In re the Estate of Hamilton
1993 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 1084, 593 N.Y.S.2d 372, 190 A.D.2d 927 (1993)
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Rule of Law:
When a donor's will requires that a power of appointment be exercised only by a "specific reference to the power," the donee's will must refer to that specific power. Referencing a power of appointment from a prior, revoked will is insufficient to exercise the power granted in the current, effective will.
Facts:
- On August 26, 1966, Milton W. Hamilton executed a will that granted his wife, Anita G. Hamilton, a power of appointment.
- On December 22, 1967, Anita G. Hamilton executed her will, which explicitly stated she was exercising the power of appointment given to her in her husband's will dated August 26, 1966, in favor of her son, John H. Ricketson.
- On April 5, 1982, Milton W. Hamilton executed a new will that revoked all of his prior wills.
- This 1982 will created a marital trust (Fund A) and granted Anita G. Hamilton a power of appointment over it, but stipulated the power was "exercisable only by specific reference to said power" in her will.
- Milton W. Hamilton died on February 26, 1989.
- Anita G. Hamilton died 15 days later, leaving her 1967 will as her final testament without having updated it to reference the 1982 power of appointment.
Procedural Posture:
- Petitioner commenced an accounting proceeding in the Surrogate’s Court of Albany County, seeking a determination on the validity of Anita G. Hamilton's exercise of the power of appointment.
- The Surrogate’s Court decreed that Hamilton had failed to effectively exercise the power of appointment granted in her husband's 1982 will.
- The court ruled that the trust assets would therefore pass to the default beneficiaries, Mary H. McLaughlin and Gwendolyn H. Stevens.
- John H. Ricketson, the intended appointee under Hamilton’s will, appealed the decree to the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court.
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Issue:
Does a donee's will, which explicitly exercises a power of appointment granted in a specific, dated will that has since been revoked, satisfy the donor's requirement in a subsequent, final will that the power be exercised only by "specific reference to said power"?
Opinions:
Majority - Crew III, J.
No. A donee's will that references a power of appointment from a specific, revoked will does not satisfy the "specific reference" requirement for a power created in a later, final will. Under New York's EPTL 10-6.1(b), if a donor expressly directs that a power can only be exercised via a specific reference, an instrument lacking such a reference is ineffective. Here, Milton's 1982 will made it 'crystal clear' that a specific reference was required. Anita's will only referred to a power from Milton's 1966 will, a power that ceased to exist when the 1966 will was revoked. The court found that Anita's intent is irrelevant in the face of the donor's clear and unambiguous requirement. The argument that her attempt 'reasonably approximates' the required manner was rejected, as strict compliance with the donor's specific reference requirement is necessary.
Analysis:
This decision reinforces the legal principle of strict compliance with a donor's stated requirements for exercising a power of appointment. It clarifies that under EPTL 10-6.1(b), a reference to an incorrect, non-existent power is not sufficient when the donor demands a specific reference to the operative power. This holding serves as a strong cautionary tale for estate planners and individuals, emphasizing the critical need to update wills that exercise powers of appointment whenever the underlying instrument creating that power is changed. The court's refusal to infer the donee's intent highlights that clear, express conditions set by a donor will override equitable considerations.
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