INS v. St. Cyr
533 U.S. 289 (2001)
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Rule of Law:
The jurisdiction-stripping provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) do not repeal federal courts' habeas corpus jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Furthermore, the repeal of discretionary relief from deportation under former INA § 212(c) does not apply retroactively to aliens who pleaded guilty to crimes at a time when § 212(c) relief was available.
Facts:
- Enrico St. Cyr, a citizen of Haiti, was admitted to the United States as a lawful permanent resident in 1986.
- On March 8, 1996, St. Cyr pleaded guilty in a Connecticut state court to a charge of selling a controlled substance.
- At the time of his guilty plea, the conviction made him deportable, but he was eligible for a discretionary waiver of deportation from the Attorney General under § 212(c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA).
- After his plea, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) on April 24, 1996, and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) on September 30, 1996.
- IIRIRA repealed INA § 212(c) and replaced it with a narrower form of relief for which St. Cyr was ineligible.
- The government initiated removal proceedings against St. Cyr on April 10, 1997, after both new statutes had become effective.
- The Attorney General interpreted the new laws as removing any discretion to grant St. Cyr a waiver from deportation.
Procedural Posture:
- Enrico St. Cyr filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the U.S. District Court, alleging that the restrictions on discretionary relief in the 1996 statutes did not apply to him retroactively.
- The District Court exercised jurisdiction over the application and granted the petition, agreeing with St. Cyr's argument.
- The INS (petitioner) appealed the District Court's decision to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
- The Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's judgment, holding that it had habeas jurisdiction and that the repeal of § 212(c) relief had an impermissible retroactive effect.
- The U.S. Supreme Court granted the INS's petition for a writ of certiorari.
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Issue:
Does the repeal of discretionary relief from deportation under IIRIRA have an impermissible retroactive effect on aliens who entered guilty pleas to deportable offenses before the statute's enactment, and do federal courts retain habeas corpus jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 to review this question of law?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Stevens
Yes, the repeal has an impermissible retroactive effect, and federal courts retain jurisdiction to hear the challenge. First, federal courts retain habeas corpus jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Congress must provide a clear, unambiguous, and express statement to repeal habeas jurisdiction, and the general phrases 'judicial review' and 'jurisdiction to review' in AEDPA and IIRIRA are not sufficient to do so, especially when a contrary interpretation would raise serious constitutional questions under the Suspension Clause. Second, applying the repeal of § 212(c) relief to St. Cyr would have an impermissible retroactive effect. Under the framework from Landgraf v. USI Film Products, there is no clear congressional intent for IIRIRA's repeal of § 212(c) to apply retroactively. Applying the repeal attaches a new disability—certain deportation instead of possible deportation—to a past transaction, the plea agreement. This upsets the settled expectations and reasonable reliance of aliens like St. Cyr, who likely waived constitutional rights in their plea bargains based on the availability of discretionary relief.
Dissenting - Justice O'Connor
No. I join Justice Scalia's dissent regarding the clear statutory text stripping jurisdiction (Part I) and the weakness of the due process arguments (Part III). However, I do not join his broader analysis of the Suspension Clause because this case can be resolved on narrower grounds. The right asserted by St. Cyr—judicial review of a discretionary decision—falls outside the historical scope of habeas review guaranteed by the Suspension Clause.
Dissenting - Justice Scalia
No, the repeal does not have an impermissible retroactive effect because the courts have no jurisdiction to consider the question. The language of IIRIRA, particularly 8 U.S.C. §§ 1252(a)(2)(C) and 1252(b)(9), unambiguously and categorically repeals all provisions for judicial review, including habeas corpus, for criminal aliens like St. Cyr. The majority invents a 'magic words' requirement for repealing habeas jurisdiction that is not supported by precedent. The doctrine of constitutional doubt is inapplicable because the statute is not ambiguous. The Suspension Clause only prevents the temporary suspension of an existing writ; it does not guarantee its content or prevent Congress from permanently altering its scope. Furthermore, the historical writ of habeas corpus did not extend to compelling the exercise of executive discretion. The Court's holding perversely grants criminal aliens more opportunities for delay-inducing judicial review than non-criminal aliens.
Analysis:
This decision is a landmark in both administrative and immigration law. It powerfully reaffirms the traditional role of habeas corpus as a constitutional safety valve, establishing a super-strong clear statement rule that Congress must meet to strip federal courts of jurisdiction to hear pure questions of law. This protects access to the courts from legislative attempts to create unreviewable executive power. The ruling also solidifies the application of the Landgraf retroactivity analysis, recognizing that plea agreements are formal transactions made in reliance on the existing legal consequences, thereby preventing Congress from retroactively imposing harsher immigration penalties on those who have already entered into such agreements.
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