In re Rebecca B.
611 N.Y.S.2d 831, 204 A.D.2d 57 (1994)
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Rule of Law:
A parent's deliberate and sustained effort to interfere with and exclude the other parent from a child's life is a significant factor demonstrating a substantial change in circumstances, and is so inconsistent with the child's best interests that it may warrant a transfer of custody.
Facts:
- Following a 1987 custody determination in favor of the mother, the father and his daughter developed a profound bond.
- The child, then seven years old, repeatedly and clearly expressed a preference to live with her father.
- The mother engaged in punitive disciplinary measures, including spanking, slapping, and locking the child in her room.
- The mother actively and consistently attempted to exclude the father from the child's life, interfering with their relationship.
Procedural Posture:
- In 1987, the Family Court made an initial determination granting the mother sole legal custody of the parties' daughter.
- The father subsequently filed a motion in New York County Family Court seeking to modify the order and obtain sole legal custody.
- The Family Court (trial court) conducted a hearing, which included testimony from several expert witnesses.
- On May 8, 1992, the Family Court judge issued an order denying the father's motion for a transfer of custody.
- The father (appellant) appealed the Family Court's order to the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court, First Department (intermediate appellate court).
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Issue:
Does a custodial parent's effort to exclude the non-custodial parent from the child's life, combined with the child's expressed preference and expert testimony supporting the non-custodial parent, constitute a substantial change of circumstances sufficient to warrant a transfer of custody in the child's best interests?
Opinions:
Majority - Sullivan, J.P., Asch, Rubin, and Nardelli, JJ. (Per Curiam)
Yes. A custodial parent's effort to exclude the non-custodial parent from the child's life, along with other factors, constitutes a substantial change of circumstances that warrants a transfer of custody in the child's best interests. The court's primary duty is to determine the best interest of the child, which includes the quality of the home environment and parental guidance. The father successfully met his burden to show a substantial change in circumstances through evidence of the child's preference, their strong bond, the mother's punitive discipline, and especially the mother's efforts at parental alienation. The court found the testimony of three experts who all interviewed the entire family and recommended transferring custody to the father to be credible, while giving little weight to the mother's expert who had not spoken with the father or the child. Citing precedent like Entwistle v Entwistle, the court held that a parent's attempts to alienate the other parent are so contrary to a child's best interests that it raises a strong probability of unfitness for custody. The appellate court exercised its broad authority to overrule the trial court, finding that its decision to deny the transfer lacked a sound and substantial basis in the record.
Analysis:
This decision underscores the significant weight courts place on a parent's willingness to foster a healthy relationship between the child and the other parent. It solidifies the principle that acts of parental alienation can be a primary and decisive factor in modifying a custody order, potentially overriding the trial court's deference. The case also serves as a strong statement on the necessity of comprehensive expert evaluations in custody disputes, signaling that testimony from an expert who has not evaluated all parties involved will be given minimal consideration. Finally, it reaffirms the broad de novo review power of New York appellate courts in custody matters, allowing them to substitute their own judgment for that of the trial judge.
