Yes. The owner automatically promised the house was livable. The judge explained that renting a furnished vacation house is different from a normal, long-term lease for an empty house. Usually, the rule is 'buyer beware,' meaning the renter is responsible for checking the place out. But for a short-term, furnished rental, people are paying to use it immediately, not to spend time and money fixing it. It's also hard for a renter to spot hidden problems like bugs during a quick look. Therefore, the law assumes the owner is making an unspoken promise that the house is ready and safe to live in.

Yes, the house should have been ready to live in right away. When you rent a house that comes with everything you need, like furniture, it's expected that you can live there right away without having to fix things up. This is especially true if it's just for a short time, like a summer holiday. It's different from renting an empty house, where you might expect to do some work to make it livable. When someone rents a furnished house for a short time, they're paying extra to be able to use it right away without any hassle. It wouldn't be fair to make them fix up the house when they're only staying for a little while. This idea has been around for a long time, and other courts have agreed with it too. So, we think that when someone rents out a fully furnished summer house, they're promising that it's ready to live in without the renter having to do much more than move in their personal stuff.

<opinion type="majority">
<author id="b368-14">Knowlton, J.</author>
This is an action to recover five hundred dollars for the use and occupation of a furnished dwelling-house at Swampscott, during the summer of 1890. It was submitted <page-number citation-index="1" label="349">*349</page-number>to the Superior Court on what is entitled an “ agreed statement of evidence,” by which it appears that the defendant hired the premises of the plaintiffs for the season, as a furnished house, 1 provided with beds, mattresses, matting, curtains, chairs, tables, ■ kitchen utensils, and other articles, which were apparently in good condition; and that when the defendant took possession it was found to be more or less infested with bugs, so that the . defendant contended that it was unfit for habitation, and for / that reason gave it up and declined to occupy it. :
The agreed statement concludes as follows: “ If, under the j above circumstances, said house was not fit for occupation as a furnished house, and, being let as such, there was an implied agreement or warranty that the said house and furniture therein should be fit for use and occupation, judgment is to be for the defendant, with costs; if, however, under said circumstances, said house was fit for occupation as a furnished house, or there was no such implied agreement or warranty, judgment is to be for the plaintiffs, in the sum of five hundred dollars ($500), with interest from date of writ, and costs.” Judgment was ordered for the defendant, and the plaintiffs appealed to this court.
The agreement of record shows that the facts were to be treated by the Superior Court as evidence from which inferences of fact might be drawn. The only “ matter of law apparent on the record,” which can be considered on an appeal in a case of this kind, is the question whether the judgment is warranted by the evidence. Pub. Sts. c. 152, § 10. Charlton v. Donnell, 100 Mass. 229. Fitzsimmons v. Carroll, 128 Mass. 401. Old Colony Railroad v. Wilder, 137 Mass. 536. Mayhew v. Durfee, 138 Mass. 584. Hecht v. Batcheller, 147 Mass. 335. Rand v. Hanson, 154 Mass. 87.
The facts agreed warrant a finding that the house was unfit for habitation when it was hired, and we are therefore brought directly to the question whether there was an implied agreement on the part of the plaintiffs that it was in a proper condition for immediate use as a dwelling-house. It is well settled, both in this Commonwealth and in England, that one who lets an unfurnished building to be occupied as a dwelling-house does not impliedly agree that it is fit for habitation. Dutton v. Ger<page-number citation-index="1" label="350">*350</page-number>rish, 9 Cush. 89. Foster v. Peyser, 9 Cush. 242. Stevens v. Pierce, 151 Mass. 207. Sutton v. Temple, 12 M. &amp; W. 52. | Hart v. Windsor, 12 M. &amp; W. 68. In the absence of fraud or ( a covenant, the purchaser of real estate, or the hirer of it, for a term however short, takes it as it is, and determines for him-I self whether it will serve the purpose for which he wants it. He may, and often does, contemplate making extensive repairs upon it to adapt it to his wants. But there are good reasons why a different rule should appty to one who hires a furnished room or a furnished house for a few days or a few weeks or months. Its fitness for immediate use of a particular kind, as indicated by its appointments, is a far more important element entering into the contract than when there is a mere lease of real estate. One who lets for a short term a house provided with all furnishings and appointments for immediate residence may be supposed to contract in reference to a well understood purpose of the hirer to use it as a habitation. An important part of what the hirer pays for is the opportunity to enjoy it without delay, and without the expense of preparing it for use. It is very difficult, and often impossible, for one to determine on inspection whether the house and its appointments are fit for the use for which they are immediately wanted, and the doctrine caveat emptor, which is ordinarily applicable to a lessee of real estate, would often work injustice if applied to cases of this kind. It would be unreasonable to hold, under such circumstances, that the landlord does not impliedly agree that what he is letting is a house suitable for occupation in its condition at the time. This distinction between furnished and unfurnished houses, in reference to the construction of contracts for letting them, when there are no express agreements about their condition, has long been recognized in England, where it is held that there is an implied contract that a furnished house, let for a short time, is in proper condition for immediate occupation as a dwelling. Smith v. Marrable, 11 M. &amp; W. 5. Wilson v. Finch Hatton, 2 Ex. D. 336. Manchester Bonded Warehouse Co. v. Carr, 5 C. P. D. 507. Sutton v. Temple, ubi supra. Hart v. Windsor, ubi supra. Bird v. Lord Greville, 1 C. &amp; E. 317. Charsley v. Jones, 53 J. P. 280.
In Dutton v. Gerrish, 9 Cush. 89, Chief Justice Shaw recog<page-number citation-index="1" label="351">*351</page-number>nizes the doctrine as applicable to furnished houses; and in Edwards v. McLean, 122 N. Y. 302, Smith v. Marrable and Wilson v. Finch Hatton, cited above, are referred to with approval, although held inapplicable to the, question then before the court. See Cleves v. Willoughby, 7 Hill, (N. Y.) 83; Franklin v. Brown, 118 N. Y. 110.
We are of opinion that in a lease of a completely furnished dwelling-house for a single season, at a summer watering place, there is an implied agreement that the house is fit for habitation, without greater preparation than one hiring it for a short time might reasonably be expected to make in appropriating it to the use for which it was designed. Judgment affirmed
</opinion>

