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In re Ruffalo

Supreme Court of United States
390 U.S. 544 (1968)
ELI5:

Rule of Law:

Procedural due process requires that an attorney in a disbarment proceeding be given fair and adequate notice of the charges against them before the proceedings commence. Amending the charges mid-hearing to conform to the evidence presented by the accused attorney's own testimony violates this fundamental right.


Facts:

  • John Ruffalo was an active trial lawyer specializing in Federal Employers’ Liability Act (FELA) cases against railroads.
  • Ruffalo hired Michael Orlando, a night-shift car inspector for the Baltimore & Ohio (B&O) Railroad, to investigate FELA cases, including some against the B&O Railroad.
  • Orlando performed his investigations for Ruffalo on his own time, did not investigate cases in the yard where he worked, and had no access to confidential company information.
  • The Mahoning County Bar Association, whose president was also local counsel for the B&O Railroad, initiated disciplinary proceedings against Ruffalo.
  • The initial charges accused Ruffalo of soliciting clients through Orlando.
  • During the disciplinary hearing, both Ruffalo and Orlando testified that Orlando's role was strictly as an investigator, not a solicitor.

Procedural Posture:

  • The Mahoning County Bar Association filed a complaint with the Ohio Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline, alleging 12 counts of misconduct against Ruffalo.
  • During the disciplinary hearing, after testimony from Ruffalo and Orlando, the Board added a thirteenth charge against Ruffalo for hiring Orlando to investigate his own employer.
  • The Board found Ruffalo guilty on seven counts, including the new charge No. 13.
  • On review, the Supreme Court of Ohio sustained only two charges, one of which was No. 13, and ordered Ruffalo indefinitely suspended from the practice of law.
  • Subsequently, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, relying on the Ohio state proceedings, ordered Ruffalo disbarred from practice in that federal court.
  • The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Appeals.

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Issue:

Does amending charges in a quasi-criminal attorney disbarment proceeding, after the accused has testified, to include a new charge based on that testimony violate the attorney's procedural due process right to fair notice?


Opinions:

Majority - Mr. Justice Douglas

Yes. Amending charges in a quasi-criminal attorney disbarment proceeding after the accused has testified violates the attorney's procedural due process right to fair notice. Disbarment proceedings are quasi-criminal in nature, and as such, an attorney is entitled to procedural due process, which includes fair notice of the specific charges against them before the proceedings begin. When the charges are amended mid-hearing based on the testimony of the accused, the proceedings become a trap, depriving the attorney of the opportunity to mount a proper defense from the outset. In this case, Ruffalo had no notice that his employment of Orlando would be considered a disbarment offense until after he and Orlando had testified, which irrevocably prejudiced his defense.


Concurring - Mr. Justice Harlan

This opinion concurs in the judgment to reverse but would not reach the constitutional due process question. The notice provided in the state proceeding was inadequate for the separate purpose of a federal court disbarment, regardless of its constitutional sufficiency for the state action itself. Under Theard v. United States, federal courts are free to hold that such procedurally flawed state proceedings should not be accepted as the basis for disbarment from a federal court.


Concurring - Mr. Justice White

This opinion concurs in the judgment to reverse but rejects the majority's due process reasoning, arguing the issue was not properly raised by the petitioner. The proper ground for reversal is that a federal court cannot disbar an attorney for conduct whose ethical propriety is debatable among reasonable attorneys, unless a specific, pre-existing rule prohibits that conduct. Since responsible attorneys could differ on whether hiring the railroad employee was improper, it is unjust to disbar Ruffalo under a general 'conduct unbecoming' standard after the fact.



Analysis:

This case establishes a critical due process protection for attorneys in disciplinary proceedings, treating such actions as 'quasi-criminal' and requiring notice of charges before the hearing begins. It prevents disciplinary bodies from using an attorney's own testimony as a basis for adding new charges mid-proceeding, thereby preventing hearings from becoming 'traps.' This decision forces bar associations to conduct thorough investigations and finalize all charges before initiating a formal hearing, ensuring that the accused has a full and fair opportunity to defend against a known set of accusations.

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