport as a nonpublic forum, the Court granted government entities greater latitude to restrict speech on their property to preserve its intended purpose. The case highlights the doctrinal split between a majority focused on historical tradition and government intent versus a minority focused on the objective characteristics and suitability of a space for public discourse. The ruling makes it more challenging to claim First Amendment protections in newer forms of public gathering places.