Yes. In a lease of a completely furnished dwelling-house for a short term, there is an implied agreement that the house is fit for habitation. The court distinguished this situation from the lease of an unfurnished building, where the doctrine of caveat emptor ('let the buyer beware') generally applies and the tenant takes the property as-is. For a short-term, furnished rental, a significant part of the consideration is the ability to use the property immediately without the delay or expense of preparation. It is often impossible for a hirer to discover latent defects upon inspection, making it unreasonable to assume the landlord does not implicitly promise the dwelling is suitable for its intended purpose at the time of leasing. This approach aligns with established English common law precedent for short-term furnished leases.

Yes, there is an implied agreement that a furnished house rented for a short term is fit for immediate habitation. I affirm the judgment of the lower court because the facts agreed upon warrant a finding that the house was unfit for habitation when it was hired. It is well established that there is a significant distinction between furnished and unfurnished houses concerning implied warranties. A furnished house, especially one rented for a short term, implies a contract that it is suitable for immediate occupation. This is because the fitness for immediate use of a particular kind, as indicated by its appointments, is a far more important element entering into the contract than when there is a mere lease of real estate. One who lets for a short term a house provided with all furnishings and appointments for immediate residence may be supposed to contract in reference to a well-understood purpose of the hirer to use it as a habitation. An important part of what the hirer pays for is the opportunity to enjoy it without delay and without the expense of preparing it for use. It would be unreasonable to hold, under such circumstances, that the landlord does not impliedly agree that what he is letting is a house suitable for occupation in its condition at the time. This distinction between furnished and unfurnished houses has long been recognized in England and is applicable in this case. Therefore, in a lease of a completely furnished dwelling-house for a single season at a summer watering place, there is an implied agreement that the house is fit for habitation, without greater preparation than one hiring it for a short time might reasonably be expected to make in appropriating it to the use for which it was designed.

Ingalls v. Hobbs

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