International Longshoremen's Association v. Allied International, Inc.
456 U.S. 212, 72 L. Ed. 2d 21, 1982 U.S. LEXIS 33 (1982)
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Rule of Law:
A union's refusal to handle goods from a specific country, motivated by a political protest against that country's government, constitutes an illegal secondary boycott under § 8(b)(4) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) if it coerces neutral employers.
Facts:
- In protest of the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan, the International Longshoremen’s Association (ILA) ordered its members on January 9, 1980, to stop handling all cargoes arriving from or destined for the Soviet Union.
- Allied International, Inc. (Allied), an American company, imports Russian wood products for resale in the United States.
- Allied contracted with Waterman Steamship Lines (Waterman), an American corporation, to ship the wood from the Soviet Union to U.S. ports.
- Waterman, in turn, employed the American stevedoring company John T. Clark & Son of Boston, Inc. (Clark) to unload its ships.
- Clark obtains its longshoring employees through a collective bargaining agreement with an ILA local union.
- In obedience to the ILA's order, longshoremen refused to unload Allied's shipments of Russian wood from Waterman's ships.
- As a result of the boycott, Allied's shipments were completely disrupted, forcing it to renegotiate its contracts and substantially reduce its business.
Procedural Posture:
- Allied International, Inc. sued the International Longshoremen’s Association (ILA) in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts, seeking damages for an illegal secondary boycott.
- The District Court dismissed Allied's complaint, characterizing the ILA's action as a purely political, primary boycott outside the scope of the NLRA.
- Allied, as appellant, appealed the dismissal to the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit.
- The Court of Appeals reversed the District Court's decision, holding that the ILA's boycott was a prohibited secondary boycott under the NLRA.
- The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the Court of Appeals' decision.
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Issue:
Does a union's politically motivated refusal to handle cargo from a specific nation, which harms neutral American companies, constitute an illegal secondary boycott under § 8(b)(4) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Powell
Yes, a union's politically motivated refusal to handle cargo constitutes an illegal secondary boycott under the NLRA when it harms neutral American companies. The plain language of § 8(b)(4) prohibits union conduct that forces any person to cease doing business with any other person. Here, the ILA had no labor dispute with Allied, Waterman, or Clark; its sole dispute was with the Soviet Union. The foreseeable consequence of the union's action was to impose a heavy economic burden on these neutral parties, which is precisely the harm the secondary boycott provisions were designed to prevent. The court distinguished this case from the 'Benz' line of cases involving foreign-flag ships and alien seamen, as this dispute was an 'all-American' affair involving an American union, importer, shipper, and stevedore. The political motivation for the boycott is not a defense, as the statute makes no exception for political disputes and was drafted broadly to protect neutral parties from being embroiled in quarrels not their own. Furthermore, this conduct is not protected by the First Amendment, as it is coercive action rather than protected speech.
Analysis:
This decision clarifies that the NLRA’s secondary boycott provisions apply regardless of a union’s underlying motive, extending the prohibition to politically motivated actions. It establishes that the key inquiry is the effect on neutral employers, not the ultimate objective of the union's protest. By refusing to create a 'political dispute' exception, the Court prevents unions from using the economic power granted by federal labor law to pursue foreign policy goals at the expense of neutral domestic businesses. This precedent solidifies the protection for neutral parties and limits the scope of permissible union pressure to the primary parties involved in a dispute.
