Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc.
2004 U.S. LEXIS 4570, 159 L. Ed. 2d 355, 542 U.S. 241 (2004)
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Rule of Law:
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a), a federal district court has the discretion to order discovery for use in a foreign proceeding so long as a dispositive ruling is reasonably contemplated. The statute does not require that the foreign proceeding be pending or imminent, that the applicant be a formal litigant, or that the requested evidence be discoverable under foreign law.
Facts:
- Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. (AMD) and Intel Corporation (Intel) are worldwide competitors in the microprocessor industry.
- In October 2000, AMD filed an antitrust complaint with the Directorate-General for Competition (DG-Competition) of the European Commission.
- AMD's complaint alleged that Intel abused its dominant market position in Europe through various anticompetitive practices.
- AMD suggested that the DG-Competition seek discovery of documents Intel had produced in a separate, private antitrust lawsuit in a U.S. federal court in Alabama.
- The DG-Competition declined to seek judicial assistance in the United States to obtain these documents.
- Following the DG-Competition's refusal, AMD itself sought to obtain the documents from Intel, which is headquartered in the Northern District of California.
Procedural Posture:
- AMD filed an application in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California seeking a discovery order against Intel pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a).
- The District Court, a trial court, denied AMD's application.
- AMD, as appellant, appealed the denial to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, an intermediate appellate court.
- The Ninth Circuit reversed the District Court's decision and remanded the case for the trial court to rule on the merits of the application.
- Intel, as petitioner, filed a petition for a writ of certiorari with the U.S. Supreme Court, which was granted.
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Issue:
Does 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a) authorize a federal district court to order a company to produce documents for use in a complaint filed with the European Commission, where the Commission is a quasi-judicial body, the applicant is a complainant rather than a litigant, the proceeding is not yet pending, and the requested evidence may not be discoverable under the Commission's rules?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Ginsburg
Yes. 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a) authorizes a district court to provide discovery assistance in these circumstances. First, a complainant before the European Commission, such as AMD, qualifies as an 'interested person' because it has a significant role in the proceedings and a reasonable interest in obtaining assistance. Second, the European Commission is a 'tribunal' under the statute when it acts as a first-instance decisionmaker, as Congress intended the term to extend to administrative and quasi-judicial bodies. Third, a 'proceeding' need only be in reasonable contemplation; the 1964 amendments to the statute purposefully deleted the requirement that a proceeding be 'pending.' Finally, § 1782(a) contains no categorical requirement that the evidence sought be discoverable under the foreign jurisdiction's laws. The statute authorizes, but does not require, a district court to grant such a request, and courts should exercise discretion based on the circumstances of the case.
Dissenting - Justice Breyer
No. The Court's broad reading of the statute invites abuse, creating expensive discovery disputes that can undermine foreign proceedings and waste U.S. judicial resources. The statute should be read with categorical limits. First, when a foreign body's status as a 'tribunal' is questionable, courts should defer to that body's own view; here, the European Commission stated it is not a 'tribunal' and does not want the assistance. Second, discovery should be denied when it would be unavailable under both foreign law and analogous domestic law, as is the case here. Adopting these limits, either through statutory interpretation or the Court's supervisory power, would prevent the statute from being used to harass competitors and would better promote international comity.
Concurring - Justice Scalia
Yes. The judgment is required by the plain text of 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a). The statute's categorical language supports the Court's holding, and none of the limitations proposed by Intel can be found in its text. The Court should rely solely on this statutory text, which is the only sure expression of Congress's will, rather than resorting to legislative history like Senate Committee Reports, which are unreliable indicators of legislative intent.
Analysis:
This decision significantly broadened the scope of § 1782(a), rejecting several limiting principles that had been adopted by various circuit courts, such as the 'foreign-discoverability' rule and the requirement that a proceeding be 'imminent.' The ruling established that U.S.-style discovery is available to a wider range of participants in a broader array of foreign proceedings, including administrative investigations. By making discovery a discretionary matter for district courts rather than imposing rigid categorical rules, the decision empowers foreign complainants and bodies to seek evidence in the U.S. while tasking district courts with balancing the goals of international assistance against concerns of comity and potential abuse.
