In re Will of Wolfe
185 N.C. 563 (1923)
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Rule of Law:
A subsequent will does not implicitly revoke a prior will unless it contains an express revocation clause or has provisions that are wholly inconsistent with the prior will. The term 'effects,' when used in a will without additional context, is generally construed to mean only personal property and does not include real estate.
Facts:
- A testator executed a will on July 31, 1911, which, among other things, devised real estate to Mary Lillie Luffman.
- Subsequently, the same testator executed a second testamentary instrument on August 14, 1911.
- This second instrument stated that it disposed of 'all my effects.'
- The second instrument did not contain a clause explicitly revoking the first will, nor did it contain a residuary clause.
- The testator died, leaving behind both real and personal property.
- A dispute arose as to whether the second will, by its terms, revoked the first will.
Procedural Posture:
- The propounder submitted two testamentary instruments, dated July 31, 1911, and August 14, 1911, for probate in the trial court.
- Respondents contested the probate of the first will, arguing it was revoked by the second will.
- At trial, the presiding judge issued a peremptory instruction to the jury, ruling as a matter of law that the second instrument revoked the first.
- A verdict was returned and judgment was entered in accordance with the judge's instruction, invalidating the first will.
- The propounder (appellant) appealed this judgment to the reviewing court.
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Issue:
Does a subsequent will that bequeaths 'all my effects' but lacks an express revocation clause implicitly revoke a prior will that devises real estate?
Opinions:
Majority - Adahs, J.
No. A subsequent will bequeathing 'all my effects' without a revocation clause does not implicitly revoke a prior will devising real estate because the two instruments are not necessarily inconsistent. The term 'effects,' when used alone, is generally understood to encompass only personal property, not real estate. Therefore, a will devising land and a later will bequeathing personalty can stand together. The court reasons that revocation by implication is disfavored. To determine if a later will revokes a prior one, the court must ascertain the testator's intent from the plain language of the instruments. Here, the term 'effects' is not broad enough to include the real estate devised in the first will, as there is no context to suggest the testator intended a different meaning. Since the second will disposes of personal property and the first disposes of real property, their provisions are not so inconsistent as to require that the first be revoked.
Analysis:
This decision reaffirms the strong judicial preference against the revocation of wills by implication, requiring clear inconsistency between testamentary documents. It solidifies the default legal definition of the term 'effects' in will construction, limiting it to personal property unless the testator's contrary intent is evident from the will's context. This provides stability and predictability in estate law, ensuring that a specific devise of real estate is not inadvertently voided by a later, more general will that does not explicitly address land. Future cases will rely on this holding to interpret wills that use non-technical terms and to assess claims of implied revocation.
