Inmi-Etti v. Aluisi
492 A.2d 917, 40 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (West) 1612, 63 Md. App. 293 (1985)
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Rule of Law:
A buyer cannot obtain good title to goods from a seller who possessed only void title, which results from the goods being obtained against the owner's will or without voluntary transfer, even if the buyer is a good faith purchaser for value. A sheriff, when instructed by a plaintiff to "levy and leave" attached property, owes no duty to the property owner to maintain and protect those goods.
Facts:
- In June 1981, Adeorike Ogunsanya Duros Inmi-Etti, a Nigerian resident visiting the U.S., decided to purchase a new car to ship back to Nigeria.
- David E. Butler, an acquaintance, assisted Inmi-Etti in ordering a new 1981 Honda Prelude for $8,500 from Wilson Pontiac and Honda, Inc. on June 15, 1981, with Inmi-Etti providing a $200 deposit.
- Inmi-Etti returned to Nigeria, entrusting the cash balance for the purchase to her sister, Ms. Claxton, with instructions to complete the purchase.
- On June 24, 1981, the sale was completed, and Wilson Pontiac delivered the Honda to Inmi-Etti’s sisters, accompanied by Butler, who then drove the car to Ms. Dawodu’s home.
- Within a few weeks, a certificate of title for the Honda, issued in Inmi-Etti's name, was delivered to Butler by Wilson Pontiac.
- On August 18, 1981, Butler drove the Honda from Ms. Dawodu’s home to a location in Marlow Heights, Maryland, without Inmi-Etti's authorization.
- On January 18, 1982, Butler offered to sell the Honda to Pohanka Oldsmobile-GMC, Inc. (Pohanka), representing himself as the owner, despite his inability to produce a certificate of title for the car.
- Pohanka agreed to purchase the car for $7,200, paid Butler $2,000 upfront, and agreed to pay the remaining $5,200 upon Butler producing a certificate of title, which Butler subsequently obtained fraudulently by submitting a sworn affidavit to the Motor Vehicle Administration.
- On February 8, 1982, after Butler produced the fraudulently obtained certificate of title, Pohanka paid him the remaining $5,200, having already sold the Honda to another purchaser for $8,200 a week earlier.
Procedural Posture:
- On October 1, 1981, David E. Butler instituted a suit against Inmi-Etti in the District Court of Maryland for Prince George’s County, claiming she was an absconding debtor, and simultaneously filed an application for an attachment on original process against Inmi-Etti's Honda.
- After Inmi-Etti failed to appear, the district court granted Butler's motion for summary judgment on January 6, 1982, and entered judgment absolute in his favor on January 11, 1982.
- On February 4, 1982, Inmi-Etti filed a motion to set aside the judgment, which the district court granted, and Butler's case was ultimately dismissed.
- Meanwhile, the district court had granted Butler's attachment application, and a deputy sheriff placed a copy of the writ of attachment on the Honda on October 29, 1981, following Butler's instructions to "levy and leave" the property.
- The district court granted a motion to quash this attachment on May 27, 1982.
- Inmi-Etti sued Butler for conversion, malicious abuse of process, and wrongful attachment; Pohanka Oldsmobile-GMC, Inc. for conversion; and James V. Aluisi, Sheriff of Prince George’s County, for negligence in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County (the trial court).
- The Circuit Court entered a default judgment against Butler.
- The Circuit Court granted summary judgment in favor of Pohanka Oldsmobile-GMC, Inc. and James V. Aluisi.
- Inmi-Etti, as the appellant, appealed the Circuit Court's summary judgments in favor of Pohanka Oldsmobile-GMC, Inc. and James V. Aluisi to the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland.
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Issue:
1. Does a car dealership acquire good title to a vehicle, and thus avoid liability for conversion, when it purchases the vehicle from an individual who obtained a fraudulent certificate of title but never received a voluntary transfer of possession from the true owner? 2. Does a sheriff owe a duty to an owner to maintain and protect property that has been levied upon, when the plaintiff instructed the sheriff to "levy and leave" the property?
Opinions:
Majority - Karwacki, Judge
1. Yes, Pohanka is liable for conversion because Butler possessed only void title to the automobile, which he could not transfer, meaning Pohanka did not acquire good title to the vehicle. 2. No, Sheriff Aluisi is not liable for negligence because a sheriff, when following a plaintiff's instruction to "levy and leave" attached property, owes no duty to the owner to maintain and protect the levied goods. Regarding Pohanka, the court found that Inmi-Etti's vehicle was converted, defined as "any distinct act of ownership or dominion exerted by one person over the personal property of another in denial of his right or inconsistent with it." Pohanka's sale of the vehicle constituted such an act. The court's analysis turned on whether Butler had "void" or "voidable" title under UCC § 2-403. Voidable title, which could be transferred to a good faith purchaser for value, arises only from a voluntary transfer or delivery of goods by the owner, even if that transfer was induced by fraud. However, if goods are stolen or obtained against the owner's will, only void title results. Inmi-Etti never made a voluntary transfer of the car to Butler; he removed it without her authorization. Therefore, Butler possessed void title, and his purported sale to Pohanka conveyed no legitimate title. The court further clarified that the attachment proceedings initiated by Butler did not divest Inmi-Etti's title since no judicial sale was ever conducted, and the erroneous issuance of a certificate of title by the Motor Vehicle Administration to Butler likewise could not divest the true owner's title. Pohanka's status as a "good faith purchaser for value" was deemed irrelevant because Butler possessed void title, not voidable title, and Pohanka's innocent intent was immaterial to liability for conversion. Regarding Sheriff Aluisi, the court concluded that the sheriff owed no duty to Inmi-Etti to keep the levied goods in a safe and protected manner. Maryland District Rule G46 (then applicable) permitted the sheriff to "levy and leave" the property as instructed by the plaintiff. When a sheriff complies with such instructions, they are not expected to protect the property. The purpose of this rule is to allow the property to remain with the person in possession while under legal custody, not to impose a duty on the sheriff to safeguard it for the owner. Even if the sheriff's levy was technically imperfect by not leaving the car with a person (since no one was home), this simply meant the sheriff failed to properly acquire rights contrary to the debtor's interest, which does not create a cause of action for the owner. Absent an established duty of care, there can be no liability in negligence. Thus, summary judgment for Aluisi was proper.
Analysis:
This case significantly clarifies the distinction between "void" and "voidable" title under UCC § 2-403, establishing that void title arises from non-voluntary acquisition (like theft or unauthorized taking) and cannot be transferred, even to a good faith purchaser. This provides strong protection for original owners against unauthorized dispositions of their property. Furthermore, the ruling limits the scope of a sheriff's duty in "levy and leave" attachments, absolving them of responsibility for safeguarding property for the owner's benefit, thereby streamlining the execution of such writs and limiting potential liability for law enforcement. The decision underscores that while a certificate of title is prima facie evidence of ownership, it is not conclusive and cannot override a true owner's title when fraudulently obtained.
