Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Jong Ha Wang et ux.
450 U.S. 139 (1981)
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Rule of Law:
The Attorney General has broad discretion to interpret the term 'extreme hardship' narrowly for purposes of suspension of deportation and may deny a motion to reopen proceedings if the alien fails to establish a prima facie case supported by affidavits or other evidentiary material.
Facts:
- Respondents, Mr. and Mrs. Wang, are citizens of Korea who entered the U.S. in January 1970 as nonimmigrant treaty traders.
- Their authorized stay expired on January 10, 1972, but they remained in the United States without permission.
- During their time in the U.S., they had two children who were born in the United States and were thus citizens.
- The Wangs purchased a home in 1974 and a dry-cleaning business in August 1977.
- By December 1977, they had resided in the U.S. for the requisite seven years to seek suspension of deportation.
- The Wangs alleged that deportation would cause extreme hardship to their children, who did not speak Korean and would lose educational opportunities.
- They also claimed they would suffer economic hardship from the forced liquidation of their business and other assets.
- At the time, the Wangs had significant financial assets, including a business valued at $75,000, a home valued at $60,000, and $24,000 in savings.
Procedural Posture:
- The Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) found Mr. and Mrs. Wang deportable in a hearing in November 1974 and granted them voluntary departure.
- The Wangs did not depart and instead applied for adjustment of status, which an immigration judge denied in July 1975.
- The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), an administrative appellate body, dismissed the Wangs' appeal from that denial in October 1977.
- In December 1977, the Wangs filed a motion with the BIA to reopen their deportation proceedings to apply for suspension of deportation under § 244.
- The BIA denied the motion to reopen without a hearing, finding that the Wangs had failed to establish a prima facie case of extreme hardship.
- The Wangs, as petitioners, sought review in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
- The Court of Appeals, sitting en banc, reversed the BIA's decision and remanded for a hearing.
- The INS, as petitioner, successfully sought a writ of certiorari from the U.S. Supreme Court.
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Issue:
Did the Court of Appeals err by ordering the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) to hold a hearing on a motion to reopen deportation proceedings where the aliens' claims of 'extreme hardship' were conclusory, unsupported by evidence, and failed to meet the BIA's narrow construction of the term?
Opinions:
Majority - Per Curiam
Yes. The Court of Appeals erred by substituting its own interpretation of 'extreme hardship' for that of the agency to which Congress delegated authority. First, the court ignored the regulation requiring aliens to support their motion to reopen with affidavits or other evidentiary material; the Wangs' allegations were conclusory and unsupported. Second, and more fundamentally, the court improperly encroached on the authority of the Attorney General. The Act commits the definition of 'extreme hardship' to the Attorney General, who has the authority to construe it narrowly. A reviewing court cannot overturn the agency's construction simply because it prefers another interpretation. The BIA acted within its authority when it determined that the alleged economic detriment and educational difficulties for the children of affluent, educated parents did not constitute extreme hardship.
Analysis:
This decision significantly reinforces the principle of judicial deference to administrative agencies, particularly in the context of immigration law. It affirms the broad discretionary authority of the Attorney General (and by delegation, the BIA) to interpret ambiguous statutory terms like 'extreme hardship.' The ruling clarifies that courts should not substitute their own judgment for the agency's reasonable construction, thereby limiting the scope of judicial review over such discretionary decisions. The case establishes that aliens seeking to reopen deportation proceedings bear a significant evidentiary burden, requiring them to present a prima facie case supported by specific facts and evidence, not just conclusory allegations.
