Interinsurance Exchange of Automobile Club v. Flores
96 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 3420, 45 Cal. App. 4th 661, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d 18 (1996)
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Rule of Law:
An automobile insurance policy covering injuries "caused by an occurrence" (defined as an accident) does not provide coverage for injuries intentionally caused by the insured or an accomplice, especially when the insured knew and expected harm to occur, as such acts fall outside the definition of an "accident" and are excluded by statutory willful act provisions.
Facts:
- Eric Michael Sanders was punched by an unknown pedestrian while sitting in his van at a traffic light.
- Sanders told Roger Perez about the incident, and Perez suggested they return to the scene to seek retribution.
- Perez, armed with a handgun, along with others, got into Sanders's van.
- Sanders knew that someone was likely to get shot during the planned retaliation.
- Sanders drove Perez and the others back to the intersection where he had been punched.
- While Sanders drove past David Flores, Perez intentionally shot and injured Flores from the van.
- The van itself did not inflict any physical injury on Flores, nor was it used to block or pin him down.
- Sanders owned the van, and his parents had insured it for him under an automobile insurance policy issued by the Automobile Club.
Procedural Posture:
- Rosemary Flores, individually and as guardian ad litem for David Flores, filed a civil lawsuit against Eric Sanders and others in a trial court (court of first instance) for conspiracy, battery, and negligence.
- The Automobile Club, Sanders's insurer, reserved its rights to deny coverage and filed a declaratory relief action in the trial court to determine whether it had a duty to defend or indemnify Sanders in the underlying Flores action.
- The trial court denied the Automobile Club's motion for summary judgment.
- The parties proceeded to a trial by the court on stipulated facts.
- After trial, the trial court found that the shooting was not an accident, that Sanders acted intentionally, and that the injuries were not covered, ruling that the Automobile Club was not obligated to indemnify Sanders.
- Rosemary and David Flores (appellants) appealed the judgment of the trial court.
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Issue:
Does a standard automobile insurance policy, which covers injuries caused by an "accident" arising out of vehicle use, provide coverage for injuries to a shooting victim when the insured driver intentionally drove a vehicle to facilitate a pre-planned retaliatory shooting, knowing and expecting someone would be shot?
Opinions:
Majority - Gilbert, J.
No, a standard automobile insurance policy does not provide coverage for injuries to a shooting victim when the insured driver intentionally drove a vehicle to facilitate a pre-planned retaliatory shooting, knowing and expecting someone would be shot. The court affirmed the trial court's judgment, finding that while the phrase "arising out of the use" of a vehicle is broadly applied, coverage was precluded because the injury was not caused by an "occurrence" (defined as an "accident"). An injury is an accident only if it is an unexpected or unintended consequence of the insured's conduct. Here, Sanders drove to the scene for retaliation, knew Perez was armed, and admitted he knew someone was likely to be shot, demonstrating he intended and expected injury. This conduct removes the incident from the definition of an "accident," distinguishing it from cases involving mere recklessness (e.g., drunk driving, accidental gun discharge), where injuries were not intended or expected. Furthermore, coverage was excluded under Insurance Code section 533, which statutorily precludes insurer liability for "willful acts" of the insured. A "willful act" signifies an intent to harm or an inherently wrongful act, not just negligence. Sanders's nolo contendere plea to aiding and abetting an assault with a deadly weapon, coupled with the stipulated facts, established his intent to harm because an aider and abettor must share the perpetrator's specific intent. Insurance is fundamentally for fortuitous or unknown risks, not for harm that is certain or expected.
Concurring - Stone (S. J.), P. J.
Concurred.
Concurring - Yegan, J.
Concurred.
Analysis:
This case significantly clarifies the line between reckless acts and intentional acts for insurance coverage, emphasizing that an insured's subjective intent or expectation of harm, even in an aiding and abetting role, can negate coverage. It reinforces the fundamental insurance principle of fortuity, where policies protect against contingent or unknown risks, not anticipated harms from purposeful criminal conduct. The decision provides crucial guidance on the application of the "occurrence" (accident) clause and Insurance Code section 533's "willful act" exclusion in the context of criminal acts facilitated by an insured vehicle, potentially limiting liability for insurers in similar circumstances where an insured participates in pre-planned violence.
