In re the Estate of Morea
169 Misc. 2d 415, 1996 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 277, 645 N.Y.S.2d 1022 (1996)
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Rule of Law:
Under New York's interested witness statute (EPTL 3-3.2), a disposition to an attesting witness is not considered 'beneficial' if the witness, as a distributee, would have received a larger share of the estate through intestacy had the will been denied probate. Such a witness can therefore count as a disinterested witness for the purpose of validating a bequest to another attesting witness.
Facts:
- A testatrix executed a will on December 2, 1991.
- The will made a bequest of one-eighth of her tangible personal property to her friend, George Buonaroba.
- The will also made a bequest to her son, Kevin.
- The testatrix had six surviving children, including Kevin, who were her legal heirs (distributees).
- The value of the bequest Kevin received under the will was less than the value of the share he would have received if the testatrix had died without a will (intestate).
- The will was attested by three witnesses: George Buonaroba, Kevin, and a third individual who received no disposition under the will.
Procedural Posture:
- An uncontested proceeding was initiated in the Surrogate's Court, the court of first instance for this matter, to probate the decedent's will.
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Issue:
Does a bequest to an attesting witness who is also a distributee of the testator count as a 'beneficial disposition' under EPTL 3-3.2, thereby disqualifying them as a disinterested witness, when that bequest is smaller than the share the witness would receive under the laws of intestacy?
Opinions:
Majority - Holzman, J.
No. A bequest to an attesting witness who is also a distributee is not a 'beneficial disposition' under EPTL 3-3.2 when the witness would inherit more through intestacy if the will were invalidated. The purpose of the statute is to remove the incentive for witnesses to provide false testimony to protect their own legacies. A witness who stands to gain more from the will's invalidation has no such incentive; in fact, their financial interest is aligned with testifying against the will. The term 'beneficial' must be interpreted as 'advantageous.' Because Kevin's intestate share is greater than his bequest, the disposition is not advantageous to him and he is not disqualified as a disinterested witness. Therefore, between Kevin and the third non-beneficiary witness, there are two disinterested witnesses, which validates the bequest to George Buonaroba.
Analysis:
This decision provides a purposive interpretation of New York's interested witness statute, moving away from a rigid, literal application. By defining 'beneficial disposition' based on a comparison to the witness's intestate share, the court ensures the statute's goal—preventing witness perjury—is met without needlessly frustrating the testator's intent. This ruling establishes that the financial incentive of the witness is the key factor, thereby protecting bequests to witnesses where another witness-beneficiary has a clear incentive to be truthful or even to testify against the will. It prevents the statute from being used to create an unjust forfeiture where no risk to the will's integrity exists.

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