In the Matter of: Thomas M. Dixon
994 N.E.2d 1129 (2013)
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Rule of Law:
An attorney's statement about a judge's qualifications or integrity violates Professional Conduct Rule 8.2(a) if it is made with reckless disregard for its truth or falsity, determined by an objective standard asking whether the attorney lacked any reasonable basis for the statement. When such statements are made in good faith professional advocacy within a legal proceeding that requires criticizing a judge, such as a recusal motion, the rule is applied in the least restrictive manner to avoid chilling zealous advocacy.
Facts:
- Thomas M. Dixon, an attorney, represented 85 pro-life demonstrators who were arrested for trespassing during a protest at the University of Notre Dame.
- The consolidated criminal case was assigned to Judge Jenny Pitts Manier.
- Judge Manier's husband, Professor Edward Manier, was a retired tenured professor from Notre Dame who maintained ongoing ties to the university.
- Dixon believed Professor Manier had publicly advocated for pro-choice causes and academic freedom principles that were directly contrary to the beliefs of Dixon's clients.
- In a prior, unrelated case involving a pro-life supporter, Dixon had represented an intervenor and believed Judge Manier made erroneous rulings against them.
- Dixon planned to present a novel defense for his clients based on Catholic canon law, arguing they had a contractual right to be on the Notre Dame campus, which centered the case on the university's policies and actions.
Procedural Posture:
- Attorney Thomas Dixon filed a Motion for Change of Judge in St. Joseph Superior Court, seeking Judge Jenny Pitts Manier's recusal from a consolidated criminal trespass case.
- Judge Manier denied the motion.
- Dixon then filed a motion to reconsider, which Judge Manier also denied.
- Dixon sought to appeal the ruling by filing a Motion for Certification of an Interlocutory Appeal.
- Judge Manier certified the issue for appeal but then filed a grievance against Dixon with the Indiana Supreme Court Disciplinary Commission and recused herself from the case.
- The Disciplinary Commission filed a 'Verified Complaint for Disciplinary Action' against Dixon, charging him with misconduct.
- A hearing officer appointed by the Indiana Supreme Court conducted a hearing and concluded that several of Dixon's statements violated Professional Conduct Rule 8.2(a).
- Dixon filed a petition for review with the Indiana Supreme Court, challenging the hearing officer's adverse conclusion.
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Issue:
Does an attorney violate Professional Conduct Rule 8.2(a) by making statements in a motion to recuse a judge that question the judge's impartiality and allege bias, when those statements are supported by a detailed recitation of facts, even if they ascribe improper motives to the judge?
Opinions:
Majority - Per Curiam
No. An attorney does not violate Professional Conduct Rule 8.2(a) when statements questioning a judge's integrity are made in a good faith motion for recusal and are supported by an objectively reasonable basis, which includes a detailed factual recitation. The court explicitly adopts an objective test for Rule 8.2(a) violations, asking whether the attorney lacked any objectively reasonable basis for making the statement, considering its nature and context. Attorneys must have wide latitude in advocacy, particularly in proceedings like recusal motions that inherently require criticism of a judge to protect a client's due process right to a neutral arbiter. Unlike the speculative and unsupported statement in Matter of Wilkins, Dixon's allegations were made within a 40-page filing that provided a lengthy factual basis for his belief that Judge Manier was biased. In this context, where criticism is required by the legal procedure, the rule is applied in the least restrictive manner, and Dixon's statements did not constitute reckless disregard for the truth.
Concurring-in-part-and-dissenting-in-part - Justice Rucker
Yes. While agreeing with the adoption of an objective standard, the attorney's statements did violate Professional Conduct Rule 8.2(a). There is 'little to no daylight' between the statements at issue, which ascribed improper motives to the judge, and the statements previously found to be sanctionable in Matter of Wilkins. The comments went beyond the scope of legal argument and became personal attacks on the judge's integrity, which violates professional standards and warrants a sanction.
Analysis:
This decision formally establishes an objective standard in Indiana for judging attorney speech about judicial officers, aligning the state with the majority of jurisdictions. More significantly, it carves out a critical safe harbor for attorneys filing good-faith recusal motions, clarifying that strong, critical allegations of bias are permissible if factually supported. By distinguishing its prior holding in Matter of Wilkins based on the context (recusal motion vs. appellate brief) and the presence of factual support, the court signals that it will give attorneys more latitude for critical speech within the adversarial process when it is essential to advocating for a client's rights.
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