In the Interest of Brilliant
2002 WL 1340613, 2002 Tex. App. LEXIS 4390, 86 S.W.3d 680 (2002)
Rule of Law:
A court can exercise jurisdiction over a child custody dispute under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA) based on "significant connections" if no state qualifies as the child's "home state," and a party's departure from a state in violation of a court order does not establish "temporary absence" from a prior home state. Furthermore, a defendant who has made an appearance in a contested case is entitled to notice of a trial setting, and a default judgment entered without such notice is invalid as it violates due process.
Facts:
- Kaylee Lynn-Marie Brilliant was born in Massachusetts on June 15, 1999, to Kristen Lynn Fox (Mother) and Reginald Brilliant (Father), who were unmarried.
- Kristen and Regi lived together in Massachusetts from March 1999 until April 16, 2000, when Regi moved to El Paso, Texas, after he and Kristen had planned to relocate there and he secured a job transfer.
- Kristen and Kaylee arrived in El Paso, Texas, on June 12, 2000, where Kristen completed a rental application and job applications.
- Kaylee’s immunization records were transferred to an El Paso clinic, and her Social Security card was mailed to Regi's father's home in El Paso.
- On July 10, 2000, Kristen expressed displeasure with Texas and informed Regi of her intent to leave Texas with Kaylee and return to Massachusetts.
- Regi filed suit on July 19, 2000, and obtained a temporary restraining order (TRO) on July 21, 2000, preventing Kristen from removing Kaylee from El Paso County.
- Kristen was served with the TRO on July 22, 2000, but on July 27, 2000, she and Kaylee left El Paso for Massachusetts with Kristen's mother, in violation of the restraining order. Kristen and Kaylee had spent a total of 45 days in Texas.
Procedural Posture:
- Reginald Brilliant filed suit in a Texas trial court (court of first instance) seeking an initial child custody determination for Kaylee Lynn-Marie Brilliant.
- The Texas trial court issued a temporary restraining order (TRO) preventing Kristen Lynn Fox from removing Kaylee from El Paso County.
- Kristen Lynn Fox filed a paternity suit in Massachusetts.
- Kristen Lynn Fox filed a plea to the jurisdiction in the Texas trial court, arguing lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
- An associate judge held a hearing on Kristen's plea to the jurisdiction and ruled adversely to her.
- Kristen Lynn Fox appealed the associate judge's adverse ruling, leading to a de novo hearing before the referring Texas trial court (Honorable Alfredo Chavez).
- The Texas trial court (Judge Chavez) denied Kristen's plea to the jurisdiction.
- Kristen Lynn Fox filed a motion for new trial or, in the alternative, a motion for reconsideration, which the Texas trial court also denied.
- The Texas trial court then entered a default judgment appointing Reginald Brilliant as the sole managing conservator of Kaylee.
- Kristen Lynn Fox appealed the trial court's default judgment to the Court of Appeals of Texas, El Paso.
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Issue:
1. Does a Texas court have subject matter jurisdiction to make an initial child custody determination under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA) when the child has not resided in Texas for six consecutive months, but a parent and child have relocated to Texas, and the mother subsequently leaves Texas with the child in violation of a temporary restraining order? 2. Is a default judgment proper against a party who has filed a plea to the jurisdiction but did not receive the required 45 days' notice of the trial setting?
Opinions:
Majority - Ann Crawford McClure
Yes, a Texas court does have subject matter jurisdiction to make an initial child custody determination under the UCCJEA based on significant connections, because neither Texas nor Massachusetts qualified as Kaylee's "home state" at the time Regi filed suit. No, the default judgment was not proper because Kristen had made an appearance and was entitled to the required notice of the trial setting. The court first addressed the jurisdictional question under the UCCJEA. It found that Texas did not qualify as Kaylee's "home state" because she had not resided there for the requisite six months. The court rejected Kristen's argument that Massachusetts retained "home state" status due to her 45-day residence in Texas being a "temporary absence." The court reasoned that Kristen had relocated to Texas with Regi and Kaylee, and at the time Regi filed suit in Texas, all parties resided there, meaning no parent continued to live in Massachusetts. It explicitly stated that Kristen's departure from Texas with Kaylee in "complete and utter disregard of a court order" could not be used to retroactively establish a "temporary absence" from Massachusetts or deny Texas jurisdiction. Consequently, the court concluded that neither Texas nor Massachusetts had "home state" jurisdiction. Since no state qualified as Kaylee's home state, the court proceeded to determine if Texas could assert "significant connections" jurisdiction under Section 152.201(a)(2) of the UCCJEA. It found that Regi presented substantial evidence of Kaylee's significant connections to Texas, including the presence of her father and his extended family, the transfer of her medical records, and steps taken to update her immunizations and Social Security information. Kristen's affidavit offered only conclusory statements about her and Kaylee's ties to Massachusetts, which the court found insufficient, particularly disregarding any attachments Kaylee might have formed in Massachusetts after Kristen violated the Texas court's restraining order. Therefore, the court concluded that Texas was authorized to exercise jurisdiction based on significant connections. Secondly, the court addressed the default judgment. It held that Kristen's filing of a plea to the jurisdiction constituted an "appearance" in the contested case. Under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 245 and established due process principles, an appearing party is entitled to "reasonable notice of not less than forty-five days to the parties of a first setting for trial." Since Kristen did not receive this required notice, the default judgment against her was deemed improper and a violation of her fundamental due process rights. The judgment was reversed and remanded for a trial on the merits.
Analysis:
This case significantly clarifies the application of the UCCJEA, particularly distinguishing a genuine "temporary absence" from a relocation followed by unilateral, defiant acts by a parent. It establishes that a parent cannot manipulate jurisdiction or create a home state by disregarding court orders or by leaving a state after establishing residence, thus discouraging child snatching and forum shopping. Furthermore, the ruling strongly reinforces the fundamental procedural due process requirement for proper notice of trial settings, emphasizing that even a preliminary filing like a plea to the jurisdiction constitutes an appearance that triggers this right, preventing unjust default judgments and ensuring a party's right to be heard on the merits of a custody dispute.
