In Re the Estates of Covert
735 N.Y.S.2d 879, 761 N.E.2d 571, 97 N.Y.2d 68 (2001)
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Rule of Law:
The equitable doctrine that prevents a wrongdoer from profiting from their crime does not extend to disinherit the wrongdoer's innocent distributees who are named as beneficiaries in the victim's will.
Facts:
- On December 14, 1995, Edward M. Covert and Kathleen Covert executed a joint will.
- The will provided that upon the death of one spouse, all property would pass to the survivor.
- Upon the death of the surviving spouse, the will's residuary clause directed the estate to be distributed in three equal shares: one-third to Edward's parents, one-third to Kathleen's parents, and one-third to their collective siblings.
- Edward also owned life insurance policies and a retirement fund that named Kathleen as the primary beneficiary and his parents as the contingent beneficiaries.
- On April 3, 1998, Edward Covert shot and killed Kathleen Covert.
- Immediately following the murder, Edward Covert committed suicide.
- Edward's family members (the Coverts), who were named as beneficiaries, were not involved in the crime.
Procedural Posture:
- The executrix of the couple's will, Kelly Hawley, petitioned the Surrogate’s Court for direction in distributing the estates.
- The Millards (victim's family) requested that the Coverts (slayer's family) be precluded from taking under the will.
- The Coverts moved for summary judgment to compel distribution according to the will's express terms.
- The Surrogate’s Court (trial court) denied the Coverts' motion, granting summary judgment to the Millards and precluding the Coverts from taking any of Kathleen’s property.
- The Coverts, as appellants, appealed to the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court (intermediate appellate court).
- The Appellate Division modified the Surrogate’s Court order, treating Edward as having predeceased Kathleen and directing all property to pass through Kathleen's estate for distribution in thirds per the will.
- The Millards, as appellants, were granted leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals of New York (the state's highest court).
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Issue:
Does the slayer rule, which prevents a killer from inheriting from their victim, also prevent the killer's innocent family members from taking a bequest left to them in the victim's will?
Opinions:
Majority - Ciparick, J.
No. The equitable principle that a wrongdoer cannot profit from their crime does not disinherit the wrongdoer's innocent family members who are expressly named as legatees in the victim's will. The court reasoned that the 'slayer rule' established in Riggs v. Palmer is intended to prevent the wrongdoer from acquiring property through their crime, not to punish innocent relatives or override the testator's clear intent to benefit them. While Riggs voids any bequest from Kathleen to Edward, it does not apply to the Coverts as they are innocent distributees. The failure of the gift to Edward accelerates the residuary clause, preventing intestacy and giving effect to the will's terms. The court further held that jointly owned property should be severed, with half passing through each estate, to prevent the slayer from gaining the victim's share through survivorship without forcing a forfeiture of his own pre-existing interest, which is protected by Civil Rights Law § 79-b. Finally, proceeds from the slayer's own insurance policies and pension plans pass to the named contingent beneficiaries, as this does not involve the slayer profiting from the victim's estate but rather disposing of his own property.
Analysis:
This decision significantly clarifies and limits the scope of New York's 'slayer rule' derived from Riggs v. Palmer. It establishes a firm distinction between the culpability of the wrongdoer and the rights of innocent beneficiaries, prioritizing the testator's intent when it does not result in unjust enrichment for the killer. By refusing to extend the legal fiction of the slayer predeceasing the victim to disinherit innocent parties, the court prevents the rule from becoming punitive against those not involved in the wrongdoing. The case provides a clear analytical framework for practitioners on how to distribute various types of assets (individual, joint, and contractual) in murder-suicide cases, balancing the policy against profiting from crime with principles of will construction and property law.
