In re the Estate of Scale
830 N.Y.S.2d 618, 38 A.D.3d 983 (2007)
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Rule of Law:
Extrinsic evidence is inadmissible to vary the terms of a will when its language is clear and unambiguously identifies an existing beneficiary. A latent ambiguity justifying the admission of such evidence does not arise from general public confusion between similarly named organizations but must be found by examining the names and purposes of the competing organizations as declared by the laws of their creation.
Facts:
- On April 3, 2002, Frederick A. Scale (the testator) executed his last will and testament.
- Paragraph 2F of the will devised 10% of his residuary estate to 'The Audubon Society of New York State.'
- An organization named 'Audubon Society of New York State, Inc.' (the state organization) exists.
- Another organization, 'National Audubon Society, Inc.' (the national organization), also exists and does business as 'Audubon New York.'
- After the testator's death on June 4, 2002, both the state organization and the national organization claimed to be the intended beneficiary of the will's bequest.
- The will drafter later stated in an affidavit that although the testator confirmed he meant the state organization, the drafter believed the testator was confused and actually intended to benefit the national organization.
Procedural Posture:
- The executor of Frederick A. Scale's estate (petitioner) filed a petition in the Surrogate’s Court of Albany County to determine the proper beneficiary of a bequest.
- The Surrogate's Court found a latent ambiguity in the will's language.
- The court admitted extrinsic evidence, including an affidavit from the will's drafter.
- Based on the extrinsic evidence, the Surrogate’s Court ruled that the testator intended to make the gift to the National Audubon Society, Inc.
- The Audubon Society of New York State, Inc. (appellant) appealed the order and decree of the Surrogate's Court to the appellate court.
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Issue:
Does a latent ambiguity exist that permits the admission of extrinsic evidence to determine a testator's intent when the will names a specific, existing charitable organization, but another, similarly-named organization also claims to be the intended beneficiary?
Opinions:
Majority - Mercure, J.
No. A latent ambiguity does not exist, and extrinsic evidence is inadmissible because the best indicator of a testator's intent is the clear and unambiguous language of the will itself. Here, the will designated 'The Audubon Society of New York State,' and a corporation named 'The Audubon Society of New York State, Inc.' exists. The testator's failure to include 'Inc.' in the name does not create an ambiguity. Extrinsic evidence, such as the drafter's affidavit speculating on the testator's alleged confusion, cannot be used to create an ambiguity where none exists on the face of the document. The court reasoned that allowing a drafter's recollection to override the will's text would undermine the principle that the will itself is the repository of the decedent's intent. Allegations of public confusion between the organizations or the existence of many charities with similar names are insufficient to justify looking beyond the four corners of the will.
Analysis:
This decision strongly reinforces the sanctity of the four corners of a will, prioritizing the plain meaning of the text over extrinsic evidence of intent. It establishes a high bar for admitting parol evidence in will construction cases involving charitable bequests, limiting its use to situations where ambiguity is apparent from the corporate names and purposes themselves, not from external factors like public confusion or a drafter's subsequent testimony. The ruling promotes certainty and predictability in estate administration by refusing to allow the clear language of a testamentary instrument to be contradicted by subjective or speculative evidence. This precedent will make it more difficult for unnamed but similarly-titled organizations to challenge bequests made to specifically-named entities.
