In Re Paternity of MF
2010 WL 5288698, 938 N.E.2d 1256 (2010)
Rule of Law:
Assisted conception contracts waiving parental rights and support obligations are enforceable in Indiana if they meet certain public policy requirements beyond traditional contract elements, including physician involvement in the artificial insemination process and a sufficiently thorough and formalized written agreement; however, the party seeking to avoid the contract bears the burden of proving that these requirements were not met. Such contracts are strictly construed and do not apply to future children not explicitly covered.
Facts:
- In 1996, J.F. (Mother) was in a committed, long-term relationship with a woman referred to as Life Partner, and they desired to have a child.
- Mother and W.M. (Father), a friend, agreed that Father would provide sperm with which to impregnate Mother.
- After Mother conceived M.F., but a few weeks before M.F. was born, Mother and Father signed a detailed 'Donor Agreement' prepared by Mother's counsel.
- The Donor Agreement stated that Father had donated sperm, a child was thereby conceived, and mutually waived Father's rights to custody/visitation and Mother's rights to child support from Father, also covenanting not to sue to establish legal paternity for the child due around September 19, 1996.
- Seven years later, in 2003, C.F. was born to Mother.
- Mother and Life Partner's relationship ended sometime around 2008, when M.F. and C.F. were approximately twelve and five years old, respectively.
Procedural Posture:
- J.F. (Mother) filed for financial assistance in Fayette County.
- The IV-D Prosecutor of Fayette County filed a Verified Petition for the Establishment of Paternity on Mother's behalf against W.M. (Father).
- W.M. (Father) responded to the petition alleging multiple defenses based on the Donor Agreement.
- DNA testing established that W.M. was the biological father of both children, M.F. and C.F.
- The trial court conducted a hearing focusing primarily on the validity of the Donor Agreement.
- The trial court denied the petition to establish paternity as to both children, holding that the Donor Agreement was valid and enforceable and thus prohibited Mother from seeking to establish paternity in Father.
- J.F. (Mother) appealed the trial court's determination to the Court of Appeals of Indiana.
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Issue:
Does an assisted conception contract that waives a biological father's parental rights and support obligations violate public policy, and if not, who bears the burden of proving its enforceability, and can such an agreement extend to children not explicitly referenced in the contract?
Opinions:
Majority - Friedlander
Yes, an assisted conception contract that waives a biological father's parental rights and support obligations does not necessarily violate public policy if it meets specific requirements, and the party seeking to avoid the contract bears the burden of proving its invalidity; however, such an agreement cannot extend to future children unless explicitly stated. The court acknowledged the strong public policy favoring parental support but held that assisted conception contracts are not per se against public policy, drawing on Straub v. B.M.T. by Todd. Straub suggested enforceability if such contracts comport with uniform acts like the UPA and USCACA, which often require physician involvement. Citing Jhordan v. Mary K., the court clarified that physician involvement, at a minimum, requires the semen to be 'provided' to a licensed physician. Applying traditional contract law, the court ruled that the party seeking to avoid a facially valid contract (Mother) bears the burden of proving its unenforceability (e.g., lack of physician involvement or insemination via intercourse). Since Mother failed to provide evidence regarding the manner of M.F.'s conception or physician involvement, she did not meet her burden, and the contract was upheld for M.F. For the second child, C.F., the court found that the Donor Agreement's language consistently referred to 'the child' or 'the child due to be born on or about September 19, 1996' (M.F.). It concluded that two ambiguous references to 'any child' were insufficient to overcome the clear intent that the contract applied only to M.F., and therefore could not be construed to apply to future children. Thus, the contract did not apply to C.F., and paternity must be established for C.F. The court also emphasized that such contracts must be thorough and formalized, reflecting careful consideration, as exemplified by the detailed, attorney-prepared Donor Agreement in this case. The court further found the issue of attorney fees moot, as no fees were awarded and Father did not fully prevail.
Concurring - Barnes
Justice Barnes concurred with the majority opinion without offering separate reasoning.
Concurring in part and dissenting in part - Crone
Justice Crone concurred with the majority's decision on attorney fees (Issue 2) and the conclusion that the Donor Agreement did not apply to C.F. However, regarding M.F., an assisted conception contract that waives a biological father's parental rights and support obligations should not be upheld unless the father, as the party seeking to avoid a fundamental parental support obligation, affirmatively proves the contract's validity and consistency with public policy, including physician involvement. She argued that the core of the dispute falls squarely within family law, which has a fundamental public policy of parental support, as established in Irvin v. Hood and Straub. Therefore, she believed the burden should be on Father to prove the contract's validity as an exception to this rule, including demonstrating physician involvement in the artificial insemination, citing its importance for health and creating a formal structure. Crone would have remanded the case for a hearing to determine if a physician was involved in M.F.'s conception, consistent with Straub and Jhordan.
Analysis:
This case significantly clarifies the enforceability of assisted conception contracts in Indiana, establishing that while not per se against public policy, they are subject to strict requirements, particularly physician involvement in the insemination process and a high degree of formality in the agreement. By placing the burden of proof on the party challenging a facially valid contract, it reinforces the principle of contractual autonomy while maintaining public policy safeguards for children. The decision also sets a precedent for strict construction of such agreements, limiting their applicability only to children explicitly and unambiguously covered, thereby protecting the fundamental right of children to parental support when a contract's scope is unclear. This ruling provides crucial guidance for future cases involving reproductive technology and contract law.
