In re the Last Will & Testament & Trust Agreement of Moor
879 A.2d 648, 2005 Del. Ch. LEXIS 78 (2005)
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Rule of Law:
A testator may, in a personal property memorandum incorporated by reference into a will, validly direct executors to sell tangible personal property and distribute the resulting cash proceeds to named beneficiaries, as this constitutes a valid 'disposition' of property under statutes authorizing such separate writings.
Facts:
- In 1998, Betty R. Moor executed a will in Florida that provided for the disposition of tangible personal property via a separate written statement and left the remainder of her estate to a revocable trust.
- In 2000, Mrs. Moor moved to Delaware.
- On March 9, 2001, Mrs. Moor executed a signed personal property memorandum ('Property Memo') in Delaware, which made several specific bequests of personal items.
- The Property Memo also contained a 'Capital Gain Clause' directing that any unlisted items be auctioned and the net proceeds ('capitol gain') be distributed to the individuals named elsewhere in the document.
- On September 8, 2001, Mrs. Moor executed a codicil to her will, which changed one of her executors but otherwise ratified the 1998 will.
Procedural Posture:
- After Betty R. Moor's death, the executors of her estate, April Hudson and Richard McCann, agreed to distribute the specific items listed in the Property Memo.
- The executors contended that the 'Capital Gain Clause' was unenforceable and intended to distribute the proceeds from the sale of the remaining personal property (over $167,000) to the residuary beneficiaries of Mrs. Moor's trust.
- Robert Cooper Moor, Jr. and Marilyn Mercedes Moor, beneficiaries named in the Property Memo, petitioned the Delaware Court of Chancery (the court of first instance for this type of dispute), seeking to enforce the Capital Gain Clause against the executors.
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Issue:
Does a clause in a personal property memorandum, which directs executors to sell tangible personal property and distribute the cash proceeds to named individuals, constitute a valid 'disposition' of property under statutes that permit bequests of tangible personal property by a separate writing referenced in a will?
Opinions:
Majority - Strine, Vice Chancellor
Yes, a clause in a personal property memorandum directing the sale of tangible personal property and the distribution of the proceeds is a valid disposition of that property. The relevant Delaware and Florida statutes grant testators the broad power 'to dispose of' tangible personal property in a separate writing. The term 'dispose of' is capacious and should not be narrowly interpreted to mean only a direct, in-kind bequest. Mrs. Moor's instruction to sell property and distribute the proceeds falls squarely within a literal reading of the statutes, as she is disposing of tangible personal property, not money; the cash proceeds are merely the form the disposition takes upon completion. The public policy behind these statutes is to provide testators with a flexible means to devise their personal property. Invalidating the clause would serve no protective purpose, as the risk of undue influence is the same whether a testator devises a valuable painting directly or directs its sale for cash. Upholding the clause honors the clear and undisputed testamentary intent of Mrs. Moor.
Analysis:
This decision clarifies the scope of the statutory phrase 'dispose of' in the context of personal property memoranda, favoring a broad, flexible interpretation that prioritizes testator intent over formalism. It establishes that an indirect disposition, such as ordering a sale and distribution of proceeds, is permissible so long as the underlying asset is tangible personal property. This precedent gives estate planners and testators greater freedom in crafting dispositions of personal effects, confirming that the form of the ultimate benefit (cash) does not invalidate a bequest originating from a permissible type of property (tangible personalty).
