In re Tyvonne M.
558 A.2d 661, 211 Conn. 151, 1989 Conn. LEXIS 118 (1989)
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Rule of Law:
The common law defense of infancy, which presumes children under a certain age are incapable of committing a crime, does not apply to juvenile delinquency proceedings because the juvenile justice system is rehabilitative and not punitive.
Facts:
- Tyvonne B. was born on July 28, 1978.
- On March 1, 1987, when Tyvonne B. was eight years old, he found a small pistol while playing in a school yard and hid it in a building.
- On March 2, 1987, Tyvonne B. took the pistol to school, put it by a fence, and told another child about it, leading other children, including the victim, to hear about the pistol.
- After school, Tyvonne B. and the victim argued over whether the pistol was real, with several children examining it and deciding it was a toy.
- The victim challenged Tyvonne B., saying, 'Shoot me, shoot me.'
- Tyvonne B. then pointed the pistol at the victim, pulled the trigger, and fired one shot, striking and injuring her.
- Tyvonne B. shouted that he had been telling the truth, swore at the victim, and ran from the scene, but was apprehended shortly thereafter and taken into police custody.
Procedural Posture:
- On March 3, 1987, the state filed a petition alleging five counts of delinquent behavior arising from the shooting in the trial court (Superior Court, Juvenile Matters).
- On March 3, 1987, the trial court appointed a public defender for Tyvonne B., conducted a detention release hearing, and ordered a psychological evaluation.
- During the hearing on the delinquency petition, Tyvonne B. made an oral motion for judgment of acquittal, claiming the state had not rebutted the common law presumption of infancy for children between seven and fourteen.
- On June 10, 1987, Tyvonne B. filed a written motion for judgment of acquittal reasserting the infancy defense claim.
- On July 29, 1987, the trial court denied Tyvonne B.'s motion for judgment of acquittal.
- At the completion of the hearing, the trial court adjudicated Tyvonne B. a delinquent based on a finding that he committed assault in the second degree, dismissed other counts, and committed him to the Department of Children and Youth Services (DCYS) for a period not to exceed four years.
- Tyvonne B. appealed to the Appellate Court from the adjudication of delinquency.
- The Connecticut Supreme Court transferred the case to itself from the Appellate Court pursuant to Practice Book § 4023.
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Issue:
Does the common law defense of infancy apply to juvenile delinquency proceedings in Connecticut, thereby requiring the state to rebut a presumption that a child between seven and fourteen is incapable of committing a crime?
Opinions:
Majority - Glass, J.
No, the common law defense of infancy does not apply to juvenile delinquency proceedings. The court reasoned that Connecticut's juvenile justice legislation, established in 1921, created a system fundamentally distinct from criminal prosecutions, focused on clinical and rehabilitative objectives rather than retribution or punishment. Unlike criminal proceedings where the infancy defense shields children from punishment due to a lack of moral appreciation, juvenile proceedings aim to provide guidance and services to children in need. The court cited prior cases, such as Cinque v. Boyd, affirming that the Act establishing the juvenile justice system is not criminal in nature. Incorporating the infancy defense would frustrate these remedial goals, potentially excluding children most in need of guidance from a system designed to instill socially responsible behavior. The court acknowledged U.S. Supreme Court decisions like Kent v. United States and In re Gault, which mandated due process protections in juvenile proceedings, but emphasized that these cases did not abandon the rehabilitative focus of juvenile justice or require the application of the infancy defense. The court further distinguished cases where the infancy defense was applied, noting they were based on specific legislation or a perceived abandonment of rehabilitative goals, neither of which applied in Connecticut.
Analysis:
This case solidifies the rehabilitative and non-punitive nature of Connecticut's juvenile justice system. It establishes that the system's primary goal is to address the needs of children and society through guidance rather than to assign criminal responsibility. By rejecting the common law infancy defense, the court ensures that even very young children who commit serious acts can be brought into the juvenile system for intervention, rather than being absolved based on age-related presumptions. This decision reinforces the state's capacity to provide structured support to delinquent minors, emphasizing the distinct philosophical underpinnings of juvenile versus adult criminal justice.
