In Re: Tsarnaev v.
780 F.3d 14 (2015)
Rule of Law:
An appellate court will not grant the extraordinary remedy of a writ of mandamus to compel a change of venue unless the defendant makes a clear and indisputable showing that pretrial publicity has created a presumption of prejudice so pervasive that it is virtually impossible to select a fair and impartial jury through the voir dire process.
Facts:
- On April 15, 2013, two bombs exploded near the finish line of the Boston Marathon, killing three people and injuring over 260 others.
- A massive, four-day manhunt for the suspects, Dzhokhar Tsarnaev and his brother Tamerlan, ensued.
- During the manhunt, an MIT police officer was killed, and the suspects engaged in a shootout with police.
- Authorities issued an unprecedented "shelter-in-place" order for Boston and surrounding areas, effectively locking down the community while law enforcement searched for Dzhokhar Tsarnaev.
- Dzhokhar Tsarnaev was found hiding in a boat in a Watertown resident's backyard after a firefight with police.
- Inside the boat, Tsarnaev had allegedly written a note claiming responsibility for the bombings and stating the victims were collateral damage.
Procedural Posture:
- Dzhokhar Tsarnaev was charged in the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts with multiple federal crimes, some carrying the death penalty.
- On June 18, 2014, Tsarnaev filed his first motion to change venue, which the district court denied on September 24, 2014.
- On December 1, 2014, Tsarnaev filed a second motion to change venue.
- While the second motion was pending, Tsarnaev filed his first petition for a writ of mandamus with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit on December 31, 2014.
- The district court denied the second venue motion on January 2, 2015, and the First Circuit denied the first mandamus petition the next day.
- Jury selection began on January 5, 2015.
- On January 22, 2015, Tsarnaev filed a third motion to change venue based on juror questionnaires and voir dire, which the district court denied on February 6, 2015.
- Tsarnaev then filed a Second Petition for a Writ of Mandamus with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, which is the subject of this opinion.
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Issue:
Does extensive pretrial publicity and deep community connection to a terrorist attack create a presumption of prejudice so strong as to make a district court's refusal to change venue a clear abuse of discretion, thereby warranting the extraordinary remedy of a writ of mandamus?
Opinions:
Majority - Per Curiam
No. Extensive pretrial publicity and community connection to a crime do not create a presumption of prejudice so strong as to warrant a writ of mandamus, because the district court's ongoing and thorough jury selection process is the proper and trusted mechanism for identifying and weeding out biased jurors. The standard for mandamus relief is extraordinarily high, requiring the petitioner to show a 'clear and indisputable' right to relief and that the district court's actions amounted to a 'usurpation of power.' While pretrial publicity in this case was significant, knowledge does not equate to disqualifying prejudice. Applying the factors from Skilling v. United States, the court found that Boston's large, diverse metropolitan area, the nearly two-year passage of time since the crime, and the absence of a broadcast confession weighed against presuming prejudice. The court placed primary reliance on the trial judge's ability to gauge juror impartiality during the robust voir dire process, which it found to be thorough and effective. The petitioner's ability to raise the venue issue on direct appeal after a potential conviction also demonstrates a lack of irreparable harm.
Dissenting - Torruella, Circuit Judge
Yes. The unparalleled, pervasive, and emotionally charged pretrial publicity, combined with the fact that the entire Boston community was victimized by the attack, creates an irrefutable presumption of prejudice that requires a change of venue, and the district court's refusal to do so is a clear abuse of discretion warranting mandamus. The press coverage is 'unparalleled in American legal history,' and the entire community was terrorized, culminating in the unifying but prejudicial 'Boston Strong' sentiment. The jury selection process itself has revealed this pervasive prejudice, as evidenced by numerous statements from prospective jurors expressing prejudgment and deep personal connections. This case is far more analogous to cases like McVeigh and Rideau, where prejudice was presumed, than to Skilling, which involved non-violent financial crimes. To deny a change of venue here suggests no case would ever qualify, rendering the constitutional protection of an impartial jury a 'hollow formality.'
Analysis:
This decision reinforces the extremely high bar for pretrial appellate intervention in a trial court's management of a case, particularly concerning a change of venue. It strongly affirms the primacy of a thorough voir dire process, overseen by the trial judge, as the tool for ensuring an impartial jury, even in the face of intense, community-wide media saturation and trauma. The ruling solidifies the application of the Skilling factors, emphasizing deference to the trial court and distinguishing modern high-profile cases in large urban areas from older precedents involving smaller communities and more overtly prejudicial events like broadcast confessions. It signals to future defendants that winning a pretrial venue change via mandamus is nearly impossible, effectively pushing such challenges to post-conviction direct appeals.
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