In re Univ. of Mich.
File Name: 19a0212p.06 (6th Cir. 2019) (2019)
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Rule of Law:
Federal courts may only exercise powers granted by Congress or the Constitution, and thus a district court abuses its discretion when it orders a specific high-ranking state official to attend a public settlement conference for reasons not rooted in statutory authority or necessary inherent judicial functions.
Facts:
- John Doe sued the University of Michigan for allegedly violating his due-process rights during a school disciplinary hearing.
- The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals remanded Doe's case to the district court for reconsideration in light of a related ruling requiring live hearings and cross-examination in such proceedings.
- Upon remand, the district judge, believing the University was procrastinating, scheduled a settlement conference.
- The district judge specifically required the University's president to attend the settlement conference, refusing the University's requests to send a delegate or another person with full settlement authority.
- Two days before the scheduled conference, the district judge decided that the settlement conference, which he had previously assured would be private, should be a public event.
- The district judge stated that the conference should be public because the case involved “matters of public interest” and he desired the president to explain University policy to his constituents, the media, and the public.
Procedural Posture:
- John Doe sued the University of Michigan in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan for alleged due-process violations.
- The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals remanded Doe's case to the district court for reconsideration in light of a prior ruling (Doe v. Baum).
- On remand, the district judge scheduled a settlement conference, ordered the University's president to attend, and later ordered the conference to be public.
- The University of Michigan filed a petition for a writ of mandamus with the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, seeking to remedy the district judge's orders.
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Issue:
Does a federal district court have the power, under either congressional grants of authority (like Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16) or its inherent constitutional powers, to compel a specific high-ranking state official to attend a public settlement conference?
Opinions:
Majority - Thapar, J.
No, a federal district court does not have the power, under either congressional grants of authority or its inherent constitutional powers, to compel a specific high-ranking state official to attend a public settlement conference. Federal courts are limited to exercising powers granted by Congress or the Constitution. While Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16 allows a court to require a party or its representative with settlement authority to be present, it does not permit a district judge to insist on a specific high-ranking government official, especially when the party offers an alternative representative with full settlement authority. The Advisory Committee Notes for Rule 16 clarify that for government actors, providing access to someone who can make recommendations to the ultimate decision-making body is often sufficient. The district judge's stated reasons for requiring the president's attendance (to explain policy to constituents and the media) are not among the enumerated purposes of Rule 16 pretrial conferences. Furthermore, settlement conferences are traditionally private to encourage candid communication, and making them public undermines this purpose. The district judge's orders cannot be justified as an exercise of inherent judicial power, as such powers must be necessary for the court's core functions, incidental to all courts, and often have ancient roots; settlement conferences themselves are a relatively modern development. Lastly, the orders raise significant federalism concerns by compelling a high-ranking state official to participate in a federal court proceeding for reasons unrelated to settlement, and separation-of-powers concerns by allowing judges to effectively interrogate executive officials. Therefore, the district judge abused his discretion, warranting a writ of mandamus.
Concurring - Rogers, J.
Yes, the district court's orders constituted an abuse of discretion that warranted mandamus relief, though the court does not necessarily lack the inherent power to order a specific officer's presence in all circumstances. While agreeing with the outcome that the district judge abused his discretion by ordering the University president to attend an on-the-record settlement conference for reasons not clearly related to obtaining a settlement, I would state the reasoning somewhat differently. Ordering a specific officer's presence is not categorically beyond a federal district court's inherent power, as Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16 and its Advisory Committee Notes, along with some circuit precedent (like G. Heileman Brewing Co.), suggest that extraordinary circumstances might permit such an order. However, the specific facts here amount to an abuse of discretion that merits mandamus. Additionally, while federalism concerns are rightly implicated given the involvement of a state entity, federal separation-of-powers concerns are not, as no federal official was involved in this case.
Analysis:
This case significantly limits the scope of federal judicial power, reinforcing that district courts cannot create new powers or expand existing ones beyond specific congressional grants or well-established inherent authority. It clarifies that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16 does not empower judges to dictate which specific high-ranking government official must attend a settlement conference if a suitable representative with full settlement authority is offered. The ruling also underscores the paramount importance of privacy in settlement negotiations and serves as a check on judicial overreach, particularly concerning federal-state relations and the separation of powers by preventing federal courts from compelling state officials to account for policy in a public judicial forum.
