In re Yengo
Unknown (1980)
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Rule of Law:
An attorney's unexcused absence from trial, when combined with a frivolous, insulting, or clearly inadequate explanation, constitutes a direct contempt in the presence of the court that may be punished summarily by the trial judge.
Facts:
- John W. Yengo was a defense attorney representing Leo Leone in a complex, multi-defendant criminal gambling conspiracy trial.
- The trial judge, Judge Loftus, explicitly and repeatedly instructed all counsel that their punctual and continuous attendance was mandatory and that any absence required her prior approval.
- Yengo was aware of these instructions and had previously asked the judge to intervene on his behalf in another scheduling matter.
- On March 2, 1978, during the third week of the trial, Yengo failed to appear in court without providing any prior notice to the judge.
- Yengo had arranged for an associate, Lawrence Burns, to appear in his place for his client.
- After being unable to contact Yengo, Judge Loftus's staff called his home and was told by his daughter that he had gone to Bermuda for a four-day vacation.
- Upon his return to court, Yengo explained to the judge that he had gone to Bermuda on a business matter for a supermarket and did not know he would be going until the night before he left.
Procedural Posture:
- During a criminal trial, the trial court judge found attorney John W. Yengo in direct contempt of court for his unexcused absence and imposed a $500 fine.
- Yengo appealed the contempt conviction to the Appellate Division of the Superior Court of New Jersey, an intermediate appellate court.
- The Appellate Division reversed the trial court's judgment, concluding that the offense was an indirect contempt that required notice and a hearing before a different judge.
- The Supreme Court of New Jersey, the state's highest court, granted certification to review the Appellate Division's decision.
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Issue:
Does an attorney's unexcused absence from a trial, followed by an explanation the trial judge deems frivolous, constitute a direct contempt of court that can be punished summarily without referral to another judge?
Opinions:
Majority - Pollock, J.
Yes, an attorney's unexcused absence followed by a frivolous explanation is a direct contempt of court that can be punished summarily. The court classifies an attorney's unexplained absence as a 'hybrid' offense. The absence itself is observable by the judge, but its contumacious character depends on the explanation, which is provided later. The court established a procedural framework: the characterization of the contempt as direct or indirect should be deferred until after the attorney has an opportunity to explain the absence. If the attorney refuses to explain, or offers an insulting, frivolous, or clearly inadequate explanation, both elements of the offense (the absence and the explanation) are considered to be in the presence of the judge, who may then treat the matter as a direct contempt and dispose of it summarily. If, however, the explanation shows some evidence of adequacy or requires proof of facts outside the court's knowledge, it should be treated as an indirect contempt, requiring a formal hearing before a different judge. Here, Yengo's explanation of a sudden business trip to Bermuda during a complex criminal trial was deemed frivolous and clearly inadequate, justifying the summary contempt finding.
Concurring - Handler, J.
Yes, the attorney's conduct was a direct affront to judicial authority properly punished as a summary contempt. This opinion argues that the majority is too hesitant and its 'hybrid' analysis is unnecessary. The inherent power of the judiciary allows for swift punishment of conduct that undermines the court's authority and obstructs the administration of justice. An attorney's unexcused absence, in defiance of a direct court order, is a direct contempt because it immediately interferes with the court's exercise of its power. The subsequent explanation is not what makes the act a contempt; rather, it is relevant only to determining the attorney's mens rea (criminal intent). The need to hear an explanation does not transform a direct affront into an indirect offense that requires referral to another judge. Yengo's actions were an egregious and direct interference with the court's authority, making summary punishment fully appropriate.
Analysis:
This decision establishes a crucial procedural framework for trial courts dealing with absent attorneys, creating a 'hybrid' category of contempt. It balances the court's need to maintain authority and efficiently manage its docket with the attorney's due process rights. By making the classification of contempt (direct vs. indirect) contingent on the quality of the attorney's explanation, the ruling empowers judges to swiftly sanction conduct based on frivolous excuses while referring cases with potentially valid explanations to a more formal, neutral process. This precedent gives clear guidance on when summary punishment is appropriate, thereby deterring attorney misconduct while safeguarding against arbitrary judicial power.
