INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca
480 U.S. 421 (1987)
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Rule of Law:
The 'well-founded fear of persecution' standard for asylum eligibility under § 208(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act is more generous than, and distinct from, the 'clear probability of persecution' standard for withholding of deportation under § 243(h). An asylum applicant need not prove that it is more likely than not that they will be persecuted to establish a well-founded fear.
Facts:
- Luz Marina Cardoza-Fonseca, a citizen of Nicaragua, entered the United States in 1979 as a visitor.
- After she remained in the U.S. longer than her visa permitted, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) initiated deportation proceedings.
- Cardoza-Fonseca's brother had been tortured and imprisoned in Nicaragua due to his political activities against the Sandinista government.
- Both Cardoza-Fonseca and her brother fled Nicaragua together.
- Cardoza-Fonseca testified that she believed the Sandinistas were aware she had fled with her brother and that she would be interrogated about his activities if she returned.
- She also testified that her own political opposition to the Sandinistas would be brought to the government's attention because of her brother's status, and she feared being tortured upon return.
Procedural Posture:
- The Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) commenced deportation proceedings against Cardoza-Fonseca in an administrative hearing.
- During the proceedings, Cardoza-Fonseca requested withholding of deportation under § 243(h) and asylum under § 208(a).
- The Immigration Judge, as the trial-level adjudicator, applied the 'clear probability of persecution' standard to both claims and denied both forms of relief.
- Cardoza-Fonseca appealed the decision to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), the administrative appellate body.
- The BIA affirmed the Immigration Judge's decision, agreeing that Cardoza-Fonseca had not met her burden of proof for either claim.
- Cardoza-Fonseca, as petitioner, sought review in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, an intermediate federal appellate court.
- The Court of Appeals held that the 'well-founded fear' standard for asylum was more generous than the 'clear probability' standard for withholding of deportation and remanded the case to the BIA.
- The INS, as petitioner, successfully petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari to review the Ninth Circuit's decision.
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Issue:
Is the 'well-founded fear of persecution' standard for an alien to be eligible for asylum under § 208(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act equivalent to the 'clear probability of persecution' standard required for withholding of deportation under § 243(h) of the Act?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Stevens
No. The 'well-founded fear' standard for asylum is not equivalent to the 'clear probability' standard for withholding of deportation. The plain language of the statute, its structure, and its legislative history demonstrate that Congress intended to establish a more generous standard for asylum eligibility. The term 'fear' has a subjective component, while the 'would be threatened' language for withholding is purely objective. A person can have a 'well-founded fear' even if the chance of persecution is less than 50 percent. Congress used different language for the two provisions, indicating a deliberate choice to create different standards. Furthermore, the legislative history shows an intent to conform U.S. law with the United Nations Protocol, which uses the 'well-founded fear' standard, and Congress explicitly rejected a Senate version of the bill that would have equated the two standards. The distinction is logical because asylum is a discretionary form of relief, whereas withholding of deportation is mandatory for those who meet the stricter standard.
Dissenting - Justice Powell
Yes. The Board of Immigration Appeals' (BIA) conclusion that there is no meaningful practical distinction between the two standards is a reasonable interpretation of the statute and is entitled to deference. The BIA does not use a rigid mathematical test but rather a qualitative inquiry into whether there is a 'realistic likelihood' of persecution, and in practice, the evidence that satisfies one standard will almost always satisfy the other. The court should defer to the expert agency's judgment on this practical matter. The legislative history is ambiguous and can be read to support the BIA's view that Congress intended to formalize existing administrative practice, which treated the standards as substantially the same. The majority's focus on semantic differences ignores the practical realities of adjudicating these claims.
Concurring - Justice Blackmun
No. The standards are not identical. The Court correctly holds that the INS and BIA have been applying an incorrect legal standard. This concurrence emphasizes that the INS must now develop the meaning of 'well-founded fear' through case-by-case adjudication, guided by the plain language of the statute, the history of the United Nations Protocol, and the well-reasoned opinions of the Courts of Appeals that have almost uniformly rejected the agency's erroneous interpretation.
Concurring - Justice Scalia
No. The standards are not identical. The plain meaning of the statute and its structure are clear, so the majority's exhaustive and unnecessary investigation into legislative history is improper. Furthermore, the majority's discussion of Chevron deference is problematic; since the statute is clear, there is no need to discuss deference. The Court's opinion misinterprets Chevron by suggesting deference is only a last resort, which would eviscerate the doctrine.
Analysis:
This decision fundamentally altered U.S. asylum law by establishing a lower, more accessible standard of proof for asylum eligibility compared to the stricter standard for withholding of deportation. By delinking the two, the Court broadened the category of individuals who could be considered 'refugees' eligible for a discretionary grant of asylum, clarifying that a 'reasonable possibility' of persecution is sufficient. This holding significantly increased the flexibility of the asylum system to protect individuals who could not prove that persecution was more likely than not. The case remains a cornerstone of asylum jurisprudence and a key case in the study of statutory interpretation and administrative deference.
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