International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local 695 v. Vogt, Inc.
1 L. Ed. 2d 1347, 1957 U.S. LEXIS 1617, 354 U.S. 284 (1957)
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Rule of Law:
A state may constitutionally enjoin peaceful picketing when it is conducted for a purpose that violates a valid state public policy. This includes picketing aimed at coercing an employer to interfere with employees' rights to join or not join a union, in contravention of state law.
Facts:
- Vogt, Inc. owned and operated a gravel pit in Oconomowoc, Wisconsin, with approximately 15 to 20 employees.
- Petitioner unions unsuccessfully attempted to persuade some of Vogt's employees to join the unions.
- Following this failure, the unions began to peacefully picket the entrance to Vogt's business.
- The picket signs read, 'The men on this job are not 100% affiliated with the A. F. L.'
- As a result of the picket line, drivers for several trucking companies refused to deliver and haul goods to and from Vogt's plant.
- This refusal by third-party drivers caused substantial damage to Vogt's business.
Procedural Posture:
- Vogt, Inc. sued the petitioner unions in a Wisconsin state trial court, seeking an injunction to stop the picketing.
- The trial court granted the injunction, holding that the picketing was unlawful because there was no 'labor dispute' under a Wisconsin statute.
- The unions appealed to the Wisconsin Supreme Court.
- Initially, the Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed the trial court, finding the statute unconstitutional.
- Upon reargument, the Wisconsin Supreme Court withdrew its first opinion and affirmed the injunction on a different ground: it made its own finding that the picketing's purpose was to coerce the employer to interfere with employees' rights, which violated a different state labor statute.
- The petitioner unions appealed this final decision, and the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari.
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Issue:
Does a state court injunction against peaceful picketing violate the Fourteenth Amendment's protection of free speech when the picketing's purpose is to coerce an employer into interfering with its employees' right to join or not join a union, a purpose that contravenes a valid state public policy?
Opinions:
Majority - Mr. Justice Frankfurter
No. A state can constitutionally enjoin peaceful picketing when its purpose is to compel an action that violates a valid state public policy. While early cases like Thornhill v. Alabama equated peaceful picketing with free speech, subsequent decisions have recognized that picketing involves conduct as well as communication and can be regulated. Cases like Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co. and Building Service Employees v. Gazzam established that states have a broad field to enforce public policy, whether legislative or judicial, by enjoining picketing aimed at preventing the effectuation of that policy. Here, Wisconsin has a valid public policy protecting employees' freedom of choice regarding unionization, making it an unfair labor practice for an employer to coerce them. The Wisconsin Supreme Court rationally inferred from the undisputed facts that the union's purpose was to coerce Vogt, Inc. into pressuring its employees to join the union. Therefore, the injunction against such picketing does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment.
Dissenting - Mr. Justice Douglas
Yes. The injunction violates the Fourteenth Amendment's protection of free speech. The Court's decision represents a full retreat from the principles of Thornhill v. Alabama and A. F. of L. v. Swing, which protected peaceful organizational picketing as a form of free speech. The majority's 'unlawful purpose' doctrine is so broad that it allows state courts to suppress any picket line for almost any reason, effectively ending First Amendment protection for this form of labor advocacy. The proper test, from Giboney, is whether the speech is an inseparable part of a course of illegal conduct. Where, as here, there is only peaceful speech with no violence or coercion, it should be protected. This decision effectively surrenders the constitutional protection of peaceful picketing to the whims of state courts and legislatures.
Analysis:
This case marks the culmination of the Supreme Court's retreat from the broad 'picketing as speech' doctrine established in Thornhill v. Alabama. It solidifies the 'unlawful purpose' doctrine as the prevailing standard, granting states significant authority to regulate and enjoin even peaceful picketing based on its objectives. The decision significantly narrows the scope of First Amendment protection for picketing, shifting the balance of power in labor disputes away from unions and toward state regulatory authority. Consequently, states are empowered to prohibit picketing that conflicts with state policies, such as 'right-to-work' laws or, as in this case, statutes protecting employee freedom of choice in organization.
