In Re the Estate of Wilson
465 N.Y.S.2d 900, 452 N.E.2d 1228, 59 N.Y.2d 461 (1983)
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Rule of Law:
The judicial application of neutral trust law principles to facilitate the administration of a private charitable trust with discriminatory terms does not constitute state action that violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, so long as the court does not compel, affirmatively promote, or encourage the private discrimination.
Facts:
- In his will, Clark W. Wilson created a trust to fund college scholarships for five 'young men' graduating from Canastota High School.
- The Wilson will required the Superintendent of the Canastota Central School District to certify the names of the qualified male students to the trustee, Key Bank.
- After a complaint was filed with the U.S. Department of Education, the Canastota school district agreed to stop certifying names for the trust.
- In a separate case, Edwin Irving Johnson's will created a trust to provide college scholarships for 'bright and deserving young men' from the Croton-Harmon Union Free School District.
- Johnson's will named the Board of Education of the school district as the trustee responsible for selecting the male recipients.
- After the National Organization for Women filed a complaint, the Croton-Harmon Board of Education became unwilling to administer the trust according to its gender-restrictive terms.
Procedural Posture:
- In Matter of Wilson, the trustee, Key Bank, initiated a proceeding in Surrogate's Court for a determination of the trust's validity after the school district refused to participate.
- The Surrogate’s Court upheld the trust and ordered the trustee to continue its administration.
- On appeal, the Appellate Division, Third Department, modified the decree, exercising its cy pres power to strike the superintendent certification requirement, allowing students to apply directly to the trustee.
- In Matter of Johnson, the Attorney-General petitioned the Surrogate's Court to construe the will after the school board became unwilling to act as trustee.
- The Surrogate’s Court declined to remove the gender restriction and instead appointed a private trustee to replace the school district.
- On appeal, the Appellate Division, Second Department, reversed, holding that substituting the trustee was unconstitutional state action and reformed the trust to eliminate the gender restriction.
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Issue:
Does a court's action to reform a private charitable trust—either by replacing an unwilling public trustee with a private one or by modifying an administrative term involving a public entity—constitute state action that violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment when the trust's terms restrict beneficiaries by gender?
Opinions:
Majority - Chief Judge Cooke
No. A court's application of its equitable power to permit the continued administration of these trusts does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment. The Equal Protection Clause is triggered by state action, not merely private conduct, however discriminatory. When a court applies neutral trust law that permits, but does not compel or encourage, private discrimination in a bequest, the resulting discrimination is not fairly attributable to the State. The court distinguished this from cases like Shelley v. Kraemer, where the court's 'full coercive power' was used to enforce a discriminatory act. Here, the court's actions—replacing an unwilling trustee in Johnson or permitting a deviation from an administrative term in Wilson—are routine equitable powers that merely facilitate the administration of a private choice already made by the testator. The State is not compelling discrimination; it is simply providing a neutral legal framework that allows a private testator's intent to be carried out.
Concurring in Wilson and dissenting in Johnson - Judge Meyer
In Wilson, I concur. The superintendent's role was merely to certify class standing, which is publicly available information, and therefore did not constitute significant state action. In Johnson, I dissent. The trust was unconstitutional from its inception because it named a public body, the board of education, as the trustee for a discriminatory purpose. For a court to then legitimize this unconstitutional arrangement by substituting a private trustee is itself affirmative state action in furtherance of bias. The only constitutionally permissible action would have been to excise the discriminatory gender limitation.
Analysis:
This decision clarifies the boundary between private discriminatory intent and unconstitutional state action within the context of charitable trusts. It establishes that courts may use their inherent equitable powers to save a trust with discriminatory terms from failing due to administrative impossibilities, such as the refusal of a public entity to participate. The ruling insulates the neutral application of trust law from Fourteenth Amendment challenges, thereby prioritizing the testator's intent over claims that such judicial facilitation amounts to state-sponsored discrimination. This precedent makes it more difficult to legally challenge gender or other classifications in private philanthropy, so long as the court's role is limited to administration rather than enforcement of the discrimination itself.
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