In Re the Marriage of Olar
747 P.2d 676, 1987 WL 2981, 1987 Colo. LEXIS 677 (1987)
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Rule of Law:
An educational degree does not constitute marital property subject to division upon dissolution of marriage; however, in determining eligibility for spousal maintenance, courts must broadly interpret a spouse's "reasonable needs" and "appropriate employment" to include the parties' economic circumstances and reasonable expectations established during the marriage, especially when one spouse significantly contributed to the other's education.
Facts:
- Sally K. Olar and Terry T. Olar married on September 5, 1970.
- At the time of marriage, Sally was a high school graduate, and Terry was in his first year of undergraduate studies.
- Throughout their twelve-year marriage, Terry was a full-time student, completing undergraduate and graduate degrees, ultimately nearing completion of his doctoral degree in physiology and biophysics from Colorado State University.
- During this time, Sally worked full-time, including as a bookkeeper earning $1,200 per month gross at the time of separation, and contributed significantly to the couple's finances.
- The couple accumulated limited marital property, consisting of two motor vehicles, furniture, a mobile home worth approximately $10,000, and $1,100 in a savings account, and incurred credit card and student loan debts (Terry's student loans were approximately $5,400).
- The Olars separated on June 26, 1982, and a child was born of the marriage eleven months before the dissolution decree was entered on December 23, 1983.
- By the time of the dissolution decree, Sally was an unemployed, full-time student living with her parents, while Terry was a laboratory manager earning a gross salary of $35,000 per year.
Procedural Posture:
- Sally K. Olar filed for dissolution of marriage in January 1983 in Larimer County District Court (trial court).
- The trial court held that Sally was not eligible for maintenance because she failed to establish the threshold of need under state statute, finding she was capable of supporting herself and that nothing suggested her minor child required her full-time presence at home.
- The trial court ordered Terry to pay Sally $350 per month as child support and divided the limited marital property, awarding Sally $5,000 and Terry the balance of the combined proceeds from the mobile home sale and savings account, noting this was to assist Sally in continuing her education while working part-time.
- The trial court specifically held that Terry's education was not marital property and that his student loans were not marital obligations, ordering him to assume those debts without contribution from Sally.
- Sally K. Olar (appellant) appealed the trial court's judgment to the Colorado Court of Appeals, claiming the trial court erred in denying her maintenance.
- The Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that Sally failed to establish the requisite need for maintenance under the statutory threshold.
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Issue:
Does an educational degree constitute marital property subject to division upon dissolution of marriage, and if not, does a supporting spouse's "need" for maintenance require consideration of the parties' economic circumstances and reasonable expectations established during the marriage, including contributions to the other spouse's education?
Opinions:
Majority - Vollack, Justice
No, an educational degree does not constitute marital property subject to division upon dissolution of marriage, but a supporting spouse's "need" for maintenance requires a broader interpretation that considers the parties' economic circumstances, reasonable expectations, and contributions to the other spouse's education during the marriage. The court reaffirmed its prior holding in Graham v. Graham (1978), stating that an educational degree is not marital property because it is an intellectual achievement, lacks attributes of property in the usual sense, and its value is too speculative and dependent upon the possessor's future choices to be fairly valued. The court acknowledged the potential for injustice when one spouse sacrifices their own educational and career goals to support the other's education, especially when a dissolution occurs before the benefits of the degree can be realized and little marital property has accumulated. To address this inequity, the court reinterpreted the statutory standards for awarding maintenance under section 14-10-114, 6B C.R.S. (1987). It rejected a narrow interpretation of "reasonable needs" as merely the minimum resources to sustain human life, asserting that what constitutes "reasonable needs" depends upon the particular facts and circumstances of the parties’ marriage. Furthermore, the court clarified that "appropriate employment" must be employment suited to the individual, including that individual’s expectations and intentions as expressed during the marriage. This reinterpretation allows courts to use maintenance as a tool to balance equities and compensate a spouse whose work has enabled the other spouse to obtain an education, even if that spouse might otherwise be deemed capable of supporting themselves under a more restrictive view of the statute. Any prior statements or intimations to the contrary in Graham and In re Marriage of McVey were expressly disapproved.
Analysis:
This case significantly clarifies and expands the application of spousal maintenance in Colorado, particularly for supporting spouses in "educational marriages." While it firmly reiterates that educational degrees are not divisible marital property, it provides a vital avenue for financial redress by broadening the interpretation of statutory maintenance criteria. This ruling prevents unjust enrichment of the degree-holding spouse and ensures that the contributing spouse's sacrifices and marital expectations are given due consideration, shifting away from a minimalist interpretation of "need." It establishes that courts must examine the specific circumstances of the marriage, including the standard of living and mutual expectations, when determining both the eligibility for and the amount of maintenance, thereby promoting more equitable dissolution outcomes.
