In re Snide
52 N.Y.2d 193, 437 N.Y.S.2d 63, 418 N.E.2d 656 (1981)
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Rule of Law:
When identical mutual wills are mistakenly signed by the incorrect party during a joint execution ceremony, a court may reform the will and admit it to probate if the testator's intent is clear and there is no evidence of fraud.
Facts:
- Harvey Snide and his wife, Rose Snide, intended to execute mutual wills at a common ceremony.
- Their attorney prepared two wills with identical dispositive provisions, differing only in the names of the testator and beneficiary.
- During the execution ceremony, Harvey and Rose were presented with the wills in envelopes, but each envelope contained the will intended for the other spouse.
- Without reading the documents, Harvey Snide mistakenly signed the will prepared for his wife, Rose, and Rose mistakenly signed the will prepared for Harvey.
- All other statutory formalities for will execution were properly observed during the ceremony.
- After Harvey Snide's death, he was survived by his wife, Rose, and three children, one of whom was a minor.
Procedural Posture:
- Rose Snide, the proponent, offered the instrument Harvey Snide signed for probate in the Surrogate's Court.
- The Surrogate's Court admitted the will to probate and ordered it reformed to substitute the correct names.
- The guardian ad litem for the minor child, an objectant, appealed the Surrogate's decree to the Appellate Division.
- The Appellate Division, an intermediate appellate court, reversed the Surrogate's Court's decision on the law, holding the instrument could not be admitted to probate.
- Rose Snide, as the appellant, then appealed the Appellate Division's decision to the Court of Appeals of New York, the state's highest court.
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Issue:
Does a will signed by a testator, which was mistakenly the will prepared for his spouse during a joint execution of identical mutual wills, lack the necessary testamentary intent to be admitted to probate?
Opinions:
Majority - Wachtler, J.
No, the will does not lack the necessary testamentary intent and may be admitted to probate. A formalistic view that testamentary intent attaches irrevocably to the specific document signed should be rejected in favor of a view that considers the testamentary scheme the document reflects. The court reasoned that the mistake in this case was akin to signing a carbon copy instead of the original; the underlying intent remained clear. Because the two wills were identical except for the names, and they were executed simultaneously with all required formalities, the testator's plan is obvious. Admitting the will to probate and reforming the clerical error honors the testator's clear intent, and refusing to do so on these narrow facts would be perverse, as there is absolutely no danger of fraud.
Dissenting - Jones, J.
Yes, the will lacks the necessary testamentary intent and should not be admitted to probate. The dissent argues that the statutes governing wills require strict adherence to prescribed formalities to protect testators from fraud, even if it sometimes frustrates a decedent's clear intentions. What is admitted to probate is the specific paper writing the testator signed, and there is no doubt that Harvey Snide did not intend the document he signed to be his will. The majority's decision to reform the will is a departure from consistent precedent and an instance of a 'hard case' making 'bad law.' The dissent fears this will create a slippery slope, leading courts to reform other wills with different types of mistakes, thereby undermining the stability and predictability of the law of wills.
Analysis:
This decision represents a significant departure from the traditional, formalistic application of the Statute of Wills in New York. The court prioritized the testator's clear and undisputed intent over a strict adherence to the rule that intent must attach to the specific document signed. It established a narrow equitable exception for cases involving mistakenly swapped, identical mutual wills where there is no risk of fraud. The ruling aligns New York with a more modern, intent-serving approach seen in other common-law jurisdictions but, as the dissent notes, creates tension with the historical purpose of will formalities and raises questions about how far courts may go in correcting future testamentary errors.
