In Re the Marriage of Brown
100 Wash. 2d 729, 675 p.2d 1207, 1984 Wash. LEXIS 1445 (1984)
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Rule of Law:
Recovery for a personal injury inflicted upon a married person by a third-party tortfeasor is the separate property of the injured spouse. However, portions of the recovery that compensate the community for lost wages that would have been community property or for injury-related expenses incurred by the community are classified as community property.
Facts:
- Ronna Brown and William L. Brown were married in 1967.
- The parties entered into a postnuptial agreement providing that upon dissolution, each party would be awarded their separate property and the community property would be divided equally.
- About six months before filing for dissolution a second time, Ronna Brown was injured in an automobile accident caused by a third party.
- At the time of the dissolution trial, Ronna Brown had a pending personal injury claim for the accident.
- All out-of-pocket medical expenses incurred prior to the trial had already been reimbursed.
Procedural Posture:
- Ronna Brown filed an action for dissolution of her marriage to William L. Brown in a Washington trial court.
- In its decree of dissolution, the trial court characterized Ronna Brown's potential personal injury recovery by dividing it into separate and community property components.
- William Brown, as appellant, appealed the trial court's characterization to the Court of Appeals, Division One.
- The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court, holding that the entire potential recovery from the personal injury claim was community property.
- The Washington Supreme Court granted review of the Court of Appeals' decision.
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Issue:
Does a potential recovery on a personal injury claim, sustained by one spouse during a marriage, constitute community property for the purposes of distribution in a dissolution proceeding?
Opinions:
Majority - Dimmick, J.
No, a potential recovery on a personal injury claim sustained during marriage is not entirely community property. The court overruled its long-standing precedent from Hawkins v. Front St. Cable Ry., which held that such recoveries were community property based on a literal interpretation of statutes defining property 'acquired' during marriage. The court adopted an analytical approach, reasoning that the character of the recovery should match the character of the loss it is intended to compensate. Under this approach, compensation for pain and suffering is personal to the injured spouse and is therefore separate property. Compensation for lost wages is community property to the extent it replaces wages that would have been earned during the marriage (prior to separation), but it is separate property for wages that would have been earned after separation. Similarly, compensation for medical expenses is characterized based on whether the community or a separate fund incurred the expense. The court concluded that interpreting 'acquired' property to mean that which is obtained through toil, talent, or productive faculty, rather than compensation for injury, is more consistent with the principles of community property law and aligns Washington with the majority of other community property states.
Analysis:
This decision marks a significant departure from nearly a century of Washington precedent, replacing a rigid, all-or-nothing rule with a nuanced analytical approach. By overturning Hawkins, the court shifted from classifying personal injury awards based on when they were 'acquired' to analyzing the purpose of each component of the damages. This requires trial courts to 'trace' the nature of the recovery—separating pain and suffering, lost wages, and medical expenses—to determine its character as separate or community property. The ruling provides greater protection for the personal aspects of an injury award (like pain and suffering), ensuring they remain with the injured spouse in a dissolution, and will likely necessitate more detailed settlements or special jury interrogatories in tort cases involving a married plaintiff.
