Industrial Union Dept., AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Institute (The Benzene Case)
448 U.S. 607, 100 S.Ct. 2844, 65 L.Ed.2d 1010 (1980)
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Rule of Law:
Before promulgating a permanent health or safety standard for a toxic substance under the Occupational Safety and Health Act, the Secretary of Labor must make a threshold finding that the substance poses a significant risk of material health impairment at the current permissible exposure level, and that the new standard is reasonably necessary to eliminate or lessen that risk.
Facts:
- Benzene is a widely used industrial chemical in products like gasoline, solvents, and detergents.
- Scientific evidence has long established that exposure to high concentrations of benzene causes nonmalignant blood diseases, such as aplastic anemia.
- By the 1970s, multiple epidemiological studies had also established a causal link between high-level benzene exposure and leukemia, a form of cancer.
- In 1971, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) adopted a national consensus standard limiting workplace exposure to benzene to 10 parts per million (ppm).
- Believing benzene to be a carcinogen with no safe exposure level, OSHA initiated rulemaking to lower the standard.
- OSHA promulgated a new permanent standard reducing the permissible exposure limit for benzene from 10 ppm to 1 ppm.
- OSHA based this reduction not on a specific finding that the 10 ppm level posed a significant risk, but on its general policy that for carcinogens, the exposure limit must be set at the lowest technologically and economically feasible level.
Procedural Posture:
- The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), acting for the Secretary of Labor, promulgated a new permanent standard reducing the permissible workplace exposure limit for benzene from 10 ppm to 1 ppm.
- The American Petroleum Institute and other industry trade associations (respondents) filed a petition for pre-enforcement review of the standard in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
- The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held the standard was invalid, reasoning that OSHA had failed to show that the expected benefits of the new standard bore a reasonable relationship to its substantial costs.
- The Secretary of Labor and the Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO (petitioners) successfully petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari.
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Issue:
Does the Occupational Safety and Health Act require the Secretary of Labor to make a threshold finding that a toxic substance poses a significant risk of harm before issuing a new, more stringent exposure standard under §6(b)(5)?
Opinions:
Plurality - Justice Stevens
Yes, the Occupational Safety and Health Act requires a threshold finding of significant risk before a new standard can be issued. Section 3(8) of the Act defines a standard as one that is 'reasonably necessary or appropriate to provide safe or healthful employment,' which implies that a workplace must first be found to be 'unsafe.' A workplace is not 'unsafe' in the statutory sense unless it threatens workers with a significant risk of harm. This requirement applies to all standards, including those for toxic substances under §6(b)(5). The Act was intended to eliminate significant risks, not to create absolutely risk-free workplaces. Here, OSHA failed to carry its burden of proof; it did not find that exposure to benzene at 10 ppm posed a significant risk, but instead improperly relied on a carcinogen policy that assumed any exposure above zero is a risk that must be regulated to the lowest feasible level. Without the required threshold finding of significant risk, the 1 ppm standard is invalid.
Concurring - Chief Justice Burger
Yes, the Act requires the Secretary to find that a pre-existing standard presents a 'significant risk' of material health impairment. This policy judgment must be based on a factual finding of risk that is 'quantified sufficiently to enable the Secretary to characterize it as significant in an understandable way.' While the ultimate policy judgment of what constitutes a 'significant' risk rests with the agency, it must first make the mandated findings. Because the Secretary failed to do so here, the standard is invalid.
Concurring - Justice Powell
Yes, the Act requires a threshold finding that the current exposure level creates a significant risk of material health impairment. However, even if OSHA had made such a finding, the Act also requires the agency to determine that the economic effects of its standard bear a reasonable relationship to the expected benefits. An occupational health standard is neither 'reasonably necessary' under §3(8) nor 'feasible' under §6(b)(5) if it imposes costs that are wholly disproportionate to the expected health benefits. Since OSHA failed to conduct this cost-benefit analysis, the standard is invalid on this additional ground.
Concurring - Justice Rehnquist
Yes, the standard is invalid, but for a more fundamental reason. Section 6(b)(5) of the Act, which instructs the Secretary to set a standard to the 'extent feasible,' is an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power. The term 'feasible' provides no intelligible principle to guide the Secretary's discretion in balancing the profound social choices between worker health and economic costs. Congress improperly delegated this core legislative function to an administrative agency, rendering the provision void.
Dissenting - Justice Marshall
No, the plurality invents the 'significant risk' requirement, which has no basis in the statute's language or legislative history. The plain text of §6(b)(5) commands the Secretary, for toxic substances with no known safe level, to set the standard that 'most adequately assures, to the extent feasible,' that no employee will suffer material harm. This means the Secretary must set the exposure limit at the lowest level that is technologically and economically achievable, which is exactly what OSHA did. The plurality's decision ignores Congress's clear intent to place the burden of scientific uncertainty on industry, not on the American worker, and will substantially impair the government's ability to protect workers from cancer and other deadly diseases.
Analysis:
This decision established a major new hurdle for OSHA in regulating workplace toxins by creating the 'significant risk' doctrine. It fundamentally shifted the agency's approach from a hazard-based one (i.e., this substance is a carcinogen, so regulate it) to a risk-based one, requiring a formal, evidence-based assessment of the actual risk posed by existing standards. This holding forces the agency to quantify risks before regulating, a complex and often data-intensive process that can delay or prevent the issuance of protective standards. The case also signaled the Court's willingness to closely scrutinize the statutory authority of administrative agencies and reject interpretations that grant them broad, unchecked power over the economy.
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