In re Pers. Restraint of Monschke
197 Wash. 2d 305, 482 P.3d 276 (2021)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
Under Article I, Section 14 of the Washington Constitution, a mandatory sentence of life in prison without parole (LWOP) for defendants aged 18 to 20 at the time of their crime constitutes cruel punishment. Sentencing courts must have discretion to consider the mitigating qualities of youth before imposing such a sentence on this class of offenders.
Facts:
- At age 20, Dwayne Earl Bartholomew told his brother he intended to rob a laundromat and leave no witnesses.
- Bartholomew proceeded to rob the laundromat, taking $237 from the cash drawer.
- During the robbery, Bartholomew fatally shot a laundromat attendant.
- In a separate incident, 19-year-old Kurtis William Monschke and his friends, who were associated with a white supremacist group, purchased baseball bats.
- The group's goal was for a member to earn 'red shoelaces' by assaulting a member of a minority group.
- After two members of the group located and began beating a homeless man, they fetched Monschke.
- Monschke joined the assault, striking the man 10 to 15 times with a bat while his friends continued kicking the man's head.
- The victim of Monschke's group assault died in the hospital after 20 days on life support.
Procedural Posture:
- In 1981, a trial court jury convicted Dwayne Earl Bartholomew of aggravated first degree murder and sentenced him to death.
- The Washington Supreme Court subsequently vacated Bartholomew's death sentence.
- On remand, a jury in the trial court sentenced Bartholomew to life in prison without parole (LWOP).
- In 2003, a trial court convicted Kurtis William Monschke of aggravated first degree murder and imposed a mandatory LWOP sentence.
- Many years after their convictions became final, both Bartholomew and Monschke filed personal restraint petitions in the Washington Court of Appeals.
- The Court of Appeals transferred both petitions to the Washington Supreme Court, which consolidated the cases for review.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Does a mandatory sentence of life in prison without the possibility of parole for defendants aged 18 to 20 at the time of their offense violate the prohibition on 'cruel punishment' under Article I, Section 14 of the Washington Constitution?
Opinions:
Majority - Gordon McCloud, J.
Yes, a mandatory sentence of life in prison without parole for defendants aged 18 to 20 violates the Washington Constitution's prohibition on cruel punishment. The court's reasoning extends the constitutional principles of Miller v. Alabama, which prohibited mandatory LWOP for juveniles under 18, to this older class of youthful offenders. The court found that modern neuroscience and social science demonstrate that the cognitive and emotional development associated with youth continues into the early twenties, making the bright-line distinction at age 18 arbitrary for the purpose of imposing the state's harshest mandatory sentence. Because 18- to 20-year-olds may share the same 'mitigating qualities of youth' as those under 18—such as immaturity, impulsivity, and susceptibility to peer pressure—sentencing courts must have the discretion to consider these factors. The ruling does not categorically ban LWOP for this age group but invalidates the mandatory nature of the sentence, requiring an individualized sentencing hearing.
Concurring - González, C.J.
Concurring in the judgment only, this opinion agrees that the petitioners are entitled to new sentencing hearings. However, it disagrees with the majority's reasoning for finding the petitions timely. The concurrence argues that the exception to the one-year time bar for unconstitutional statutes (RCW 10.73.100(2)) should not apply to a sentencing statute. Instead, it would find the petitions timely under a different exception (RCW 10.73.100(6)), which allows for petitions based on a significant, retroactive change in the law, citing State v. O'Dell.
Dissenting - Owens, J.
No, a mandatory LWOP sentence for 18- to 20-year-olds does not violate the state constitution. The legislature’s determination that 18 is the age of majority is a valid policy choice that the court should not override based on a selective interpretation of scientific studies. The majority sidesteps the proper constitutional analysis established in State v. Bassett, which requires evidence of a national consensus against the practice; no such consensus exists for this age group. The dissent argues that the majority misapplies the exception to the time bar for personal restraint petitions and improperly overrules precedent (State v. Grisby) that adults are not entitled to individualized sentencing consideration. This decision risks destabilizing the justice system by inviting a flood of collateral attacks on final sentences.
Analysis:
This decision significantly expands juvenile sentencing protections to young adults in Washington, establishing a new constitutionally significant category of 'youthful offenders' aged 18 to 20. By rejecting a rigid bright-line rule at age 18 for mandatory LWOP sentences, the court has incorporated principles from developmental neuroscience directly into its state constitutional jurisprudence. This holding creates a new precedent in Washington that will require resentencing for numerous individuals convicted of aggravated murder as young adults and may influence other jurisdictions to reconsider the constitutionality of severe mandatory sentences for this age group. The decision marks a shift from a purely chronological definition of adulthood to a more nuanced, developmental one in the context of criminal culpability.
Unlock the full brief for In re Pers. Restraint of Monschke