Ingersoll Milling MacHine Co. v. John P. Granger
833 F.2d 680, 1987 U.S. App. LEXIS 15191 (1987)
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Rule of Law:
Under the Illinois Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act, a foreign judgment is conclusive and must be enforced by U.S. courts if the foreign tribunal had jurisdiction and afforded procedures compatible with due process, even if the foreign procedures and substantive law differ significantly from those in the United States.
Facts:
- In 1968, John P. Granger began working for Ingersoll Milling Machine Co. (Ingersoll) in Rockford, Illinois.
- In 1971, Ingersoll and Granger agreed he would transfer to work for an Ingersoll subsidiary in Brussels, Belgium.
- The parties negotiated an agreement governing the transfer, which covered matters such as salary, insurance, and expenses.
- In 1975, Granger was promoted to manager of the Belgian subsidiary and was placed on its payroll for tax purposes in Belgium.
- Granger's employment with the Belgian company was terminated on December 31, 1977.
- Following his termination, Granger continued to live in Belgium but obtained employment with a different company in The Netherlands.
Procedural Posture:
- On April 27, 1978, John P. Granger sued Ingersoll and its Belgian Subsidiary in the Brussels' labor court (a Belgian court of first instance).
- In August 1979, Ingersoll sued Granger in an Illinois state trial court, seeking a declaratory judgment.
- Granger removed Ingersoll's suit to the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois.
- The Belgian trial court found in favor of Granger.
- After the Belgian trial court's judgment, the U.S. district court stayed its proceedings pending the outcome of the Belgian appellate process.
- The Belgian Labour Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's decision.
- Granger filed a counterclaim in the U.S. district court action, seeking enforcement of the Belgian judgment.
- The Belgian Cour de Cassation, Belgium's highest court, affirmed the appellate court's decision, making the judgment final.
- The U.S. district court granted summary judgment to Granger on his counterclaim to enforce the judgment and against Ingersoll on its complaint.
- Ingersoll, as the appellant, appealed the district court's judgment to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit; Granger is the appellee.
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Issue:
Does the Illinois Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act require a U.S. court to recognize and enforce a monetary judgment from a Belgian court when the foreign court's procedures differed from U.S. procedures and it applied Belgian law despite a choice-of-law clause pointing to Illinois?
Opinions:
Majority - Ripple, J.
Yes, the Act requires recognition of the Belgian court's judgment. A foreign money judgment must be recognized if it meets the Act's mandatory conditions for conclusiveness, and the court did not abuse its discretion by declining to apply the Act's optional grounds for non-recognition. First, the Belgian judgment was conclusive because the Belgian court had both personal and subject matter jurisdiction, and its procedures were compatible with the requirements of due process. The lack of U.S.-style cross-examination does not amount to a due process violation, as the Act requires fundamentally fair procedures, not identical ones. Second, the district court did not abuse its discretion by rejecting Ingersoll's arguments for non-recognition. The application of Belgian employment law was not 'repugnant' to Illinois public policy; the parties' choice-of-law provision was not a choice-of-forum provision that would bar the Belgian proceeding; and Belgium was not a 'seriously inconvenient forum' because Ingersoll voluntarily conducted business there.
Analysis:
This case reinforces the principle of international comity and clarifies the high bar for refusing to enforce a foreign judgment under the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act. The court's decision establishes that mere differences in legal procedure, such as the unavailability of American-style cross-examination, do not render a foreign system incompatible with due process. It also draws a critical distinction between a choice-of-law clause, which does not preclude a foreign court from hearing a case, and a choice-of-forum clause. This precedent makes it more difficult for U.S. companies to evade foreign judgments by arguing the foreign legal system was simply different or that the application of foreign law contravenes a general state policy like 'freedom of contract'.
